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 I 
Abstract 
The development process of safety-critical, software-intensive embedded systems is character-
ized by the need to identify hazards during safety assessment in early stages of development. 
During operation, such hazards may lead to harm to come to humans and external systems in 
the form of death, injury, damage, or destruction, respectively. In order to improve the safety 
of the system during operation, mitigations are conceived for each hazard, and documented 
during requirements engineering by means of hazard-mitigating requirements. These hazard-
mitigating requirements must be adequate in the sense that they must specify the functionality 
required by the stakeholders and must render the system sufficiently safe during operation with 
regard to the identified hazards.  
The adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements is determined during requirements valida-
tion. Yet, the validation of the adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements is burdened by the 
fact that hazards and contextual information about hazards are a work product of safety assess-
ment and hazard-mitigating requirements are a work product of requirements engineering. 
These work products are poorly integrated such that the information needed to determine the 
adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements are not available to stakeholders during validation. 
In consequence, there is the risk that inadequate hazard-mitigating requirements remain covert 
and the system is falsely considered sufficiently safe. 
In this dissertation, an approach was developed, which visualizes hazards, contextual infor-
mation about hazards, hazard-mitigating requirements, as well as their specific dependencies in 
graphical models. The approach hence renders these information accessible to stakeholders dur-
ing validation. In addition, an approach to create these graphical models was developed and 
prototypically implemented. Moreover, the benefits of using these graphical models during val-
idation of hazard-mitigating requirements was investigated and established by means of four 
detailed empirical experiments. 
The dissertation at hand hence provides a contribution towards the integration of the work 
products of safety assessment and requirements engineering with the purpose to support the 
validation of the adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements. 
 
 
 III 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Entwicklungsprozess sicherheitskritischer, software-intensiver eingebetteter Systeme wird 
im Besonderen durch die Notwendigkeit charakterisiert, zu einem frühestmöglichem Zeitpunkt 
im Rahmen des Safety Assessments sogenannte Hazards aufzudecken, welche im Betrieb zu 
Schaden in Form von Tod oder Verletzung von Menschen sowie zu Beschädigung oder Zerstö-
rung externer Systeme führen können. Um die Sicherheit des Systems im Betrieb zu fördern, 
werden für jeden Hazard sogenannte Mitigationen entwickelt, welche durch hazard-mitigie-
rende Anforderungen im Rahmen des Requirements Engineering dokumentiert werden. Ha-
zard-mitigierende Anforderungen müssen in dem Sinne adäquat sein, dass sie zum einen die 
von Stakeholdern gewünschte Systemfunktionalität spezifizieren und zum anderen die Wahr-
scheinlichkeit von Schaden durch Hazards im Betrieb minimieren. 
Die Adäquatheit von hazard-mitigierenden Anforderungen wird im Entwicklungsprozess 
im Rahmen der Anforderungsvalidierung bestimmt. Die Validierung von hazard-mitigierenden 
Anforderungen wird allerdings dadurch erschwert, dass Hazards sowie Kontextinformationen 
über Hazards ein Arbeitsprodukt des Safety Assessments darstellen und die hazard-mitigieren-
den Anforderungen ein Arbeitsprodukt des Requirements Engineering sind. Diese beiden Ar-
beitsprodukte sind in der Regel nicht schlecht integriert, sodass den Stakeholdern bei der Vali-
dierung nicht alle Informationen zur Verfügung stehen, die zur Bestimmung der Adäquatheit 
der hazard-mitigierenden Anforderungen notwendig sind. In Folge könnte es dazu kommen, 
dass Inadäquatheit in hazard-mitigierenden Anforderungen nicht aufgedeckt wird und das Sys-
tem fälschlicherweise als ausreichend sicher betrachtet wird. 
Im Rahmen dieses Dissertationsvorhabens wurde ein Ansatz entwickelt, welcher Hazards, 
Kontextinformationen zu Hazards, hazard-mitigierende Anforderungen sowie die spezifischen 
Abhängigkeiten in einem graphischen Modell visualisiert und somit für die Validierung zu-
gänglich macht. Zudem wird ein automatisierter Ansatz zur Generierung der graphischen Mo-
delle vorgestellt und prototypisch implementiert. Darüber hinaus wird anhand von vier detail-
lierten empirischen Experimenten der Nutzen der graphischen Modelle für die Validierung ha-
zard-mitigierender Anforderungen nachgewiesen.  
Die vorliegende Arbeit leistet somit einen Beitrag zur Integration der Arbeitsergebnisse des 
Safety Assessments und des Requirements Engineerings mit dem Ziel die Validierung der Adä-
quatheit hazard-mitigierender Anforderungen zu unterstützen. 
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1. Motivation and Goal 
This chapter serves as the introduction of this dissertation. Section 1.1 introduces the develop-
ment process of safety-critical systems in early phases by illustrating the interplay between 
early safety assessment activities and requirements engineering. In Section 1.2, challenges re-
garding the validation of the adequacy of requirements intended to mitigate hazards are dis-
cussed. Assumptions for a solution approach are discussed in Section 1.3. The solution idea is 
presented in Section 1.4 followed by an overview of the solution presented in this thesis in 
Section 1.5. The structure of this thesis is outlined in Section 1.6.  
1.1. The Early Development Stages of Safety-Critical Systems 
The development process of safety-critical systems shall make sure that the system to be devel-
oped is sufficiently safe. “Safe” in this sense means that no harm can come to human users or 
external systems (see [Ericson 2005], p. 478). In early safety assessment1, the system’s func-
tional requirements are subjected to hazard analyses (e.g., Functional Hazard Analysis, FHA, 
see [Ericson 2005], p. 271ff). According to [Leveson 2011a], hazards are operational situations 
that – given disadvantageous trigger conditions from the operational context – can cause or 
contribute to harm (cf. [Leveson 2011a], p. 467). During hazard analyses, hazards are identified 
based on the functional requirements that induce them. The functional requirements are defined 
during requirements engineering. They specify the functionality needed to fulfill the system’s 
operational purpose [IREB e.V. 2016]. Some of the functional requirements may be the reason 
of hazards to occur during operation. In the following, we will use the term “hazard-inducing 
requirements” for such functional requirements (cf. [Firesmith 2004], see Section 2.1 for the 
definitions of the terminology used in this work). Based on the identified hazards, safety goals 
are derived and mitigations are conceived to fulfill the safety goals. In requirements engineering 
[IREB e.V. 2016], the term “goal” refers to a top-level desired property or objective of the 
system under development. For safety-critical embedded systems, this means that the safety 
goals derived during hazard analyses must be refined into mitigations that fulfill the safety goals 
[Leveson 2011b]. Mitigations thus comprise specific functionalities, which avoid, reduce, or 
control the occurrence of the hazard’s trigger conditions, once these functionalities have been 
implemented into the system entirely and without error ([Leveson 1995], p. 401). This can be 
                                                 
1 In this dissertation, we use the term “safety assessment” to refer to the activities carried out during development 
of a system, while we use the term “safety engineering” for the academic discipline. 
1 – Motivation and Goal 
4 
achieved by pursuing one of the following strategies (see [Leveson 1995], pp. 154, 177, and 
401, for a detailed discussion): 
 Hazard Prevention. A hazard is mitigated by preventing the hazard’s trigger conditions 
from occurring during operation.  
 Hazard Reduction. A hazard is mitigated by reducing the likelihood of the hazard to oc-
cur, e.g., by reducing the likelihood of the trigger conditions to occur.  
 Accident Prevention. If a hazard cannot be prevented or sufficiently reduced, a mitigation 
can be concerned with preventing an accident due to the hazard.  
 Damage Control. If a hazard can neither be prevented, nor sufficiently reduced, nor can 
damage can be prevented, a mitigation can aim to protect human users from injury or ex-
ternal systems from damage or reduce the severity of injury or damage. This could be 
achieved, for example, by means of additional functionality intended specifically for dam-
age reduction. 
In the simplest case, the hazard-inducing requirement can simply be omitted in order to mitigate 
a hazard. Yet, typically, the requirement documents functionality that is necessary for the sys-
tem’s operational purpose. Therefore, regardless of the chosen mitigation strategy, in order to 
incorporate the mitigation into the system, it is first necessary to amend the functional require-
ments specification of the system under development by means of hazard-mitigating require-
ments [Berry 1998]. Hazard-mitigating requirements are a specific type of functional require-
ments (cf. [Firesmith 2004]) which, assuming correct and complete consideration of the haz-
ard’s trigger conditions, fulfill the safety goals [Wilson et al. 1997; Bishop et al. 2004] in order 
to make harm sufficiently unlikely or sufficiently tolerable (see [Berry 1998; Leveson 1995; 
US NASA 2011]).  
One of the challenges of the development of safety-critical systems according to [Hatcliff 
et al. 2014] is to validate that the hazard-mitigating requirements are adequate to mitigate the 
hazards (see [Bohm 1984; Leveson 1995 (p. 177); Hatcliff et al. 2014]). This means that the 
right hazard-mitigating requirements must be defined to adequately prevent or reduce the haz-
ard, prevent an accident, or control the occurring damage. We use the term “adequate” in the 
sense outlined in [Glinz 2000] in order to distinguish between provable correctness of require-
ments, which is ascertained through formal methods, and the subjective suitability of require-
ments to document stakeholder needs (see [Glinz and Fricker 2015]), which must be validated 
manually. Validating adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements means that stakeholders 
must check whether the hazard-mitigating requirements are suitable to mitigate a hazard. This 
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is typically done using techniques, such as reviews [Flynn and Warhurst 1994; Wiegers 2002] 
or inspection-like techniques [Aurum et al. 2002].  
1.2. Challenges in Hazard-Mitigating Requirements Adequacy Validation 
The challenge in validating the adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements is due to the de-
pendencies between hazard-mitigating requirements the hazards intended to be mitigated. Typ-
ically, these dependencies are not trivial one-to-one relationships, where one hazard-mitigating 
requirement mitigates exactly one hazard. The following multiplicities can exist (see [US DOD 
2010], p. 101): 
1. One-to-One: One hazard-mitigating requirement exists for one hazard. This is the 
simplest case, in which the adequacy of exactly one hazard-mitigating requirement de-
pends on its ability to prevent or reduce exactly one hazard, prevent an accident due to 
the hazard, or control the damage due to a hazards. 
2. One-to-Many: One hazard-mitigating requirements exists for multiple hazards. In 
this case, the adequacy of exactly one hazard-mitigating requirement must be judged with 
regard to all hazards it is intended to mitigate. This means that the hazard-mitigating re-
quirement may adequately mitigate one hazard, but potentially not all other hazards. 
3. Many-to-One: A number of hazard-mitigating requirements exist to mitigate one 
hazard. In this case, a set of hazard-mitigating requirements has been specified. All of 
those hazard-mitigating requirements must adequately mitigate exactly one hazard. 
4. Many-to-Many: A number of hazard-mitigating requirements exist to mitigate mul-
tiple hazards. This case is a combination of case 2 and case 3. The adequacy of a set of 
hazard-mitigating requirements depends on their ability to mitigate every single hazard 
they are intended to mitigate. A set of hazard-mitigating requirements may adequately 
mitigate one hazard, but not another hazard. Furthermore, there might be overlap within 
the set of hazard-mitigating requirements such that an individual hazard-mitigating re-
quirement contributes to mitigating one hazard, but impairs the adequate mitigation of 
another hazard. 
These different types of multiplicities make validating the adequacy of hazard-mitigating re-
quirements difficult. Among others, the stakeholders have to identify the type of multiplicity 
before validation can commence. In addition, hazard-mitigating requirements and hazard anal-
yses results exists in two independent types of documents: hazards, trigger conditions, and 
safety goals are typically documented by means of hazard analysis worksheets (e.g., [Ericson 
2005], p. 276). They are work products of safety assessment. The hazard-inducing requirements 
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as well as the hazard-mitigating requirements are part of the functional requirements specifica-
tion. The functional requirements specification is a work product of the requirements engineer-
ing process. Typically, dependencies between safety assessment artifacts and requirements en-
gineering artifacts are not explicitly documented ([Cleland-Huang 2005; Cleland-Huang et al. 
2012], cf. [Hatcliff et al. 2014]). Figure 1-1 illustrates this situation.  
 
Figure 1-1 Current Situation –Lack of Explicit Dependencies between Independent Artifact Types. 
In Figure 1-1, the functional requirements specification contains all of the system’s require-
ments and the hazard analysis worksheets contain all hazards, the hazards’ trigger conditions, 
and safety goals. The stakeholders must consider the information within the requirements spec-
ification as well as the information within the hazard analysis worksheet (black arrows in Figure 
1-1) and manually differentiate hazard-mitigating requirements from other functional require-
ments. Due to the lack of explicitly documented dependencies between the hazards and their 
mitigation, the stakeholders must manually ascertain which hazard-mitigating requirements are 
intended to mitigate which hazards. Only if stakeholders know which hazard-mitigating re-
quirements pertain to which hazard, the adequacy of the mitigation can be validated. This leads 
to the following challenges for the stakeholders during validation: 
Challenge 1: Stakeholders have no indication how hazards have been mitigated. 
As mentioned above, hazard analysis worksheets contain “recommended actions” in the form 
of hazard negations. If there are no explicitly documented dependencies between the hazard-
mitigating requirements and the hazard, stakeholders have difficulty ascertaining which hazard-
mitigating requirements were defined to mitigate which hazard, and whether these hazard-mit-
igating requirements adequately fulfill the safety goal (see Section 4.1 in [Heimdahl 2007]). 
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Challenge 2: Stakeholders have no indication how trigger conditions are influenced by the 
hazard-mitigating requirements. 
Hazard analysis worksheets typically list causal factors of a hazard (see [Ericson 2005], p. 276). 
However, hazard analysis worksheets typically do not define how the occurrence of the trigger 
conditions during operation can be avoided in order to adequately mitigate the hazard [Leveson 
1991; Hatcliff et al. 2014]. Whether or not alternative conditions to trigger a hazard exist, or 
how these trigger conditions influence one another is also not documented (cf. [Lutz 2000]). 
Hazard-mitigating requirements might adequately mitigate the hazard for one trigger condition. 
Yet, if they also prevent the occurrence of a trigger condition for another hazard remains covert. 
Challenge 3: Stakeholders have no indication which hazard a specific hazard-mitigating 
requirement is related to. 
The requirements specification typically does not differentiate between hazard-mitigating re-
quirements and other functional requirements with no impact on safety. A lack of differentiation 
increases the effort for stakeholders to identify the relevant hazard-mitigating requirements in-
tended to mitigate a specific hazard. Moreover, stakeholders cannot easily distinguish hazard-
mitigating requirements pertaining to the same hazard mitigation from hazard-mitigating re-
quirements intended to mitigate other hazards. In consequence, their ability to validate the haz-
ard-mitigating requirements’ adequacy to mitigate the hazard is impaired.  
1.3. Assumptions 
In order to develop an approach to address the challenges outlined above, we make the follow-
ing assumptions.  
Assumption 1: Focus on software-intensive safety-critical embedded systems. 
The approach will be specific to and evaluated with regard to its application to software-inten-
sive safety-critical embedded systems. For example, a discussion of the differences of hazards 
for mechanical and software-intensive systems is given in [Leveson 1986] and the differences 
between hazards for embedded and cyber-physical systems are discussed in [Tenbergen et al. 
2014]. 
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Assumption 2: Focus on “early” hazards identified based on functional requirements. 
The approach focuses on hazards identified during early phases of development. Hazards iden-
tified during late development phases of safety assessment, e.g., through Failure Mode and Ef-
fect Analysis (FMEA, see [Ericson 2005], p. 235) are typically dealt with on implementation-
level. Such hazards are defined as constraints and formal quality assurance methods are applied 
to check those constraints. 
Assumption 3: Completeness of functional requirements specification and hazard analysis 
results. 
A functional requirements specification is complete and available such that hazard analyses can 
be conducted (see Section 1.2). Hazard analyses must be conducted based on the functional 
requirements in order to determine which of the functional requirements induce hazards, to 
identify the hazards that are induced, to identify the hazard’s trigger conditions, and to elicit 
possible safety goals. Based on these hazard analysis results (see Assumption 5), mitigations 
can be conceived (see Assumption 6). For this work, it is assumed that these activities have 
been carried out completely and yielded complete results. 
Assumption 4: Depiction of functional requirements in UML activity diagrams. 
The same information that is input for hazard analyses are available in a graphical representa-
tion, i.e. UML activities and other activity diagram modeling elements (see [OMG 2015b]). For 
these modeling elements, an underlying ontology exists called the meta-object facility (MOF, 
see [OMG 2015a] for details). These modeling elements can be hence be ontologically inte-
grated with hazard analysis results (see Assumption 5). Specifying functional requirements us-
ing diagrammatical representations in this manner is common industry practice [Cziharz et al. 
2016]. 
Assumption 5: Documentation of hazard analyses in worksheets. 
Hazard analyses have been conducted based on the functional requirements (see Assumption 
3) and the results are documented and available to stakeholders. The hazard analysis worksheets 
suggested in [Ericson 2005] (p. 276) are a table-based format, which can be ontologically re-
lated to the modeling elements representing the functional requirements of the system (see As-
sumption 4).  
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Assumption 6: Completeness of mitigations. 
The engineering effort necessary to conceive at least one mitigation for each hazard has been 
undertaken by the stakeholders. This means that the approach is not concerned with finding a 
mitigation, but instead with documenting the dependencies between the mitigation and the haz-
ard analysis worksheets. 
1.4. Goal and Solution Idea 
Based on the assumptions from Section 1.3, the goal of this dissertation can be formulated as 
follows: 
GOAL OF THIS DISSERTATION 
»Support stakeholders in the validation of hazard-mitigating requirements through an inte-
grated diagrammatic representation which visualizes the dependencies between hazard-miti-
gating requirements, hazards, the hazard’s trigger conditions, and the hazard’s safety goal.« 
This dissertation proposes an integrated diagrammatic representation of hazard-mitigating re-
quirements, hazards, the hazards’ trigger conditions, and the safety goal in order to explicitly 
visualize the dependencies between them. The integrated diagrammatic representation is called 
“Hazard Relation Diagram.” Hazard Relation Diagrams contain the information from hazard 
analysis worksheets as well as the hazard-mitigating requirements defined to mitigate a specific 
hazard. The stakeholders make use of Hazard Relation Diagrams during validation in order to 
ascertain the adequacy of the hazard-mitigating requirements to mitigate hazard. Hazard Rela-
tion Diagrams address the challenges outlined in Section 1.2 in the following way: 
 By making explicit the dependencies between hazard-mitigating requirements and hazard 
analysis results, Hazard Relation Diagrams allow visualizing how hazards have been miti-
gated, i.e. which specific hazard-mitigating requirements pertain to which hazard. This ad-
dresses Challenge 1. 
 Hazard Relation Diagrams visualize mitigations and hazards together with the hazard’s 
trigger conditions, in one diagram, per hazard mitigation. This allows stakeholders to focus 
validation on whether or not the hazard-mitigating requirements sufficiently mitigate the 
hazard. This addresses Challenge 2. 
 Hazard Relation Diagrams preserve the relationship between the functional requirements 
that were part of a diagram before the mitigation was included, the hazard-inducing re-
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quirements which gave rise to some hazard, and the hazard-mitigating requirements in-
tended to mitigate the same hazard. This allows Hazard Relation Diagrams to visually dif-
ferentiate the modeling elements that constitute the hazard-mitigating requirements from 
those modeling elements in the diagram that remained unchanged. This eases validation of 
the adequacy of the mitigation and addresses Challenge 3. 
One Hazard Relation Diagram is created for each hazard mitigation. A Hazard Relation Dia-
gram contains all hazard-mitigating requirements that are part of the mitigation for the same 
hazard. During validation, each Hazard Relation Diagram is reviewed individually, thereby al-
lowing for each hazard mitigation to be validated.  
1.5. Overview of the Approach 
The specific solution approach is discussed in Part II. Figure 1-2 shows an overview over the 
solution approach. 
 
Figure 1-2 Solution Approach – Definition of a Diagrammatic Representation to Visualize Dependencies. 
As can be see, the solution approach consists of the following components and the following 
interplay of the components: 
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1. Modeling Concepts of Hazard Relation Diagrams. The modeling concepts of Hazard 
Relation Diagrams is the central solution component, which introduces the modeling ele-
ments to visualize the dependencies between functional requirements, hazard-inducing 
requirements, hazard-mitigating requirements, hazards, trigger conditions, and safety 
goals. To do so, an ontology is used to derive syntactic well-formedness rules, which are 
based on the semantic relationship defined in the ontology between the modeling concepts 
depicted in the Hazard Relation Diagram. A visual notation for each concept type and 
relationship type of the ontology defines the visual language of Hazard Relation Dia-
grams. This language is used to represent concrete hazard-mitigating requirements, haz-
ards, trigger conditions, and relationships in a Hazard Relation Diagram. This solution 
component is described in Chapter 5. 
2. Creation Approach for Hazard Relation Diagrams. The creation approach is used to 
create Hazard Relation Diagrams. It uses the transformation steps as well as the depend-
encies documented in mitigation templates. Mitigation templates document the depend-
encies between the mitigated hazard from the hazard analysis worksheet, its trigger con-
ditions and safety goal, as well as to the hazard-inducing requirements that induced the 
hazard. The mitigation takes the form of transformation steps to allow for the creation of 
Hazard Relation Diagrams from activity diagrams containing functional requirements. 
The approach executes the transformation steps and observes the well-formedness rules 
defined on the basis of the ontology and makes use of the visual notation to depict mod-
eling elements. This solution component is described in Chapter 5.5. 
3. Tool Support for Hazard Relation Diagrams. The tool makes use of the mitigation 
templates from the creation approach to specify the mitigation for a certain hazard. Using 
a technical UML profile that adheres to the ontology, well-formedness rules and visual 
notation, the tool allows creating Hazard Relation Diagrams manually or automatically. 
This solution component is described in Chapter 7. 
In addition, we conduct an empirical evaluation of Hazard Relation Diagrams. The purpose of 
the evaluation is to investigate the impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams. The results of the em-
pirical evaluation show that using Hazard Relation Diagrams during validation improves stake-
holders’ ability to ascertain how hazards have been mitigated (Challenge 1). The evaluation 
furthermore provides evidence that Hazard Relation Diagrams improves stakeholders’ ability 
to ascertain how hazard-mitigating requirements avoid, control, or reduce the occurrence of the 
hazard’s trigger conditions (Challenge 2). Our results indicate that Hazard Relation Diagrams 
successfully allow stakeholders to differentiate hazard-mitigating requirements from other 
1 – Motivation and Goal 
12 
functional requirements with no impact on safety (Challenge 3). The empirical evaluation is 
described in Part III. 
1.6. Outline 
This dissertation is structured as follows: 
 In Part I “Introduction,” the specific challenges and goal of this dissertation are illus-
trated. Furthermore, this part discusses the fundamentals necessary for the remainder of 
this dissertation consisting of the terminology adopted in the dissertation, and approaches 
this dissertation builds upon. Finally, this part discusses and evaluates the state of the art 
of relevant related state of the art. 
 In Part II “Hazard Relation Diagrams,” the solution to the challenges developed in this 
dissertation is outlined. Ontological foundations and formal underpinnings of the solution 
components are illustrated and the approach developed in this dissertation is presented. 
Furthermore, tool support for the approach is discussed consisting of a UML profile as well 
as a tool-prototype. 
 In Part III “Empirical Evaluation,” the experiments conducted to evaluate the integrated 
diagrammatic representation are presented. The motivation and design of the four experi-
ments is descried, including both, between-subjects and within-subjects designs. The re-
sults of the experiments are discussed in detail in this section as well.  
 In Part IV “Conclusion and Outlook,” we summarize and critically discuss the results of 
this dissertation. Limitations of Hazard Relation Diagrams and their underlying approach 
are discussed. Furthermore, an outlook on future work to continue this research trajectory 
is given. 
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2. Fundamentals 
In this chapter, we introduce a running example and define the adopted terminology. 
2.1. Running Example – The Adaptive Cruise Control System 
In this section, the running example is introduced. This running example is used to illustrate the 
solution approach in Part II as well as the empirical evaluation in Part III. 
The example system under development (SUD) is a simplified adaptive cruise control sys-
tem (ACC) from the automotive domain. An ACC is a driver assistance system of modern au-
tomobiles that maintains both a desired speed set by the driver and a minimal safe distance to a 
vehicle driving ahead. An excerpt of the functional requirements from such a simplified ACC 
are shown in the UML activity diagram in Figure 2-1.  
 
Figure 2-1 Excerpt of the Functional Requirements of the Example ACC. 
As can be seen, the ACC in this example continuously monitors the Driver’s Desired Speed 
and the Own Vehicle’s Current Speed and computes the Adjusted Speed through the function 
“Compute Optimal Velocity”. Doing so allows the ACC to gradually reach the desired speed 
through smooth acceleration and deceleration, rather than using maximum engine power or 
brake force. Concurrently, the function “Measure Distance” continuously monitors some Vehi-
cle Ahead that has been detected, e.g., by means of RADAR or LIDAR sensors, and computes 
the Distance to Vehicle Ahead. Based on the adjusted speed and the distance to the vehicle 
ahead, the function “Compute Closing Rate” determines whether or not the own vehicle is clos-
ing in on the vehicle driving ahead. The term “Closing Rate” hence refers to the rate of approx-
imation of the own vehicle to the vehicle driving ahead. If it is determined that the own vehicle 
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underruns the minimal safe distance, the ACC computes the Required Brake Force to maintain 
the minimal distance. Else, the Required Engine Torque is computed to achieve the Adjusted 
Speed. More details on ACCs can be found in [Reif 2010; Mao and Chen 2012; Caramihai and 
Dumitrache 2013]. 
Given that ACCs are driver assistance system from the automotive domain, their develop-
ment is governed by safety standards, particularly [ISO26262 2011]. This means that during 
early phases of safety assessment, these functional requirements are subjected to systematic 
hazard analyses. It is to note, that depending on the industry, different types of hazard analyses 
may be common. For example, while the avionics industry mandatorily conducts Functional 
Hazard Analysis (FHA, see [ARP4761 1996]) for the purpose of certification, the automotive 
industry typically conducts Hazard and Risk Assessment Analysis (H+R, see [ISO26262 
2011]). As outlined in [Ericson 2005], early-stage hazard analyses overlap with respect to the 
identification of potential hazards, their harmful effects, possible trigger conditions under which 
the hazards are induced, and possible safety goals in response to the hazard (see Section 2.1 for 
definitions of these terms). In this example, the results of hazard analyses have been docu-
mented using the hazard analysis worksheet suggested in [Ericson 2005] (p. 276). The hazard 
analysis worksheet has been truncated by removing risk index fields, as these are beyond the 
scope of this research. In Table 2-1, an excerpt of a hazard analysis for the functional require-
ment “Compute Brake Force” from Figure 2-1 is shown.  
Table 2-1 Functional Hazard Analysis of the Function “Compute Brake Force” from Figure 2-1. 
System Adaptive Cruise Control Functional Hazard Analysis 
Hazard-Inducing 
Requirement 
Hazard 
Effect Trigger Condition 
Safety Goal 
ID Description ID Description 
Compute Brake 
Force 
H1 
Yaw Momentum 
Causes Oversteering 
Loss of Control, caus-
ing Crash 
Driving through Curve 
and (High Vehicle Veloc-
ity or Low Road Surface 
Friction) 
SG1 
Prevent Loss of Control in 
Curves 
H2 
Understeering due to 
Skidding 
Driving through curve or 
Low Road Surface Fric-
tion 
SG2 
Use Anti-Lock Brakes to 
Prevent Wheel Skid 
SG3 
Adjust Brake Force In-de-
pendently for All Four 
Wheels H3 
Brake Force Too Low 
due to Skidding 
Rear-End Collision 
with Vehicle Driving 
Ahead 
Low Road Surface Fric-
tion 
 
As can be seen from Table 2-1, “Compute Brake Force” induced three hazards. It is hence not 
only a functional requirement, but also a hazard-inducing requirement (see Section 1.1). One 
hazard that could occur during operation is that a rapid deceleration command is issued by the 
ACC whilst the car is driving through a curve, which may cause the driver to lose control over 
the vehicle and crash (hazard H1 in Table 2-1). There are two possible mitigations for hazard 
H1 to fulfill the safety goal “Prevent Loss of Control in Curves” (SG1 in Table 2-1): 
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Mitigation 1: Query Yaw Rate and Delimit Maximum Brake Force. 
Safety goal SG1 in Table 2-1 could be satisfied by querying a yaw rate sensor in order to deter-
mine whether or not the vehicle is currently driving through a curve, and hence limit the maxi-
mum brake force. Naïvely, this may be an adequate way to mitigate the hazard. However, doing 
so might cause the vehicle to not brake sufficiently, thereby underrunning the minimal safe 
distance, or possibly even rear-ending the vehicle driving ahead.  
Mitigation 2: Query Yaw Momentum and Brake Individual Wheels. 
More experienced automotive engineers might instead choose to query the current yaw momen-
tum (i.e. the lateral force exerted onto the car during yaw) from the electronic stability program 
(ESP) in addition to querying the yaw rate sensor. In addition, this mitigation computes the 
necessary brake force for each wheel and submit the result to the ESP, thereby maximizing 
brake efficiency and maintaining a controlled yaw, while at the same time, keeping a safe dis-
tance to the vehicle driving ahead. 
2.2. Terminology 
Anecdotal evidence [Heimdahl 2007] suggests that different interpretations between practition-
ers and scholars in the disciplines of safety engineering and software engineering may be the 
culprit. To lay a common foundation for the following sections, this section defines the basic 
concepts, terms, and relationships that are relevant for this dissertation.  
The term ”hazard” is used differently across industrial safety standards (e.g., [ARP4761 
1996; ISO26262 2011]) and scholars in the field of safety engineering. For example, while both 
[ARP4761 1996] as well as [ISO26262 2011] use the term hazard to denote some unsafe effect 
of the system onto its operational context, [ARP4761 1996] adopts a somewhat broader defini-
tion. In [ISO26262 2011], a hazard merely arises from random hardware failures (i.e. endoge-
nous hazards according to [Leveson 1995]), whereas in [ARP4761 1996], a hazard may also be 
triggered by external events such as faulty user input (i.e. exogenous hazards according to 
[Leveson 1995]). Consequently, the conditions triggering a hazard are considered failure con-
ditions in [ISO26262 2011] and hazardous events in [ARP4761 1996]. Moreover, hazards can 
be differentiated by means of other characteristics (see [Tenbergen et al. 2014] for a detailed 
overview and a taxonomy). For example, hazards can arise due to defects or failures in design 
or implementation or due to the basic functionality of the system (see [Berry 1998]). While the 
former are design-specific hazards, the latter are design-agnostic (cf. [Pumfrey 1999]). Such 
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design-agnostic hazards are identified based functional requirements during early stages of de-
velopment as described in Section 1.1. This is done by guiding hazard analyses through the use 
of key words indicating erroneous behavior (e.g., “fails to operate,” “operates inadvertently,” 
“produces wrong output,” see [Ericson 2005], p. 372f). In Assumption 2 (see Section 1.3), this 
approach was limited to the latter kind, i.e. design-agnostic “early” hazards. We therefore adopt 
the following generic definition of the term “hazard,” based on [Leveson 2011a] (p. 467) and 
[Stoneburner 2006]: 
Definition 1: Hazard. 
A hazard is an operational situation that – given disadvantageous triggering con-
ditions in the operational context of the system – could lead or contribute to harm 
to come to humans or systems. 
In this sense, a hazard does by itself not cause harm during operation, but creates the potential 
for harm, if no mitigation is in place. As outlined in Section 1.1, hazards are triggered by dis-
advantageous trigger conditions. We define the term trigger condition as follows in accordance 
with [Leveson 2011a] (p. 184):  
Definition 2: Trigger Condition.  
A trigger condition is an operational or environmental condition, which may occur 
during operation such that a hazard is caused.  
This means that a trigger condition, possibly together with other trigger conditions can cause 
one or more hazards during operation and hence render the system potentially unsafe. Trigger 
conditions must hence be avoided or rendered sufficiently unlikely to occur during operation in 
order for the hazard to be mitigated. Safety goals are conceived in response to the hazard and 
its trigger conditions. For the term “safety goal,” we adopt the following definition based on 
[Leveson 2011b]: 
Definition 3: Safety Goal. 
A safety goal is a statement about the system’s safety or about a specific safety 
property that the system possesses or shall possess. 
Many authors point out that safety goal are often simple objectives, which must be fulfilled by 
the system’s specification (see also, e.g., [Wilson et al. 1997; Bishop et al. 2004; Kelly and 
Weaver 2004; US FAA 2009a; US FAA 2009b]). In the most trivial cases, safety goals simply 
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state the negation of an identified hazard (see, e.g., [Johnson and Holloway 2006; Kelly 2007; 
US FAA 2009b; ISO26262 2011]), but just like in goal-oriented requirements engineering, 
these goals have to be refined into concrete functional safety requirements to mitigate a hazard.  
The term “functional safety requirement” entails two distinct, but related meanings. On the 
one hand, safety engineering literature understands requirements to be safety-critical when they 
give rise to a hazard (see, e.g., [Knight 2002; Johnson and Holloway 2006]). On the other hand, 
especially requirements engineering literature often considers safety requirements a type of 
quality requirement (e.g., [Kotonya and Sommerville 1998]), which is in place to achieve a 
certain level of safety. However, safety can only be achieved when concrete functional safety 
requirements in the sense of [Firesmith 2004] are in place, i.e. concrete conditions and capabil-
ities that, when implemented entirely and without error, mitigate the hazard. To honor this dual 
role of requirements (see also [Berry 1998]) with regard to safety and to emphasize the func-
tional nature of requirements documenting hazard mitigations, we hence adopt the following 
definitions inspired by [Firesmith 2004]: 
Definition 4: Hazard-Inducing Requirement. 
A hazard-inducing requirement is a functional safety requirement in the sense of 
[Firesmith 2004], which is origin of a hazard during operation, given the occur-
rence of trigger conditions from the operational context of the system. 
 
Definition 5: Hazard-Mitigating Requirement 
A hazard-mitigating requirement is a functional safety requirement in the sense of 
[Firesmith 2004], which mitigates a hazard (possibly together with other hazard-
mitigating requirements). 
Hazard-mitigating requirements may themselves cause hazards. Therefore, safety assessment 
must entail iterative hazard identification and hazard mitigation (see, e.g., [ARP4761 1996; 
Pumfrey 1999; ISO26262 2011]), i.e. hazard-mitigating requirements themselves must be sub-
jected to hazard analyses and it might be necessary to conceive hazard-mitigating requirements 
for hazards that arise due to a mitigation of another hazard.  
Definition 5 suggests that minimally, the mitigation of a hazard consists of one hazard-
mitigating requirement. In practice, this is rarely the case and typically, multiple hazard-miti-
gating requirements must be defined in order to adequately mitigate a hazard. In this sense, 
completeness of hazard-mitigating requirements may impair adequacy: if one or more hazard-
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mitigating requirements are missing, the mitigation is likely to be inadequate. Assessing the 
adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements is part of the validation process. 
In the safety engineering literature, the term “mitigation” is used rather abstractly. For the 
technical aspects of Hazard Relation Diagrams (see Sections 5.4 and 5.5), a differentiation of 
this term is necessary. This is because in model-based specifications, diagrams are structured 
according to, e.g., organizational needs [Conway 1967], use cases, or the appropriate level of 
detail needed for the specific development situation [Finkelstein et al. 1992]. Requirements 
diagrams are hence rarely organized according the hazards identified during hazard analyses. 
In consequence, it is necessary to differentiate the hazard-mitigating requirements that pertain 
to some mitigation from other model elements. We therefore define the following two terms: 
Definition 6: Partial Mitigation.  
A partial mitigation consists of a set of hazard-mitigating requirements that are 
intended to mitigate a specific hazard. 
 
Definition 7: Conceptual Mitigation 
A conceptual mitigation consists of at least one partial mitigation, which refines a 
hazard’s safety goal into concrete implementable measures to avoid the hazard or 
reduce its harmful effects. 
The term “conceptual mitigation” hence refers to the chosen strategy of how to mitigate a 
hazard, while the term “partial mitigation” refers to the concrete hazard-mitigating require-
ments defined to implement the strategy. The concept “conceptual mitigation” therefore serves 
as a bridge between the abstract mitigation strategy (see Section 1.1 as well as [Leveson 1995]) 
and its technical realization (see Section 6.3). If two or more conceptual mitigations for the 
same hazard exist, these can be thought of as alternative strategies to mitigate the same hazard. 
In the following Section 5.4, the distinction between conceptual mitigations and partial mitiga-
tions is discussed in more detail. 
The relationship between these the terms and concepts is visualized in Figure 2-2 by means 
of the running example from Section 2.1. As can be seen, the functional requirements of the 
ACC from Figure 2-1 were subjected to hazard analyses. One hazard that could be triggered 
when driving through a curve at high velocity is that the yaw momentum might exceed a critical 
level, thereby causing oversteering such that the driver to loses control. This might potentially 
result in a crash (see hazard H1 in Table 2-1). In this case, “Compute Brake Force” from Figure 
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2-1 is a hazard-inducing requirement for the hazard “Yaw Momentum Causes Oversteering.” 
A possible conceptual mitigation for this would be to add requirements to achieve the safety 
goal “Prevent Loss of Control in Curves” (SG1 in Table 2-1). Following the strategy indicated 
in the conceptual mitigation, one partial mitigation was added, containing hazard-mitigating 
requirements to determine the current yaw rate (“The ACC shall query the yaw sensor to deter-
mine the current yaw rate”) and limiting the brake force (“If the yaw rate exceeds 5°/sec, the 
maximum brake force shall be reduced by 15% per 5°/s of yaw”). 
 
Figure 2-2 Relationship between Defined Concepts. 
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3. State of the Art 
In the following subsections, the relevant state of the art is reviewed and evaluated. Subject of 
this evaluation are approaches, which contribute to addressing the challenges discussed in Sec-
tion 1.2. For this purpose, an evaluation framework is derived and discussed in Section 3.1. The 
following Sections 3.2 through 3.6 present and evaluate the related approaches before Section 
3.7 summarizes the findings of the evaluation.  
3.1. Evaluation Framework for the State of the Art  
The evaluation framework for the state of the art is composed of two components: a set of 
categories of related approaches and a set of evaluation criteria for the related approaches in 
the respective categories.  
 Categories of Related Work 
Existing work in the state of the art is considered related, if the work potentially contributes to 
a solution of the challenges discussed in Section 1.2. We differentiate between the following 
categories: 
1. Elicitation of safety requirements. This category comprises constructive approaches in-
tended to obtain safety-related requirements after hazard analyses have been conducted. 
Such approaches typically aim at providing “constructively correct” requirements that 
make up the conceptual mitigation2 for a hazard (see Assumption 4 in Section 1.3). If 
constructively correct conceptual mitigations consisting of hazard-mitigating require-
ments in the sense of Definition 5 can be obtained using these approaches and their de-
pendency to a hazard (in the sense of Definition 1) and the hazard’s trigger conditions (in 
the sense of Definition 2), is explicit, the challenges from Section 1.2 can be addressed. 
This state of the art is described in Section 3.2. 
2. Requirements quality assurance. This category comprises analytical approaches in-
tended to assess the quality of safety-related requirements. Such approaches are poten-
tially capable of identifying inadequacy in hazard-mitigating requirements (in the sense 
of Definition 5) with regard to their ability to mitigate a hazard (in the sense of Definition 
                                                 
2 Since in the related work, the distinction between the hazard’s conceptual mitigation and the partial mitigation 
subsuming the hazard-mitigating requirements is not common, we will use the terminology proposed by the 
respective authors throughout Chapter 3 and relate these terms to the terminology outlined in Section 2.2 as well 
as the challenges from Section 1.2. 
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1). Such approached therefore potentially contribute to addressing the challenges from 
Section 1.2 and are reviewed in Section 3.3. 
3. Traceability of requirements. This category comprises approaches concerned with es-
tablishing trace dependencies safety-related requirements or other requirements to other 
development artifacts. Such approaches can possibly be adapted to establishing depend-
encies between hazard-mitigating requirements (in the sense of Definition 5) and hazard 
analysis worksheets for the purpose of assisting validation. These approaches hence po-
tentially contribute to addressing the challenges outlined in Section 1.2 and are reviewed 
in Section 3.4. 
4. Safety argumentation. This category comprises approaches focused on demonstrating 
that the system under development is certifiably safe. Safety arguments are typically con-
cerned with establishing inferences between evidence for the system’s safety and some 
top-level safety claim. Such inferences can be understood as dependencies between a 
safety goal (in the sense of Definition 3) and a conceptual mitigation (in the sense of 
Definition 7). Hence, safety argumentation may harbor potential solutions for the chal-
lenges outlined in Section 1.2. These approaches are reviewed in Section 3.5. 
5. Model-based safety assessment. In contrast to approaches pertaining to traceability of 
safety requirements (see Section 3.4), approaches in this category do not focus on estab-
lishing dependencies, but visualizing them. Since the goal of this dissertation is concerned 
with visualization of the dependencies between hazard-mitigating requirements and haz-
ard analysis worksheets (see Section 1.4), this category harbors potentially applicable ap-
proaches. These approaches are reviewed in Section 3.6. 
 Evaluation Criteria for Related Approaches 
To evaluate related work we define a set of evaluation criteria based on the challenges outlined 
in Section 1.2. The approaches are evaluated with regard to their contribution to solve a chal-
lenge, their ability to solve a challenge in part, or their unsuitability to solve a challenge. The 
following Table 3-1 summarizes the challenges from Section 1.2, lists the three contribution 
levels solved completely (), partially solved (), and unsolved (), and summarizes the nec-
essary criteria for a related approach to meet a certain level. 
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Table 3-1 Evaluative Criteria for the Related Approaches in the State of the Art. 
Challenge 
Solved Completely Partially Solved Unsolved 
   
Challenge 1:  
Indication, how hazards were 
mitigated. 
The approach entails the creation of ex-
plicit dependencies from each identified 
hazard to the specific set of hazard-miti-
gating requirements intended to mitigate 
it. 
The approach entails the systematic 
consideration of hazards or hazard-
mitigating requirements, but does 
not establish explicit dependencies 
between the two. 
The approach is not con-
cerned with hazards in the 
sense of Definition 1 nor 
with the dependencies be-
tween hazards and hazard-
mitigating requirements. 
Challenge 2:  
Indication, how trigger condi-
tions influence a hazard’s oc-
currence. 
The approach entails the creation of ex-
plicit dependencies from each hazards’ 
trigger conditions to hazard-mitigating re-
quirements. 
The approach entails the systematic 
consideration of trigger conditions, 
but does not establish explicit de-
pendencies between hazards’ trig-
ger conditions and hazard-mitigat-
ing requirements.  
The approach is not con-
cerned with the dependencies 
between hazards’ trigger 
conditions in the sense of 
Definition 2 and hazard-miti-
gating requirements. 
Challenge 3:  
Differentiate hazard-mitigat-
ing requirements from re-
mainder of the functional re-
quirements specification. 
The approach differentiates hazard-miti-
gating requirements in the sense of Defi-
nition 5 pertaining to one hazards from 
hazard-mitigating requirements pertaining 
to other hazards or from other functional 
requirements with no impact on safety. 
The approach is concerned with, 
e.g., “safety requirements” but 
does not distinguish hazard-miti-
gating requirements in the sense of 
Definition 5 from other require-
ments with no impact on safety. 
The approach is not con-
cerned with hazard-mitigat-
ing requirements in the sense 
of Definition 5, nor with 
safety requirements, nor with 
their differentiation. 
3.2. Safety Requirements Elicitation 
Requirements elicitation approaches are considered relevant in the context of this dissertation 
(see Section 1.4) as long as they are informed by hazard analyses in order to elicit hazard-
mitigating requirements with regard to the identified hazards. These approaches can be distin-
guished into goal- or scenario-based approaches and formal safety requirements elicitation ap-
proaches.  
 Goal- and Scenario-Based Elicitation of Hazard-Mitigating Requirements 
Goal-based requirements elicitation approaches are typically concerned with deriving concrete, 
implementable functional requirements from higher-level abstract goal descriptions.  
The KAOS Approach 
The KAOS approach was initially proposed in [Darimont and van Lamsweerde 1996]. A de-
tailed elaboration can be found in [van Lamsweerde 2009a]. In the KAOS approach, goals and 
dependencies between goals are graphically depicted. The central concern of the KAOS ap-
proach to refine each goal [Letier and van Lamsweerde 2002]. These refinements are much akin 
to functional requirements and follow formal patterns. In [van Lamsweerde and Letier 1998], 
it is suggested to apply the concept of goal refinements onto what the authors call “obstruc-
tions.” Obstructions can be considered anti-goals, i.e. goals which must be avoided. Among 
other things, obstructions can arise due to impaired safety concerns, i.e. hazards in the sense of 
Definition 1. Refinements of such “hazard obstructions” [van Lamsweerde and Letier 1998] are 
called “resolutions” and are similar to hazard-mitigating requirements according to Definition 
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5. Following the refinement graph from a hazard obstruction to its resolution in this sense gives 
an indication how a hazard was mitigated, hence solving Challenge 1, but the resolutions of the 
hazard obstructions in the remainder are treated the same way as refinements of any other goal. 
Hazard-mitigating requirements can hence be only distinguished from other requirements with 
no impact on safety if an appropriate trace concept is in place which allows to associate hazard-
mitigating requirements with the hazard obstructions. In consequence, the KAOS approach par-
tially addresses Challenge 3. Furthermore, KAOS supports the formal specification of the sys-
tem’s behavioral goals using temporal logic [Letier and van Lamsweerde 2004; van 
Lamsweerde 2009b], however, is unconcerned with the influence of the resolutions of hazard 
obstruction on the occurrence of a hazard obstruction. In KAOS, Challenge 2 is therefore only 
partially addressed.  
The i* Approach and Derivatives 
Another prominent approach is i* [Yu 1997]. The i* approach is a software engineering meth-
odology originally intended to refine requirements during early stages of development into con-
crete architectural components called “agents.” In i*, dependencies between business goals and 
goal-fulfilling system components or external actors can be visualized in strategic dependency 
models and strategic rationale models and can then be formally analyzed and refined. The i* 
approach is extended by the Tropos approach (e.g. [Bresciani et al. 2001]) with the specific aim 
to associate business goals with risks and security impairments. Furthermore, the Tropos “goal-
risk-framework” [Asnar and Giorgini 2006] is concerned with risks at the organizational level 
and is not concerned with risks to safety (i.e., hazards) while the Secure Tropos extension 
[Mouratidis et al. 2003] introduces concepts to model trust and resources for the purpose of 
modeling possible security vulnerabilities and their resolution. Albeit safety engineering is con-
cerned with mitigating hazards to parties external to the system, while security engineering is 
concerned with protecting the system from external threats, the mitigation of hazards and secu-
rity vulnerabilities often involves similar strategies (see [Raspotnig and Opdahl 2013] for a 
comprehensive overview on the application of security engineering techniques on system 
safety). Therefore, through formal refinement of security goals, Secure Tropos partially ad-
dresses Challenge 1 from Section 1.2. However, since Secure Tropos in not concerned with 
trigger conditions in the sense of Definition 2 nor with differentiating hazard-mitigating re-
quirements in the sense of Definition 5 from functional requirements with no impact on safety, 
Challenges 2 and 3 remain unaddressed. 
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The Approach by Menon and Kelly 
Very similar to goal-oriented approaches is the approach presented by Menon and Kelly 
[Menon and Kelly 2010]. The authors propose separating safety arguments into modules such 
that each module addresses logical, contractual, or organizational concerns with particular re-
gard of the interplay between system modules and software modules. Doing so allows separat-
ing the problem space into orthogonal aspects, which aids in eliciting a set of top-level safety 
goals pertaining to each aspect. This allows differentiating hazard-mitigating requirements per-
taining to specific hazards to some degree (Challenge 1), yet does not consider the impact of 
the safety goal refinements with regard to the hazards’ trigger conditions (Challenge 2). Con-
ceivably, the idea of separating the system into safety-related “modules” supports differentiat-
ing those modules with impact on safety from those without. Yet, this is not explicitly suggested 
in [Menon and Kelly 2010], hence only partially addressing Challenge 3. 
The Approach by Kotonya and Sommerville 
Separation of the problem space is also done in the viewpoint-oriented approach in [Kotonya 
and Sommerville 1997]. In this approach, the authors aim at identifying safety-relevant aspects 
within the system’s operational environment in order to guide hazard and risk assessment und 
subsequent systematic elicitation of safety constraints. Safety constraints are derived from ab-
stract safety concerns and subsequently subjected to formal verification (albeit the authors use 
the term “validation”). While the combined safety analyses/requirements engineering process 
model is well illustrated in [Kotonya and Sommerville 1997], safety validation in this approach 
is mainly concerned with formally checking the requirements specification against constraint 
violations (see Section 3.3.2). Conceivably, such constraint violations could be considered trig-
ger conditions for the hazards, hence addressing Challenge 2. However, the approach is not 
concerned with hazards in the sense of Definition 1 nor with hazard-mitigating requirements in 
the sense of Definition 5. Therefore, Challenge 1 and 3 are not addressed. 
The Approach by Allenby and Kelly 
Other approaches aim at eliciting safety requirements from scenarios and/or use cases. For ex-
ample, in [Allenby and Kelly 2001], the authors propose an [ARP4761 1996]-compliant model-
based approach to identify possible deviations from intended system behavior by making use 
of user scenarios and use cases. Possible hazards arising from the deviations can be identified 
and possible mitigations can be suggested by developing safety requirements from these use 
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cases. This allows specifying hazard-mitigating requirements specifically for hazards and ad-
dresses Challenge 1. Conceivably, deviations can be caused by the hazards’ trigger conditions. 
However, details about the exact nature of the origin of such deviations are not addressed in 
[Allenby and Kelly 2001]. The approach is therefore categorized are partly fulfilling Challenge 
2. Moreover, the approach is unconcerned with differentiating resulting requirements from the 
remainder of functional requirements. Doing so requires extensive additions of the approach, 
e.g., through the use of a qualified trace concept (see, e.g., Section 3.4). The approach by itself 
hence does not address Challenge 3.  
The Approach by Dittel and Aryus 
In [Dittel and Aryus 2010], an approach for the construction of [ISO26262 2011]-compliant 
safety cases is presented. The approach takes vehicle functions and use cases (which can be 
regarded as a logical consolidation of related scenarios) and performs a series of analysis steps 
in order to elicit safety requirements and construct an ISO26262 safety concept. The approach 
aids in creating a V&V plan, which allows assessing whether the safety goal has been met. 
Since some safety goals can be seen as negation of hazards [Bishop et al. 2004], the approach 
hence partly solves Challenge 1. However, the approach is does not take into account the haz-
ard’s trigger conditions in the sense of Definition 2 and makes no mention of the creation of 
specific hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense of Definition 5. The approach hence does 
not consider Challenges 2 nor 3. 
Misuse Cases 
Another approach intended to derive hazard-mitigating requirements are misuse cases [Sindre 
and Opdahl 2001]. Misuse cases allow specifying the system’s behavior by means of a collec-
tion of user-perceivable interactions with the system, i.e. use cases. The idea of such an inter-
action is extended to interactions that are hostile, e.g., originating from a malicious user, or to 
interactions that allow using the system in unforeseen ways. Such hostile or unintended inter-
actions are considered misuse cases, for which appropriate system responses and system con-
straints must be found to maintain security. In [Sindre 2007], misuse cases are applied in a case 
study to safety-critical systems with the aim to identify hazards and find hazard resolutions. 
Albeit the results of the case study show that in principle, misuse cases are applicable and have 
advantages for safety assessment, particularly for hazard identification and tracing of hazard-
mitigating requirements, misuse cases should be seen as a supplemental technique. Challenges 
1 and 3 are hence addressed in part because tailoring of misuse cases is necessary in order to 
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fully address these challenges. Since misuse cases are unconcerned with the conditions from 
the operational context that trigger hazards to occur during operation in the sense of Definition 
2, Challenge 2 as outlined above is not addressed.  
 Formal Elicitation of Hazard-Mitigating Requirements  
There is a plethora of approaches concerned with eliciting hazard-mitigating requirements 
through formal analyses. These approaches have in common that the term “requirements” in 
these approaches typically refers to safety-critical invariants or constraints and often consider 
information provided by safety analyses. 
The Approach by Chen and Motet 
An example of a formal elicitation approach is the approach by Chen and Motet [Chen and 
Motet 2009a; Chen and Motet 2009b; Chen and Motet 2009c]. In this approach, safety require-
ments are considered constraining control structures for the behavior specified by the functional 
requirements. For this purpose functional requirements are formalized using interface automata. 
Formal safety constraints are elicited using control automata for each hazardous control struc-
ture. While the formal dependencies between control structures and safety constraints allow for 
a differentiation of safety constraints from non-safety-critical constraints (Challenge 3), neither 
hazards in the sense of Definition 1 nor trigger conditions in the sense of Definition 2 are con-
sidered (Challenges 1 and 2). 
The Approach by Zafar and Dromey 
In [Zafar and Dromey 2005], a formal approach is suggested, which elicits behavior constraints 
by making use of behavior trees. Behavior trees allow analyzing the formal behavior specifica-
tion with regard to conflicts or defects in behavioral constraints. Under the assumption that 
conflict or defect might result in a hazard during operation, the behavior constraints can be 
revised in order to address this hazard. The approach hence partially addresses Challenge 1. 
However, there is no specific consideration of the hazards trigger conditions in the sense of 
Definition 2 and elicited safety constraints are not differentiated from non-safety-relevant con-
straints (Challenge 3).  
Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis 
Leveson’s Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) approach [Leveson 2004] is an inte-
grated approach that considers causes for hazards and accidents based on the operational pur-
pose and emergent properties of the system. The STPA approach provides process guidance for 
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the identification of hazards as well as for the functions mitigating the hazard. For each hazard 
controlling functions, invariants can be identified and documented, thereby addressing Chal-
lenge 1. Furthermore, STPA fosters adequacy validation of such mitigations by investigating 
how such a hazard can occur (i.e. what are the trigger conditions in the sense of Definition 2), 
and how a hazard controlling function will impact the respective hazard. STPA therefore also 
addresses Challenge 2. Yet, since the key focus of STPA are hazards and their mitigation, the 
approach makes no mention how to proceed with the identified hazard-mitigating requirements. 
Hence, whether or not hazard-mitigating requirements are explicitly differentiated from other 
functional requirements without impact on safety in the sense of Challenge 3 is not discussed. 
Challenge 3 therefore is not explicitly considered in the STPA approach.  
The Approach by Hansen et al. 
Hansen et al. propose a formal elicitation approach based on Fault Tree Analyses (FTA) in 
[Hansen et al. 1998]. Fault Tree Analysis attempts to find possible sources of failures and doc-
ument them in a tree structure using conjunctions and disjunctions. The approach by Hansen et 
al. translates these fault trees into timing constraints, which must be honored by the subse-
quently implemented software components. Any potential timing deviation is considered haz-
ardous and must be mitigated. In this sense, the approach considers special types of hazards, 
specifically those that occur due to violated real-time constraints. In consequence, the approach 
neither considers hazards in the sense of Definition 1 nor trigger conditions in the sense of 
Definition 2 and hence neither addresses Challenge 1 nor 2 in the sense outlined above. Since 
safety-critical timing constraints are derived for specific system components, these timing con-
straints are explicitly distinguishable from non-safety related timing constraints. Yet, these are 
not hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense of Definition 5. Therefore, Challenge 3 is ad-
dressed in part by this approach.  
The Approach by Troubitsyna 
An approach that combines FMEA with FTA in order to elicit hazard-mitigating requirements 
is presented in [Troubitsyna 2008]. In this approach, FTA is conducted to find critical software 
components and possible failures therein. Then, statecharts are used to facilitate control struc-
tures for the identified hazardous components. Afterwards, FMEA is applied in order to find 
appropriate tolerance requirements with regard to the formal system behavior documented in 
the statecharts. Albeit the FTA-guided identification and subsequent systematic derivation of 
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hazard-mitigating requirements allow for finding candidate mitigations for each hazard (Chal-
lenge 1), the approach does not consider the conditions triggering a hazard (Challenge 2) in the 
sense outlined above. Furthermore, the statecharts used in this approach depict control struc-
tures for all hazards and hence do not allow differentiating between mitigations nor between 
hazard-mitigating requirements and functional requirements (Challenge 3).  
The Approach by Belli et al. 
In [Belli et al. 2007], an event-based approach is suggested which combines qualitative risk 
analyses and FTA in order to mitigate hazards that emanate from the system. This is done by 
first modeling user inputs and system outputs and analyzing the event chain from input to out-
put. Unsafe interactions can thereby be mitigated. Hence, this approach is concerned with find-
ing candidate mitigations for unsafe interactions with the user that are built into the system 
rather than eliciting safety requirements with regard to system hazards. Yet, these candidate 
mitigations have the character of “counter-examples,” where some assumed to be safety-critical 
condition is achieved in the system and hence resolves some hazardous interaction. Hence, the 
approach addresses Challenge 3. However, the approach is unconcerned with hazards in the 
sense of Definition 1 nor with trigger conditions in the sense Definition 2, and therefore does 
not address Challenge 1 or 2. 
3.3. Requirements Quality Assurance 
Approaches pertaining to requirements quality are considered relevant to the fulfillment of the 
goal of this dissertation (see Section 1.4) as long as they make use of information provided by 
hazard analyses against which the adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements is evaluated. 
There are two types of such approaches: Tailored approaches to improve generic requirements 
validation techniques, and formal requirements quality approaches.  
 Approaches to Support Requirements Validation 
In a state of practice report from 1994 [Flynn and Warhurst 1994], Flynn and Warhurst have 
indicated that unstructured reviews are the predominant technique to conduct validation. The 
authors pointed out that effectiveness and review coverage is considerably impaired by the size 
of the specification as well as missing traces between requirements. Furthermore, lack of avail-
able reference information and inherent subjectivity is seen as detrimental to review objectivity 
by practitioners. Although more recent investigations into the state of practice are desirable, it 
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becomes obvious that these issues prevail to this day: For example, more recent empirical find-
ings were reported by Shull et al. [Shull et al. 2002] and Boehm and Basili [Boehm and Basili 
2001], who also indicate that peer reviews are about 60% effective in identifying defects in 
engineering artifacts. A number of improvements to reviews [Wiegers 2002] and review-like 
techniques such as Fagan inspections [Fagan 1976; Fagan 1986] have been proposed to alleviate 
these issues (see [Porter et al. 1995] for an in-depth comparison). These techniques are appli-
cable to the challenges outlined in Section 1.2, however require safety-specific tailoring as out-
lined in the following.  
Perspective-based Reading 
Perspective-based reading is a technique to improve upon requirements reviews and inspections 
[Shull et al. 2000]. The key component in perspective-based reading is to read the requirements 
specification from the perspective of different roles involved in the development process. For 
example, the hazard-mitigating requirements could be read from the perspective of the safety 
engineer, who has conducted the hazard analyses. Applying perspective-based reading has 
shown to improve effectiveness during reviews [Basili et al. 1996]. This techniques could there-
fore address Challenge 1 and Challenge 2, if the stakeholders reading the hazard-mitigating 
requirements were trained in to read the specification in the capacity of the safety engineer. 
However, stakeholders would still need to manually identify the hazard-mitigating require-
ments in the first place. Hence, perspective-based reading does not address Challenge 3. 
Value-based Reading 
Value-based reading is a technique intended to assist in the prioritization of artifacts [Li et al. 
2011]. By applying value-based reading, the requirements in a specification can be assigned 
priorities to allow for more critical requirements to be validated first and hence increase vali-
dation effectiveness [Lee and Boehm 2005]. This is achieved by reading the requirements spec-
ification and assigning values through a conceived metric, for example in order to find the re-
quirements with the highest impact on business risks, security, or potentially safety. Value-
based reading is therefore suitable to identify hazard-mitigating requirements within the re-
quirements specification, if an appropriate safety-centric metric was conceived. Yet, such an 
adaptation requires considerable extension of the value-based reading technique such that Chal-
lenge 3 can at best be evaluated as partly addressed. Moreover, value-based reading requires 
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conjunctive application with other techniques (e.g., the aforementioned perspective-based read-
ing technique), in order to be applicable to Challenge 1 and Challenge 2, as by itself, value-
based reading does not consider hazards nor their trigger conditions explicitly.  
Checklist-based Reading 
Checklist-based reading and derivative approaches such as defect-based reading are techniques 
aimed towards increasing the detection rate of defects in software artifacts [Porter et al. 1995]. 
The key component of such approaches is a guidance document (i.e., a checklist), which assists 
the stakeholder conducting the validation in finding common types of defects. Such guidance 
documents can be tailored to the operational purpose of the system or the specific defects. This 
could include defects like missing mitigations for specific hazards or inadequate consideration 
of the hazard’s trigger conditions. In consequence, checklist-based reading-like techniques are 
potentially applicable to address Challenge 1 and 2, but requires manual identification of haz-
ard-mitigating requirements, much akin to perspective-based reading. Therefore, Challenge 1 
and 2 are considered partly addressed. However, similar to perspective-based reading, stake-
holders still need to manually identify the hazard-mitigating requirements in the first place such 
that checklist-based reading does not address Challenge 3. 
SafeSpection 
SafeSpection is a framework aimed at improving project-specific hazard identification in soft-
ware-intensive systems [Denger et al. 2008]. The framework makes use of what is called “meta-
questions,” which can be refined into “project-specific questions” in order to identify hazards 
and, conceivably, the hazard-mitigating requirements intended to mitigate the hazard. During 
the SafeSpection process, hazard analysis is guided by common guidewords. The impact of 
hazard mitigations on the trigger conditions can be assessed through what the SafeSpection 
framework calls “influence factors” [Denger 2009]. These can be tailored towards the system 
under development, its functions, and the specific hazards the system’s functions induce. In this 
sense, SafeSpection addresses Challenge 1 and Challenge 2. However, hazard-mitigating re-
quirements must still be manually identified during the SafeSpection process, similarly to per-
spective-based and checklist-based reading techniques. Therefore, SafeSpection does not ad-
dress Challenge 3. 
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 Formal Quality Assurance Approaches  
While the formal approaches discussed in Section 3.2.2 aim at analyzing system artifacts in 
order to elicit safety requirements, other formal approaches are concerned with identifying 
safety-critical defects within mitigations. Examples of these approaches are discussed in the 
following. 
The Approach by Heitmeyer et al. 
An example for approaches that are concerned with behavioral constraints is the approach by 
Heitmeyer et al. suggested in [Heitmeyer et al. 1998; Bharadwaj and Heitmeyer 1999]. The 
approach of Heitmeyer et al. interprets the requirements specification as a state machine and 
focuses on invariants, states, and transitions similar to the approach by Troubitsyna [Trou-
bitsyna 2008]. The approach is capable of generating candidate solutions that may circumvent 
safety defects, but the focus of the approach is verification rather than elicitation or validation. 
Candidate solutions to resolve specific safety-critical defects can be found using this approach 
(hence addressing Challenge 1), given the violated safety-relevant invariants (hence addressing 
Challenge 2). However, the approach only generates candidate solutions that entail the entire 
system behavior. Hence, albeit the approach generates hazard-mitigating requirements, no dis-
tinction is made to remaining functional requirements. Therefore the approach by Heitmeyer et 
al. only partially addresses Challenge 3.  
The Approach by Snelting et al.  
The approach by Snelting et al. [Snelting et al. 2006] is an example of approaches concerned 
with data safety. Specifically, the approach is concerned with safety-critical invariants called 
“path conditions” between input and output variables of the system. The principle idea is to 
assert path conditions which must hold for any execution of the software and to use constraint 
solvers to check if the path conditions can be satisfied in all instances. If circumstances are 
found in which a path condition is violated, it is asserted that this constitutes a potentially unsafe 
execution. In this sense, the approach is concerned with the conditions, under which the system 
exerts hazardous behavior, hence addressing Challenge 2. However, the approach is neither 
concerned with dependencies to requirements mitigating these hazards (Challenge 1) nor with 
differentiating such requirements from the remainder of the specification (Challenge 3). 
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The Approach by Cheung and Kramer 
In [Cheung and Kramer 1999], an approach is presented that allows reducing the state space of 
a behavior specification such that the reduced behavior model still reflects the same behavior 
as the initial model. To this extent, behavior which is not externally observable but may be 
safety-relevant is analyzed in the approach (e.g., internal control structures). The aim is to iden-
tify states and transitions that do not affect externally observable behavior and can be removed 
without impairing system safety. By making use of this approach while refining the behavior 
specification and/or the system design, error correction efforts can be reduced. The approach is 
hence an example of a class of approaches which assert that a system is safe, if there are no 
violated behavioral constraints. These behavioral constraints can be viewed as trigger condi-
tions for hazards (Challenge 2). Yet, like the approach in [Snelting et al. 2006], the approach 
by Cheung and Kramer is not concerned with identifying specific mitigations for hazards in the 
sense of Definition 1 (Challenge 1). Similarly, the approach does not assist in differentiating 
hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense of Definition 5 from other functional requirements 
without impact on safety (Challenge 3). 
The Approach by Saeed et al. 
In [Saeed et al. 1993], an approach is suggested which assesses the robustness of the require-
ments specification against specific risks. The requirements specification is generated by con-
ducting a series of qualitative analysis pertaining to different viewpoints of system safety with 
varying degrees of abstraction. In this sense, the approach is similar to the approach in [Kotonya 
and Sommerville 1997], however with emphasis on verifying suitability of the requirements 
specification against potential accidents, hazards, and risks. Subsequent quantitative analyses 
allow generating fault trees that can be used to find behavioral violations in the specification 
with regard to the identified hazards. In this sense, the approach addresses Challenge 1 insofar 
that it allows checking if a mitigation for a hazard is in place. However, neither the hazard’s 
trigger conditions are considered in the sense of Challenge 2 nor are the hazard-mitigating re-
quirements differentiated from the remainder of the specification (Challenge 3). 
3.4. Traceability of Safety Requirements 
Requirements traceability describes the ability of stakeholders to trace requirements from their 
origin to their implementation. Two types of requirements traceability can be distinguished 
[Gotel and Finkelstein 1994]: pre-traceability describes the ability to trace requirements to their 
origin, i.e. to the stakeholder, who elicited the requirement or to the analysis result that made 
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the requirement necessary. Post-traceability describes the ability to trace requirements to their 
realization in design documents or in the implementation. In the context of this work, pre-trace-
ability of requirements is of particular relevance, as the hazard from the hazard analysis work-
sheet in the sense of Definition 5 becomes the origin of the hazard-mitigating requirements 
intended to mitigate the hazard. In the literature, a host of approaches, techniques, and tools 
have been suggested to establish and manage requirements traceability (see, e.g., [Bashir and 
Qadir 2006; Rochimah et al. 2007; Torkar et al. 2012] for overviews). In the following, we will 
review types of approaches that are particularly aimed at pre-traceability of safety requirements 
or pre-traceability of quality requirements3 that are applicable to safety requirements. 
The Trace Queries Centric Approach by Cleland-Huang et al. 
In [Cleland-Huang et al. 2012], an approach is proposed that allows tracing requirements for 
safety-critical systems by means of queries modeled in between artifacts. The aim of the ap-
proach is to support stakeholders in showing the mitigation of hazards for the purpose of certi-
fication. The approach consists of four steps. First, fault trees are built in order to determine 
“preliminary hazards” of the system. Each of these preliminary hazards is explored by a sub-
tree to identify the specific failures which cause the hazard. Afterwards, cut sets are defined to 
identify the failures, whose simultaneous occurrence will result in the occurrence of the root 
fault of the system. This yields and understanding of the failure causes of the system and allows 
specifying safety-related requirements. These safety-related requirements can be related to the 
root fault in the fault tree to be mitigated. To do so, a graphical language is used to visualize 
the traces between hazards and their mitigations. Using this visualization, the safety-related 
requirements must be subjected to validation. The approach is based on a conceptual infor-
mation model that establishes dependencies between, among other things, the preliminary haz-
ards and the artifact containing the hazards (in this case, the fault tree), formal state-based mod-
els, software requirements, and system requirements. System requirements in this approach re-
fer to hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense of Definition 5, which addresses Challenge 
1. The state-based models allow capturing the formal system behavior, i.e. system states and 
transitions. They also capture “certain assumptions about the environment” ([Cleland-Huang et 
al. 2012], p. 182). Albeit the approach is concerned with “failures” which result in hazardous 
behaviors, the operational conditions that cause these failures in the sense of Definition 2 are 
                                                 
3 We use the term “quality requirement” to refer to the notion of “non-functional requirements” used by some 
authors to underline the fact that some quality properties, e.g., safety, are impacted by functional requirements, 
as outlined in [Glinz 2007]. 
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not in the focus of the approach. Moreover, it must be noted that albeit the approach establishes 
and visualizes dependencies between hazards and their mitigations, the established dependen-
cies trace individual hazard-mitigating requirements to hazards. This partly addresses Chal-
lenge 3. However, in order to fully address Challenge 3, the approach requires extension such 
that hazard-mitigating requirements pertaining to different hazards can be differentiated from 
one another.  
The Softgoal-Centric Traceability Approach by Cleland-Huang et al. 
In another approach [Cleland-Huang et al. 2005], Cleland-Huang and colleagues propose the 
use of goal analysis to trace the satisfaction of quality requirements. The approach consists of 
four steps. First, a goal model is created, which documents the qualities to be considered as 
softgoals and dependencies between softgoals. In a second step, dependencies between soft-
goals are analyzed using a probabilistic algorithm in order to delineate the impacts between 
goals and a functional model of the system. Furthermore, in this step, human users assess the 
dependency links manually prunes incorrectly delineated links. Afterwards, in a goal analysis 
step, human users can modify the functional elements to which the softgoals are related in order 
to optimize their satisfaction. This may include the addition, removal, or substitution of func-
tional elements and is similar to the conception of hazard-mitigating requirements in order to 
fulfill some top-level safety goal (cf. Section 1.2). After the modification is done, goal satisfac-
tion is recursively re-evaluated. In the last step, stakeholders make decisions on whether to 
accept or reject the modifications. Albeit the approach is intended for “non-functional” proper-
ties, specifically security, performance, and usability, the approach has been successfully ap-
plied to a case example in order to trace other qualities, including safety. This means that in 
principle, the approach can be applied to generating dependencies between hazards and hazard-
mitigating requirements in the sense of Challenge 1. Since the approach entails the analysis of 
specific changes conducted by human users, the approach can conceivably also differentiate 
between hazard-mitigating requirements and the remainder of the functional requirements spec-
ification in the sense of Challenge 3. However, the approach is unconcerned with the specific 
trigger conditions leading to a hazard and hence does not Challenge 2. 
The Event-Based Traceability Framework by Cleland-Huang et al. 
Another contribution by Cleland-Huang and colleagues (see [Cleland-Huang et al. 2002a; Cle-
land-Huang et al. 2002b; Cleland-Huang et al. 2003]) makes use of the publisher-subscriber 
3 – State of the Art 
36 
model to inform related artifacts in a requirements specification about changes in updated arti-
facts. The contribution presents a framework, which consists of three parts [Cleland-Huang et 
al. 2002a]: a requirements manager maintains a repository of all requirements artifacts that can 
be updated or related to other requirements artifacts. The second component is an event server, 
which manages update events of requirements artifacts. Update events entail “change actions” 
[Cleland-Huang et al. 2002b], such as adding, removing, or replacing artifacts within the re-
quirements manager. The third components is the subscriber manager, which listens to update 
events and notifies all related requirements artifacts about the change. The framework assumes 
that traceability information between requirements artifacts are already in place. The framework 
has been applied to model-based requirements [Cleland-Huang et al. 2003], but conceivably, 
the implementation of the publisher-subscriber model proposed in the framework can be applied 
to other artifacts as well, such as hazards or trigger conditions. In the sense of Challenge 1 and 
2, hazards and/or trigger conditions would be “notified” (in the sense outlined in [Cleland-
Huang et al. 2002a]) about requirements that have been changed in order to mitigate the hazard. 
However, the nature of the framework does not allow distinguishing between hazard-mitigating 
requirements and the remainder of the requirements artifacts in the sense of Challenge 3. 
The Safety Artifact Traceability Model by Katta and Stålhane  
In [Katta and Stålhane 2011], the authors propose a conceptual traceability model between the 
system development process and the safety assessment process. The conceptual model is 
closely related to the interaction between the two development processes first introduced in 
[Pumfrey 1999] and relates artifacts in both processes to one another. Specifically, the tracea-
bility model relates conceptual system functions in the system conceptualization phase to spe-
cific hazards identified during early stage hazard analyses. Mitigations are traced to hazards in 
the hazard analysis stage as well. Functional safety requirements in the conceptual traceability 
model take the role of hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense of Definition 5 and constitute 
a specialization of a mitigation. Functional safety requirements also trace to system safety re-
quirements in the “requirements analysis” phase of system development in the conceptual 
model. These system safety requirements are special types of functional requirements of the 
system in the traceability model. In summary, the traceability model presented in [Katta and 
Stålhane 2011] takes a process-centric approach. It allows tracing hazards to their mitigation in 
the sense of Challenge 1 and differentiates those requirements that are part of a mitigation from 
those that are not in the sense of Challenge 3. However, the traceability must still be manually 
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established. Furthermore, albeit the traceability model considers the “effects” that lead to a haz-
ard like the trigger conditions in the sense of Definition 2, these effects are not traced to any 
type of requirement.  
The Approach by Hill and Tilley 
The approach proposed by Hill and Tilley in [Hill and Tilley 2010] is aimed at establishing 
traceability between artifacts of legacy systems for the purpose of recertification. The approach 
is based on a risk taxonomy and database, which contains information about risks for the system 
to be certified. In this sense, the term “risk” means operational conditions which threaten the 
operational mission of the system. The purpose of the risk taxonomy and database is to allow 
product managers to identify risks and conceive strategies to avoid them. These strategies are 
documented as safety requirements and inform a risk evaluation process. However, the ap-
proach makes no mention of distinguishing safety requirements of the system to be certified 
from other requirements without impact on safety. In this sense, the approach is concerned with 
managing the development process and does not establish dependencies between the hazards in 
the sense of Definition 1 nor to its trigger conditions. The approach therefore does not address 
Challenge 1 nor 2, but in part addresses Challenge 3.  
The Approach by Sánchez at al. 
An approach to trace safety requirements in model-based development proposed in [Sánchez et 
al. 2011]. The approach is specific to the development of robotic applications. In such applica-
tions, hazards do not occur due to trigger conditions in the system’s operational context in the 
sense of Definition 2, but due to specific “tasks” a robots undertakes. The approach features a 
traceability metamodel, which describes traces between generic elements. These elements can 
either be elements from a safety analysis metamodel or a safety-based requirements metamodel. 
The safety analysis metamodel relates hazards to specific tasks as well as to “hazard solutions.” 
Hazard solutions in this sense can be understood as hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense 
of Definition 5. These hazard solutions are elicited in a systematic process: First a “problem 
analysis step” identifies hazards, tasks, and associated risks. Afterwards, in a manual step, rec-
ommendations regarding the mitigation of the hazards are conceived and documented as safety 
requirements for the system. These safety requirements become part of the system requirements 
specification together with other system requirements. In subsequent development steps, the 
implementation of the safety requirements as well as other requirements can be traced to spe-
cific functions in the code of the robots. In summary, albeit the approach related mitigations to 
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hazard and therefore addresses Challenge 1, the approach does not trigger conditions and there-
fore does not address Challenge 2. Furthermore, the approach makes no mention whether or not 
the safety requirements can be explicitly differentiated from the remainder of the system re-
quirements specification. 
The Approach by Peraldi-Frati and Albinet 
An approach specific to the tracing of the satisfaction of requirements in the automotive domain 
is presented in [Peraldi-Frati and Albinet 2010]. The approach can be divided into three distinct 
steps: First, hazardous “effects” and their “causes” are identified using FMEA as well as FTA. 
The results of these analyses are stored in what the authors call a “system safety document,” 
which they propose to be traced to the requirements specification. In the requirements specifi-
cation, these effects and causes are refined into safety requirements, which are intended to mit-
igate the effects. This mitigation relationship is described by means of traceability types pro-
posed in the approach: “decompose,” “derive,” or “copy.” Afterwards, the satisfaction of each 
safety requirement in subsequent design and code artifacts is documented by means of “satisfy” 
relationships and test cases can be traced to the satisfaction of the safety requirements by means 
of “verify” relationships. It is to note that the approach is intended to the tracing of the satisfac-
tion of hazard-mitigating requirements in late stages of development. The notion of a “failure 
mode” and a “failure effect” in this sense pertains to specific implementation aspects (cf. [Er-
icson 2005], p. 235ff) as opposed to hazards occurring during early stages of development in 
the sense of Definition 1 (cf. [Ericson 2005], p. 271ff). Albeit the approach could conceivably 
be applied to Challenge 1 and 2, it only partly addresses these challenges. Furthermore, the 
approach makes no mention of differentiating hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense of 
Definition 5 from the remainder of the requirements specification and hence does not address 
Challenge 3. 
The Requirements Traceability Reference Model 
In [Ramesh and Jarke 2001], a generic reference model for requirements traceability is pre-
sented. The reference model consists of four submodels, i.e. the requirements managements 
submodel, the rationale submodel, the design allocation submodel, and the compliance verifi-
cation submodel. In addition, the reference model describes a more abstract “low-end” tracea-
bility model. The low-end model allows tracing requirements to their implementation into com-
ponents. The management submodel takes a more abstract view on the development process 
and allows tracing requirements to strategic dependencies as well as system objectives. The 
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design allocation submodel takes a more detailed view on the allocation of requirements to 
implementation into components. The difference to the “low-end” model is merely in the level 
of detail concerning to the contained concepts and, together with the other four submodels, is 
geared towards complex “high-end” traceability tasks. The other two submodels, i.e. the ra-
tionale submodel and the compliance verification submodel, harbor potential application to the 
challenges from Section 1.2. The aim of the rationale submodel is to provide traceability be-
tween implementation decisions and the requirements documenting the decision. This idea 
could potentially be extended to incorporate “mitigation decisions” such that the rationale sub-
model documents the mitigations for each hazard and its trigger conditions from a hazard anal-
ysis worksheet. Similarly, the aim of the compliance verification submodel is, among other 
things, to document specific changes to requirements due to verification procedures such as 
tests, reviews, or inspections. This submodel could be extended to show which specific sets of 
hazard-mitigating requirements have been elicited in order to mitigate a hazard from the ra-
tionale submodel. 
3.5. Safety Argumentation  
The process of arguing that a system is sufficiently safe is one of the core concerns of safety 
assessment, as outlined in Section 1.1. Safety argumentation is considered relevant to the ful-
fillment of the goal of this dissertation (see Section 1.4) insofar that the process of providing 
evidence for claims regarding the system’s safety (e.g., such as the claim that hazard-mitigating 
requirements are adequate to mitigate a hazard) may address the challenges outlined in Section 
1.2. Safety argumentation is aimed at providing a justifiable and objective argument that all 
identified hazards have been mitigated and are hence sufficiently unlikely to cause harm. This 
is done by means of an artifact type called safety cases.  
Safety Cases 
A safety case is an argument structure according to [Toulmin 1958] that consists of a high-level 
claim concerning the safety of a system, a set of quantitative of qualitative evidence satisfying 
the claim, and an inference structure, showing how the evidence satisfies the claim (see [Fe-
nelon and McDermid 1993; Kelly and Weaver 2004]). In the safety engineering literature, other 
terms such as “assurance case” (e.g. [Bishop et al. 2004]) or “assurance argument” (e.g., [Kelly 
2007]) have been used to describe the same idea. Safety cases can be visualized in a tree-like 
structure using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN, see [Kelly and Weaver 2004]). In GSN safety 
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cases, the top-level claim is called a safety goal in the sense of Definition 3. Safety goal fulfill-
ment is achieved given specific contextual information. These contextual information could be 
the hazard’s trigger conditions in the sense of Definition 2, but can also be organizational as-
pects such as laws, standards, or other constraints under which a safety goal must be fulfilled. 
Hazard-mitigating requirements can serve as evidence for the fulfillment of a safety goal and 
the inference structure of a safety case can be considered the considered mitigation according 
to Definition 7. If a safety goal is put in place for each identified hazard, the artifact structure 
in a GSN safety case can provide explicit dependencies between a hazard and the hazard-miti-
gating requirements it fulfills (Challenge 1). Moreover, considering the impact of trigger con-
ditions on the fulfillment of a safety goal is also supported by visualizing the dependencies 
(Challenge 2). However, safety cases merely contain information that hazard-mitigating re-
quirements are in place, not whether these hazard-mitigating requirements are adequate and do 
not distinguish hazard-mitigating requirements from other requirements for the purpose of val-
idating the adequacy. In fact, accepting the mere presence of hazard-mitigating requirements as 
sufficient evidence for the mitigation of a hazard might be seen as argumentatively weak [Haw-
kins et al. 2011].  
Confidence Cases 
To alleviate the issue of weak argumentation, it has recently been suggested to augment safety 
cases with confidence cases (see [Sun 2012]).A confidence case is an “argument that justifies 
the sufficiency of confidence” ([Hawkins et al. 2011], p. 1) in a safety case. Therefore, in con-
trast to safety cases, confidence cases are not meant to argue that a safety goal is fulfilled, but 
why the safety goal is fulfilled adequately. Confidence cases can be visualized using the same 
GSN modeling elements as safety cases. In confidence cases, the top-level goal asserts desired 
safety argument for which confidence is to be demonstrated. The inference associates evidence 
with the asserted confidence goal, like in safety cases. Evidence in confidence cases take the 
form of activities carried out in order to show sufficiency of the evidence in the related safety 
case. For example, such an activity could include the systematic identification and subsequent 
validation of hazard-mitigating requirements to ascertain their adequacy. The safety argument 
of a system therefore consists of a safety case containing evidence which demonstrate what 
mitigations are in place for a hazard and a corresponding confidence case containing evidence 
which demonstrate why the mitigations are adequate (cf. [Hawkins et al. 2011]). With regard 
to the challenges from Section 1.2, this means that confidence cases by themselves neither ad-
dress Challenge 1 nor Challenge 2, but may be used to demonstrate which hazard-mitigating 
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requirements have been identified and subjected to validation (Challenge 3). Yet, stakeholders 
need to identify and differentiate the hazard-mitigating requirements from other functional with 
no impact on safety manually. Moreover, it must be noted that both safety cases and confidence 
cases are a means to visualize dependencies between safety-relevant information pertaining to 
a safety argument. Establishing these dependencies, however, is done using alternative means. 
3.6. Model-Based Safety Assessment 
The term “model-based safety assessment” refers to techniques which are either intended to 
“facilitate better traceability between safety assessment and design models” ([Lisagor et al. 
2010], p. 169) or to create system models based on safety assessment. In [Lisagor et al. 2011], 
a detailed review of several types of model-based safety approaches is given. According to the 
authors, these types can be classified using two orthogonal categories, as shown in Table 3-2.  
Table 3-2 Classification Scheme of Model-Based Safety Approaches according to [Lisagor et al. 2011]. 
  Represented Aspects in the Models 
 Only Data, Energy, or 
Matter Flows 
Data, Energy, or Matter 
with Failure Mode Flows 
Only Failure Mode Flows 
M
o
d
el
 P
u
rp
o
se
 
Dedicated Safety Model Failure Effects Modeling Hybrid Type between  
Failure Effects and Logic 
Modeling 
Failure Logic Modeling 
Partial Utilization of System Model  
(e.g., requirements, architecture) 
Hybrid Approaches, e.g. 
Extended System Modeling 
Hybrid Approach, e.g.  
Formal Methods, Error 
Modeling Annex of AADL 
Hybrid Approaches, e.g., 
Integration of Safety Anal-
ysis Results into modeling 
frameworks 
Automated Construction or 
Utilization System Model 
Failure Injection / Extended 
System Modeling 
- Hybrid Approaches, e.g., 
Software Deviation  
Analysis 
 
In Table 3-2, rows depict the way a model is used, while columns depict the information de-
picted in the models. Cells represent types of approaches identified in [Lisagor et al. 2011]. For 
the purpose of this work, approaches pertaining to model-based safety assessment are consid-
ered relevant to the fulfillment of the goal of this dissertation (see Section 1.4) as long as they 
make use of information provided by hazard analyses against which the adequacy of hazard-
mitigating requirements is evaluated and depict them together with functional requirements of 
the system in a unified fashion. This means that approaches that only document data, energy or 
matter flows (left content column in Table 3-2) as well as approaches that only model failure 
mode flows (right content column in Table 3-2) are beyond the scope of relevant approaches. 
Moreover, approaches that make use of a dedicated safety model (top content row in Table 3-2) 
are excluded also. In the following, we will therefore discuss the relevant type of approach 
identified in the middle content cell of Table 3-2 (highlighted in light grey). For details on the 
other types of approaches excluded from this review, please refer to [Lisagor et al. 2011]. 
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As outlined above, approaches pertaining to model-based safety assessment are concerned with 
integrating safety analysis results into artifacts of the remainder of the system development 
process. There is a plethora of approaches that belong to this category. In addition to the cate-
gorization proposed in [Lisagor et al. 2011], these approaches can further be divided into over-
lapping subcategories: 
 Approaches concerned with formal modeling (e.g.,[US NASA 2006; Correa at al. 2010]); 
 Approaches concerned with graphical representation of safety analyses (e.g., [Cancila et 
al. 2009; Beckers et al. 2013; Panesar-Walawege et al. 2013]); 
 Approaches concerned with architecture modeling (e.g., [Sandberg et al. 2010; Correa at 
al. 2010; Kaiser et al. 2010]). 
 Approaches concerned with safety standard compliance (e.g., [Kaiser et al. 2010; Sandberg 
et al. 2010; Panesar-Walawege et al. 2013; Beckers et al. 2013]). 
In the following, examples of these approaches are summarized. 
The Approach by Joshi and Heimdahl 
In [Joshi and Heimdahl 2005a; Joshi and Heimdahl 2005b; US NASA 2006], a model-based 
safety analysis approach is proposes, which is specifically aimed at improving knowledge trans-
fer between system developers and safety engineers. The approach is based on a modified de-
velopment process model [Joshi and Heimdahl 2005a], which adds system level hazard analysis 
steps and fault tree analysis steps after an initial set of system requirements are conceived (see 
also [Pumfrey 1999] as well as Section 1.1). Based on the safety analysis steps in early stages 
of development, the derived safety requirements are formalized. The output of this step is a 
formal system model, which incorporates safety aspects as well as system development arti-
facts, which become input for further development activities. The central idea of this approach 
is that safety engineers and system developers work on a common, formal system model [Joshi 
and Heimdahl 2005b]. The developer using the approach is free to choose some formalization 
technique to formalize the system model [US NASA 2006]. For example, the authors propose 
temporal or higher-order predicate logic languages or modeling languages such as UML, SIM-
ULINK, or SCADE (see [Joshi and Heimdahl 2005a; US NASA 2006] for details). Once for-
malization is complete, the system model can be subjected to further safety engineering tech-
niques, such as formal proofs, simulation, verification, and model-checking. The approach 
makes no mention of special consideration of hazards, trigger conditions, or hazard-mitigating 
requirements and is more akin to a formal verification method (see also Section 3.3.2), seam-
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lessly integrated into the development process, than an approach focused on graphical repre-
sentation of dependencies as outlined in Section 1.4. In this sense, hazards as well as their trig-
ger conditions become “axioms,” which must be disproven by showing that “safety properties” 
hold for the entire system model [US NASA 2006]. The approach is hence not concerned with 
hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense of Definition 5 (Challenge 3), the impact of hazard-
mitigating requirements on trigger conditions (Challenge 2), nor with the dependencies of haz-
ard-mitigating requirements to hazards (Challenge 1). 
The SOPHIA Modeling Language 
In [Cancila et al. 2009], the SOPHIA Modeling Language is presented. SOPHIA is a SysML-
compatible language intended to improve the traceability between safety engineering artifacts 
and the artifacts produced during other development activities. SOPHIA is a meta-language, 
which proposes fundamental modeling concepts to document system accidents, i.e. operational 
scenarios that result in harm, as well as the relative risk and probability accidents have. For this 
purpose, three packages are defined: the “Accidents” package, which defines occurrence fre-
quencies and relative risk of hazards, accidents, and accident consequences, the “Mitigations” 
package, which defines the measures taken to mitigate an accident, and a “FaultContainment-
Region” package, which documents error propagations. Albeit there is no concrete visual syn-
tax proposed in [Cancila et al. 2009], the authors suggest three integration strategies with 
SysML. On the one hand, the fundamental SOPHIA concepts can be implemented as a SysML 
extension using a UML profile in the sense of [Fuentes-Fernandés and Vallecillo-Moreno 2004; 
Selic 2007]. On the other hand, SOPHIA can be implemented as a stand-alone domain-specific 
language in the sense of [Kelly and Tolvanen 2008]. The third strategy treats SOPHIA funda-
mentals concepts as an orthogonal meta-model to SysML or other languages. SOPHIA does not 
prescribe nor restrict the specific system develop artifacts that can be traced to accidents. In this 
sense, SOPHIA is concerned with documenting dependencies between accidents and develop-
ment artifacts at large. Albeit hazards play a role in SOPHIA, the language is more concerned 
with focusing on accident mitigation. The language hence partly addresses Challenge 1. Yet, 
SOPHIA is neither concerned with hazards’ trigger conditions, nor with the specific distinction 
between hazard-mitigating requirements and other development artifacts and therefore does not 
address Challenge 2 nor Challenge 3. 
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The Approach by Beckers et al. 
In [Beckers et al. 2013], a model-based hazard analysis and risk assessment approach is pre-
sented. Like the approach by Kaiser et al., the approach by Beckers et al. is [ISO26262 2011]-
compatible. Yet, in contrast to [Kaiser et al. 2010], the approach in [Beckers et al. 2013] is not 
concerned with creating a safety concept, i.e. a document summarizing how hazards have been 
mitigated by the system design, but with documenting the relative risk in terms of the Automo-
tive Safety Integrity Level. The approach entails a seven-step process: After item definitions, 
i.e. a summary of the functionality of a system under development along with its interaction 
with the operational context, is defined, “fault-type guidewords” are instantiated. The purpose 
of this step is to assist the developer later on in identifying hazards. Afterwards, a situation 
classification step is executed. This step entails the identification of scenarios, in which the 
hazards identified in the previous step occur. This includes not only the operational conditions, 
but also their relative occurrence probability. Given the guidewords and classified situations, 
hazard analyses are conducted and documented in a tabular form, much like the hazard analyses 
worksheets proposed in [Ericson 2005] (p. 276). Once a list of hazards have been identified, 
the hazards are classified according to severity, exposure, and controllability as proposed in 
[ISO26262 2011] and safety goals are defined. In the last step, an independent review as re-
quired by [ISO26262 2011] is conducted. These reviews are informed by “validation condi-
tions” proposed in the approach, which are system-agnostic well-formedness rules that must 
hold for the hazard and risk assessment results. By making use of a metamodel for the hazard 
analysis and risk assessment results, the approach allows importing the results into a design 
model of the system. Doing so enables tracing of hazards as well as their trigger conditions to 
the specific functional safety requirements that mitigate the hazard. The approach hence com-
pletely addresses Challenge 1 and partially addresses Challenge 2. However, the approach is 
focused on the hazard and risk assessment process up to the point of defining safety goals and 
hence does not concern the distinction of hazard-mitigating requirements from other functional 
requirements with no impact on safety in the sense of Challenge 3. 
Error Modeling in EAST-ADL2 or AADL 
In several publications, approaches have been proposed to extend architecture description lan-
guages by a means to model error occurrence and failure propagation. For example, in [Chen 
at al. 2008; Biehl et al. 2010; Sandberg et al. 2010], EAST-ADL2 architectural building blocks 
of the system [Chen at al. 2008] are integrated with GSN safety cases according to [Kelly and 
Weaver 2004] (see Section 3.5) on a process level. Safety architecture components are then 
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subsumed in a feature model of the system [Sandberg et al. 2010], which represents the mitiga-
tion for errors identified during preliminary hazard analyses [Biehl et al. 2010]. Based on a 
common domain model, the EAST-ADL2 architecture artifacts of the system can be traced to 
the hazards as well as the safety requirements that have been defined in order to fulfill the safety 
goal in the safety case. The term “safety requirements” in the approach refers to architectural 
constraints, similar to “technical safety requirements” in [ISO26262 2011]. This mainly com-
prises constraints to avoid particular errors and failures during operation. Hence, the approach 
is not concerned with hazards in the sense of Definition 1 (see also Assumption 2 in Section 
1.3), but with errors that occur during operation due to specific properties in the design or im-
plementation. In consequence, the approach is also not concerned with hazard-mitigating re-
quirements in the sense of Definition 5 (Challenge 3). Consideration of trigger conditions in the 
sense of Definition 2 is not discussed in the approach as well (Challenge 2).  
Similarly, in [Correa at al. 2010], AADL has been extended with the ability to model errors 
as well as their propagation, much like in [Biehl et al. 2010], but for the purpose of simulation 
rather than formal verification. The approach consists of six step process. At first, the require-
ments of the system under development are elicited and the system’s functions are modeled in 
order to simulate their interactions at runtime. Afterwards, the aspects of the operational context 
in which the system will operate once it is deployed is formalized and used to configure the 
simulation. Then, in an iterative process, the system’s functionality is refined into executable 
components, which are described in terms of their runtime behavior (e.g., threading, thread 
modes, etc.), and enhanced with execution time properties (e.g., worst case execution times, 
etc.). Finally, based on this information, simulation is conducted, in which the execution be-
havior of the system model is verified against safety constraints specified in temporal logic. 
The error modeling approach for AADL proposed in [Correa at al. 2010] is therefore reminis-
cent of a real-time verification approach (see also Section 3.3.2). Real-time constraints are con-
sidered to be safety requirements and hazards are violations of such constraints. Hazards in the 
sense of Definition 1 (Challenge 1), trigger conditions in the sense of Definition 2 (Challenge 
2) or hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense of Definition 5 (Challenge 3) are not consid-
ered. 
The Approach by Kaiser et al. 
In [Kaiser et al. 2010], another approach concerned with the integration of safety analysis re-
sults and system architecture descriptions is presented. In contrast to [Sandberg et al. 2010; 
Correa at al. 2010], however, the approach by Kaiser et al. is not limited to error modeling and 
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does not prescribe a specific architecture language to be used. Instead, the architecture is de-
scribed using generic modeling languages, such as UML or SysML. Once the architecture is 
documented, FMEA are conducted in order to identify system functions, malfunctions, and their 
effects. The FMEA results are documented in a failure net, which is a hierarchical structure 
similar to the architecture description and allows tracing of failures through the architecture. In 
a subsequent step, safety goals are defined in order to avoid the failure and the system architec-
ture is refined by means of “safety measure.” Safety measures are mitigations in the sense of 
Definition 6, which comprise specific requirements to mitigate the failures identified in the 
failure net. Lastly, based on the architecture, the identified failures, conceived safety goals, and 
the documented safety measures, these information are comprised into a safety concept in the 
style of [ISO26262 2011]. An ISO26262 safety concept is an artifact, which documents the 
dependencies between these items and allows certification authorities to trace possible failures 
from origin to their mitigation. Albeit the approach in [Kaiser et al. 2010] is concerned with 
“failures” as opposed to hazards in the sense of Definition 1, the approach established depend-
encies between failures and their mitigation. This partly addresses Challenge 1. Moreover, due 
to the nature of FMEA, it is possible to trace the trigger conditions of a failure (i.e. “failure 
mode,” see [Ericson 2005], p. 235), thereby partly addressing Challenge 2. Safety requirements 
that are part of the safety concept, but become a constituent of the requirements specification 
that are not explicitly documented as such. The approach hence partly addresses Challenge 3. 
The Approach by Panesar-Walawege et al. 
In [Panesar-Walawege et al. 2013], a model-based approach to prove compliance with safety 
standards such as [ARP4761 1996; ISO26262 2011] is presented. The central aspect of the 
approach is the creation of a conceptual model of the standard that compliance shall be estab-
lished with. This allows establishing dependencies between the system models and the model-
ing elements documented therein and the concepts of the standard in question in order to allow 
manufacturers and suppliers to demonstrate compliance with the standard. The proposed ap-
proach makes use of UML profiles to establish these dependencies between concrete models. 
To do so, the approach defines a process consisting of four steps, which closely resembles the 
lightweight extension approach proposed by Lagarde et al. (see also [Lagarde et al. 2007; 
Lagarde et al. 2008. The first step in this process is concerned with creating a conceptual model 
of the standard. This is akin to steps 1 and 2 in [Lagarde et al. 2007; Lagarde et al. 2008]. Once 
a sufficiently stable conceptual model of the standard exists, a UML profile of the standard is 
created. This allows integration of the conceptual model of the standard with the system models 
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developed for the system under development and is similar to step 3 in [Lagarde et al. 2007; 
Lagarde et al. 2008]. Based on the UML profile of the standard and the system models, an 
elaboration step is carried out, in which the compliance of the standard is ascertained. This step 
is similar to the domain analysis and profile optimization steps in [Lagarde et al. 2007; Lagarde 
et al. 2008], as the approach in [Panesar-Walawege et al. 2013] considers the system the domain 
to be certified. In this sense, this step entails the creation of dependencies between the concep-
tual model of the standard and the domain model of the system to be certified along with invar-
iants that must hold between the models. The result of this step is a mapping between the system 
and the standard, which is instantiated for a specific certification task in the final step of the 
approach. In this sense, the approach is capable of documenting and visualizing dependencies 
between hazards and hazard-mitigating requirements. However, this is only the case if the con-
ceptual model of the safety standard as well as the domain model of the system under develop-
ment allow for such modeling elements. Challenge 1 is therefore only partly addressed. Simi-
larly, the approach allows considering trigger conditions in the sense of Definition 2 only if the 
safety standard as well as the domain model allow for such modeling concepts. Challenge 2 is 
therefore partly addressed as well. The approach treats the information specified in the system 
models as abstract system requirements, which must be concretized for a certification task. The 
approach is not concerned with hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense of Definition 5 and 
hence does not address Challenge 3. 
3.7. Evaluation Summary of the State of the Art 
In Section 1.2, the following three challenges regarding the validation of adequacy of hazard-
mitigating requirements were identified: 
 Challenge 1: Stakeholders have no indication how hazards have been mitigated. 
 Challenge 2: Stakeholders have no indication how trigger conditions are influenced by the 
hazard-mitigating requirements. 
 Challenge 3: Stakeholders have no indication which hazard a specific hazard-mitigating 
requirement is related to. 
In Section 3.1.2, these challenges were concretized into evaluation criteria for the state of the 
art. Table 3-3 summarizes the findings of the analysis of the state of the art against the evalua-
tion criteria using the symbols regarding fulfillment of challenges from Table 3-1.  
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Table 3-3 Evaluation Summary of Related Works. 
Approach Type Approach 
Challenge 1 Challenge 2 Challenge 3 
Indication, how haz-
ards were mitigated 
Indication, how trigger conditions 
influence a hazard’s occurrence. 
Differentiate HMR from 
remainder of the FRs. 
Goal- and Scenario 
Based Elicitation of 
Hazard-Mitigating 
Requirements 
KAOS    
i* and derivatives    
Menon and Kelly    
Kotonya and  
Sommerville 
   
Allenby and Kelly    
Dittel and Aryus    
Misuse Cases    
Formal Elicitation of 
Hazard-Mitigating  
Requirements 
Chen and Motet    
Zafar and Dromey    
STPA    
Hansen et al.    
Troubitsyna    
Belli et al.    
Approaches to  
Support Requirements 
Validation 
Perspective-based  
Reading 
   
Value-based Reading    
Checklist-based Reading    
SafeSpection    
Formal Quality  
Assurance  
Heitmeyer et al.    
Snelting et al.    
Cheung and Kramer    
Saeed et al.    
Approaches Pertaining 
to Traceability of 
Safety Requirements  
Trace Query Approach     
Softgoal Approach     
Event-Based Approach    
Safety Artifact  
Traceability Model 
   
Hill and Tilley    
Sánchez et al.    
Peraldi-Frati and Albinet    
Requirements Traceabil-
ity Reference Model 
   
Approaches Pertaining 
to Safety  
Argumentation 
Safety Cases    
Confidence Cases    
Approaches Pertaining 
to Model-Based 
Safety Assessment 
Joshi and Heimdahl    
SOPHIA    
Beckers et al.    
Error Modeling in  
EAST-ADL2 or AADL 
   
Kaiser et al.    
Panesar-Walawege et al.    
 
In Table 3-3, “” denotes that a challenge is completely solved. The symbol “” denotes that 
a challenge is partially solved, and “” indicates that a challenge is not addressed. As can be 
seen, there is no single approach, which completely addresses all three challenges. Albeit some 
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approaches can in principle be used to support stakeholders with certain aspect during the val-
idation of the adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements, the analysis of the state of the art 
has confirmed the gap in research with regard to the goal outlined in Section 1.4. 
A warranted question becomes whether or not tailoring or combining some of the ap-
proaches outlined above may be applicable. Such an undertaking is burdened by the specific 
purpose and underlying assumptions of the approaches. For example, formal quality assurance 
approaches (see Section 3.2.2) as well as formal model-based safety assessment and error mod-
eling approaches (see Section 3.6) make the implicit assumption that correctness and fault tol-
erance alone is sufficient to establish safety. Yet, as has been argued in depth by many authors 
(e.g., [Heimdahl 2007; Leveson 2011a; Hatcliff et al. 2014]), a formally correct system (i.e., 
where the development artifacts are contain no formal error), may still be hazardous during 
operation. Similarly, elicitation approaches (see Section 3.2) promise to generate “construc-
tively correct” requirements and typically allow the stepwise refinement (and tracing of de-
pendencies) from the origin to the implementation of a requirement (i.e. “post-traceability” in 
the sense of [Gotel and Finkelstein 1994]). While these are valuable and useful contributions 
for the purpose of this work, they do not relieve the developer from validating whether or not 
the hazard-mitigating requirements are adequately mitigate a hazard. Conducting validation in 
this sense is mandated by safety standards (see, e.g., [ARP4761 1996; ISO26262 2011]).  
A promising avenue to tailor and combine existing approaches is to combine Leveson’s 
STPA approach [Leveson 2004] with a model-based assessment approach, which makes heavy 
use of conceptual models (e.g., [Beckers et al. 2013; Panesar-Walawege et al. 2013]). Such a 
combined approach would yield dependencies on a meta-model level between hazards, trigger 
conditions, and the hazards’ mitigations and would allow for traceability in the sense of, e.g., 
[Sánchez et al. 2011; Cleland-Huang et al. 2012] such that hazard-mitigating requirements can 
be identified (see Section 3.4). Through extension of modeling languages these dependencies 
can be visualized to support validation. The diagrams instantiating these conceptual models can 
subjected to validation using, e.g., perspective-based, checklist-based, or value-based reading 
or safety-specific validation processes like SafeSpection (see Section 3.3.1), to ascertain the 
adequacy of the hazard-mitigating requirements. Our approach can be seen as an extension of 
these concepts. However, rather than combining and extending the approaches outlined above, 
a novel, ontology-centric approach was developed. This was done because of the following 
reasons: 
 Generic Applicability of the Approach. Leveson’s STPA approach [Leveson 2004] fo-
cuses on a systems-theoretic hazard causation model, but requires a tailored and safety 
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assessment-centric development process. It replaces traditional development processes ra-
ther than integrating the safety assessment process with the development process. In order 
to maintain a high degree of adaptability and generic applicability, the approach developed 
in this dissertation makes use of the systems-theoretic understanding of hazards and their 
causes (see [Leveson 2011a]), yet focuses on ontological integration of the work products 
to integrate work products of requirements engineering and hazard analyses, as outlined in 
Section 1.2. 
 Tailoring of Ontologies. The approaches proposed by [Beckers et al. 2013] and [Panesar-
Walawege et al. 2013] make use of ontologies to establish dependencies between hazard 
analysis results and safety requirements. In [Beckers et al. 2013], the purpose is to support 
risk assessment, while in [Panesar-Walawege et al. 2013], the purpose is to provide proof 
of adherence to safety standards. These ontologies must be adapted to express the depend-
encies between safety requirements and hazard analysis worksheets using the systems-the-
oretic understanding of the causation of hazards (cf. Section 2.1). Therefore, the approach 
developed in this dissertation builds on the idea of using ontologies to document depend-
encies between safety-related requirements and hazards. 
 Visual Notation for Validation. The traceability-centric approaches in [Sánchez et al. 
2011; Cleland-Huang et al. 2012] as well as the model-based safety assessment approaches 
in [Beckers et al. 2013; Panesar-Walawege et al. 2013] establish traces between hazards 
and requirements, yet, the trace relationships produces by the respective approaches are not 
visualized graphically. To visualize the trace relationship, a graphical notation must devel-
oped to represent the trace relationships and ontological concepts.  
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4. Overview  
In Section 1.5, we presented an overview over the solution approach. The principle idea of the 
solution approach is to define Hazard Relation Diagrams in order to visualize the dependency 
between the specific hazard-mitigating requirements (in the sense of Definition 5) that make 
up the conceptual mitigation (in the sense of Definition 7) of the one hazard (in the sense of 
Definition 1). Hazard Relation Diagrams furthermore visualize the dependency between the 
hazard-mitigating requirements and the contextual information about the hazard, i.e. the trigger 
conditions (in the sense of Definition 2) and the safety goal (in the sense of Definition 3) that 
were identified for that hazard during hazard analysis. These dependencies are described in the 
ontology for Hazard Relation Diagrams. An overview over the dependencies within Hazard 
Relation Diagrams is given in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 briefly overviews the creation approach 
before Section 4.3 overviews tool support for Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
4.1. Modeling Concepts of Hazard Relation Diagrams 
Figure 4-1 exemplarily illustrates the instantiations of the dependencies in Hazard Relation Di-
agrams. The hazard-inducing requirements HIR 1 causes all three hazards from the hazards 
analysis worksheet (dashed light grey double-headed arrows). Dashed boxes represent partial 
mitigations according to Definition 6. The hazard-mitigating requirements within the partial 
mitigation are depicted as a box with an inverted corner labeled “HMR.” Dependencies between 
partial mitigations and mitigated hazards are depicted as solid black double-headed arrows.  
 
Figure 4-1 Example for the Definition of Ontological Relationships between Artifact Types. 
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As can be seen, the partial mitigation comprises the hazard-mitigating requirements in the sense 
of Definition 5 and Definition 6. These hazard-mitigating requirements are defined as specific 
changes to the functional requirements. To this end, the approach makes use of corresponding 
template-based format to specify mitigations called a “mitigation template.” For each hazard in 
the hazard analysis worksheets, a mitigation template is specified, detailing the hazard-mitigat-
ing requirements needed to mitigate the respective hazard. Doing so will make explicit how the 
hazards have been mitigated, i.e. which hazard-mitigating requirements have been defined to 
mitigate which hazards and allows instantiating the dependencies for the purpose of visualiza-
tion. In Assumption 4 in Section 1.3, we have assumed that functional requirements are docu-
mented using UML activity diagrams. This allows defining Hazard Relation Diagrams as ex-
tensions of UML activity diagrams as well, using the UML profile mechanism defined in MOF 
[OMG 2015a]. Chapter 5 discusses the ontological foundations, visual notation, and well-
formedness rules of the modeling concepts of Hazard Relation Diagrams.  
4.2. Creation Approach for Hazard Relation Diagrams 
As discussed in Section 4.1, Hazard Relation Diagrams are based on an ontology, which extends 
UML activity diagrams by concepts from the hazards analysis worksheets. This means that 
Hazard Relation Diagrams must be created by unifying modeling elements from UML activity 
diagrams and modeling elements that represent hazard analysis worksheet concepts. In this 
sense, Hazard Relation Diagrams require the integration of two meta-models, i.e. UML activity 
diagrams defined in MOF and the ontology underlying hazard analysis worksheets. OMG QVT 
Operational Mappings (QVTo, see [OMG 2016]) have been selected as the approach to create 
Hazard Relation Diagrams, as QVTo transformation scripts allow a stepwise transformation 
from hazard-inducing requirements to hazard-mitigating requirements and furthermore addition 
of extraneous modeling elements to represent information from the hazard analysis worksheets. 
Chapter 5.5 discusses the approach to create Hazard Relation Diagrams. In Section 7.3, the tool 
prototype implementing this approach is discussed. 
4.3. Tool Support for Hazard Relation Diagrams 
The approach taken in this dissertation is focused on extending UML activity diagrams by the 
ability to visualize the dependencies between hazard-mitigating requirements and hazard anal-
ysis results. The approach reuses existing UML activity diagram modeling elements to docu-
ment functional requirements as well as their semantics. Therefore, the lightweight extension 
approach by Lagarde et al. is applicable. In [Tenbergen et al. 2013], the approach by Lagarde 
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et al. has been adapted in order to support the definition of method-specific profiles, which is 
used to meet the specific goal of this dissertation (see Section 1.4). Section 5.1 explains the 
ontological foundations pertaining the definition of Hazard Relation Diagrams and thereby de-
scribe how Hazard Relation Diagrams extend UML activity diagrams. In Section 7.2, the UML 
profile is discussed, which implements the extensions from Section 5.1.  
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5. Modeling Concepts of Hazard Relation Diagrams 
We introduce the underlying modeling concepts Hazard Relation Diagrams outlined in Section 
4.1. The principles underlying Hazard Relation Diagrams have first been described in [Tenber-
gen et al. 2015] and extensions have been proposed in [Tenbergen et al. 2017]. In Section 5.1, 
the ontological foundations is discussed. Section 5.2 explains their integration into the existing 
UML activity diagram ontology. Section 5.3 presents the visual notation of the modeling con-
cepts for functional requirements as well as for the extensions specific to Hazard Relation Dia-
grams. In Section 5.4, we illustrate how Hazard Relation Diagrams can be used to address the 
non-trivial multiplicities between hazards and hazard-mitigating requirements outlined in Sec-
tion 1.2. Finally, in Section 5.5, we introduce well-formedness rules of Hazard Relation Dia-
grams that are based on the ontological foundations from Section 5.1.  
5.1. Ontological Foundations  
By defining conceptual mitigations for each hazard, which subsume partial mitigations, the 
chosen approach supports the different types of multiplicity between hazards and hazard-miti-
gating requirements discussed in Section 1.1. For this reason, Hazard Relation Diagrams con-
tain exactly one hazard and one conceptual mitigation. This way, each Hazard Relation Dia-
gram will contain all hazard-mitigating requirements that are part of the conceptual mitigation 
for the same hazard. During validation, each Hazard Relation Diagram is reviewed individually, 
thereby allowing for each conceptual mitigation to be validated.  
In order to visualize these dependencies, Hazard Relation Diagrams comprise the following 
modeling concepts: 
 Hazard. The modeling concept hazard represents a hazard (in the sense of Definition 1) 
identified during hazard analysis (and hence represents a trace thereto). During validation, 
the adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements must be judged with regard to this hazard, 
for example, to assess whether or not its harmful effects have been reduced or controlled 
(i.e. made less likely to occur or possible harm has lessened, see [Leveson 1995]).  
 Trigger condition. The modeling concept trigger condition represents the trigger condi-
tions of the hazard (in the sense of Definition 2) identified during hazard analysis. Incor-
porating the trigger conditions into the Hazard Relation Diagrams allows stakeholders to 
assess whether or not the conceptual mitigation was successful in preventing the hazard 
from occurring in the first place (see [Leveson 2011a]). All trigger conditions for the spe-
cific hazard featured in the Hazard Relation Diagram must be depicted. 
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 Safety goal. The modeling concept safety goal represents the goal in the sense of Definition 
3 that has conceived as part of the hazard analysis in response to the hazard. This enables 
stakeholders to assess whether the hazard-mitigating requirements adequately refine the 
safety goal and hence serve as a conceptual mitigation for the hazard.  
 Hazard-mitigating requirements. The hazard-mitigating requirements (see Definition 5) 
in Hazard Relation Diagrams represent the requirements whose adequacy are to be vali-
dated. For this, it is necessary that between conducting hazard analyses and conducting 
validation, an engineering process took place, during which hazard-mitigating require-
ments were elicited and documented (see Section 1.3).  
 Partial mitigation. In model-based specifications, diagrams typically contain hazard-mit-
igating requirements that pertain to multiple hazards and may also contain model elements, 
which are unspecific for any conceptual mitigation (e.g. other requirements that are not 
safety-relevant, annotations, or the like). It is therefore necessary to differentiate the haz-
ard-mitigating requirements that pertain to some particular hazard from those that pertain 
to any other hazards or other model elements. The modeling concept partial mitigation in 
a Hazard Relation Diagram subsumes all hazard-mitigating requirements belonging to the 
specific hazard depicted in the Hazard Relation Diagram. It is to note, that as outlined in 
Section 1.1, there might be overlap in hazard-mitigating requirements, i.e. a hazard-miti-
gating requirement may aid in mitigating two or more different hazards. In this case, this 
specific hazard-mitigating requirement is subsumed by two or more partial mitigations, but 
in different Hazard Relation Diagrams (see Section 5.4 for more details). 
 Hazard Relation. The Hazard Relation is the central modeling concept, which associates 
exactly one hazard to its trigger conditions, safety goal, and the hazard-mitigating require-
ments to be validated, subsumed by the partial mitigation. A Hazard Relation can hence be 
thought of as an n-ary association between these modeling concepts. Each Hazard Relation 
Diagram contains exactly one Hazard Relation. 
5.2. Integration with UML Activity Diagrams 
In [Tenbergen et al. 2015], we have introduced Hazard Relation Diagrams as an extension of 
UML/SysML activity diagrams. These were extended in [Tenbergen et al. 2017] and are shown 
in the ontology in Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1 Ontological Foundation of Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
In Figure 5-1, the modeling concepts which constitute the extensions specific to Hazard Rela-
tion Diagrams and are depicted in light grey boxes. Dark grey boxes depict the elements of the 
UML meta-model for conventional activity diagram from [Störrle 2004] upon which Hazard 
Relation Diagrams build. It is to note that in accordance with Definition 4 and Definition 5, the 
ontological element Functional Safety Requirement subsumes both hazard-inducing and haz-
ard-mitigating requirements, since depending on the development situation, a functional safety 
requirement can have either role. In either case, UML activities and activity diagram control 
structures (i.e. fork, join, decision, and merge nodes) are used to document functional safety 
requirements. As can be seen, the core of a Hazard Relation Diagram is the Hazard Relation 
which associates one hazard to its set of trigger conditions, safety goals, and at least one partial 
mitigation. A partial mitigation (see Definition 6) subsumes a set of hazard-mitigating require-
ments (see Definition 5). It is to note that functional requirements for a system are in practice 
not specified in a single but in multiple activity diagrams. In consequence, partial mitigations 
could comprise hazard-mitigating requirements scattered across multiple diagrams, as we will 
illustrate in Section 5.4. In the following Section 5.3 shows the visual notation for this ontology. 
5.3. Visual Notation for the Modeling Concepts 
A visual language for Hazard Relation Diagrams was developed in accordance with Moody’s 
“Physics of Notations” principles outlined in [Moody 2009]. This visual language consists of 
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two components: a collection of diagrammatic elements to depict functional requirements (Sec-
tion 5.3.1) and a collection of diagrammatic elements to depict the modeling concepts defined 
for Hazard Relation Diagrams (Section 5.3.2). In Section 5.3.3, an example of the usage of the 
visual notation is presented. 
 Visual Notation for Functional Requirements 
As outlined in Section 5.2, Hazard Relation Diagrams are an extension of UML activity dia-
grams. Hence, in order to depict functional requirements, UML activity diagram notation is 
used. Table 5-1 shows the notational elements defined in UML activity diagrams used to depict 
functional requirements in Hazard Relation Diagrams.  
Table 5-1 UML Activity Diagram Elements Used to Depict Functional Requirements in Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
Modeling Concept Diagrammatic Element Description of Visual Notation Example Visual Notation 
Functional Requirement 
Action / Activity 
Rounded edge rectangle bearing the name of 
the action or activity. 
 
ObjectNode / 
Input Pin / Output Pin 
Square placed on the border of an action or 
activity bearing the name of the object being 
transmitted.  
Control Flow 
Directed arrow between two activities. Cor-
ners or bends are permissible. 
 
Data Flow Directed arrow between two object nodes. 
 
Fork Node 
Horizontal or vertical bold black bar with one 
incoming control or data flow and at least 
two outgoing control or data flows.  
Join Node 
Horizontal or vertical bold black bar with at 
least two incoming control or data flows and 
one outgoing control or data flow. 
 
Decision Node 
Diamond shape “standing” on one corner, 
bearing the decision condition as the name, 
and with one incoming control or data flow 
and at least two outgoing control or data 
flows, respectively. Guards in square brack-
ets represent disjoint decision alternatives. 
 
Merge Node 
Diamond shape “standing” on one corner 
with two incoming control or data flows and 
one outgoing control or data flow, respec-
tively. 
 
 
As outlined in Section 2.2, functional requirements comprise both hazard-mitigating require-
ments and hazard-inducing requirements. In Hazard Relation Diagrams, this comprises UML 
actions, fork-, join-, decision-, and merge nodes, as well as control flows and data flows (see 
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Moody’s principles of Cognitive Fit and Cognitive Integration in [Moody 2009]). Safety as-
sessment requires a precisely defined scope of the system under development in order to be able 
to ascertain effect of the system onto its operational context under consideration of the inputs 
the system receives from humans or other systems [Ericson 2005]. Therefore, the system bound-
ary is documented in Hazard Relation Diagrams using UML activities, which contain the afore-
mentioned modeling elements to document the system’s functional requirements (see Moody’s 
Principle of Complexity Management in [Moody 2009]). System inputs and system outputs are 
depicted using input pins and output pins, respectively. ObjectNodes are used to depict input 
parameters and output parameters for actions. Data flows are directed activity edges between 
input pins, output pins, or ObjectNodes. Control flows are seen as “primitive” data flows, which 
merely call the next action, and are documented as edges with no ObjectNodes.  
 Visual Notation for Hazard Relation Diagram Extensions 
As discussed in Section 5.2, Hazard Relation Diagrams extend UML activity diagrams with a 
minimal set of additional modeling concepts (see Moody’s Principle of Graphic Economy in 
[Moody 2009]). These modeling concepts are shown in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 Modeling Concepts of Hazard Relation Diagrams and their Visual Notation. 
Modeling Concept Diagrammatic Element Description of Visual Notation Example Visual Notation 
Hazard Hazard 
Rectangle featuring a flash symbol in the 
middle and bearing the stereotype <<Haz-
ard>> as well as the name of the hazard. 
 
Trigger Condition 
Atomic Trigger Condition 
Rounded edge rectangle with a dashed border 
bearing the name of the condition. 
 
Trigger Condition Conjunction Circle featuring two ampersand characters. 
 
Trigger Condition Disjunction 
Circle featuring two vertical lines (i.e. “pipe” 
operators) 
 
Safety Goal Safety Goal 
Rectangle bearing the stereotype <<Safety 
Goal>> as well as the name of the safety 
goal. 
 
Partial Mitigation Mitigation Partition 
Transparent rounded edge rectangle bearing 
the word “Mitigation.” 
 
Hazard Relation Hazard Relation Empty circle with a bold border. 
 
Hazard Association Hazard Association 
Line connecting a Hazard Relation with ei-
ther a Hazard, with a Safety Goal, a Trigger 
Condition tree, and at least one Mitigation 
Partition. Corners and bends are permissible.   
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As can be seen in Table 5-2, Hazards are depicted using UML class-style boxes with a lightning 
bolt in the middle to symbolize the potential for harm (see Moody’s principles of Semiotic 
Clarity and Semantic Transparency in [Moody 2009]). In the literature, a number of visual no-
tations for the modeling concept “goal” have been proposed, e.g. a parallelogram in KAOS 
[Darimont and van Lamsweerde 1996], a rounded-edge rectangle or variant thereof in i* [Yu 
1997], a cloud-symbol in Tropos [Giorgini et al. 2005], or a rectangle in GSN [Kelly and 
Weaver 2004]. Since Hazard Relation Diagrams extend UML’s meta-object facility and be-
cause Hazard Relation Diagrams can conceivably be used in combination with any of these goal 
modeling languages, no specific shape for safety goals is mandated. Instead, safety goals are 
modeled using a UML class stereotyped “<<Safety Goal>>,” thereby allowing future exten-
sions to derive dedicated symbols in combination with other model-based development ap-
proaches (see also the principles of Cognitive Integration and Dual Coding in [Moody 2009]).  
The hazard’s trigger condition is documented using rounded-edge rectangles, similar to 
UML states. In order to emphasize that these states are not system states, but conditions in the 
assumed operational context of the system, the trigger conditions are depicted using a dashed 
border. Furthermore, since trigger conditions in FHA may also be complex Boolean expressions 
rather than individual states (see Table 2-1), condition and disjunctions can be used in combi-
nation with trigger conditions to graphically represent Boolean expressions as a binary tree. 
Conjunctions and disjunctions between atomic trigger conditions are represented using node-
elements bearing ampersand and “pipe” symbols reminiscent of modern programing languages 
(e.g. Java). 
In Hazard Relation Diagrams, the partial mitigation outlined in Section 5.1 (see also Defi-
nition 6) are depicted using bold, dashed, rounded-edge mitigation partitions which encapsulate 
the hazard-mitigating requirements. This follows Moody’s Principle of Perceptual Discrimina-
bility (see [Moody 2009]). It is to note, that there may be multiple mitigation partitions (and, 
consequently, also multiple system boundaries) within one Hazard Relation Diagram, as is dis-
cussed in Section 5.4 in more detail.  
A Hazard Relation can hence be thought of as an n-ary association between the hazard, the 
safety goal, the binary tree of trigger conditions, and the mitigation partitions. In UML class 
diagrams, n-ary associations are represented as diamond shapes, which are visually identical to 
UML activity diagram decision and merge nodes. Since decision and merge nodes can occur 
(as part of the UML activity diagram modeling elements) in Hazard Relation Diagrams, this 
may lead to confusion (see Moody’s principles of Visual Expressiveness and Semiotic Clarity 
in [Moody 2009]). Hence, Hazard Relations are depicted using a circle with a bold border and 
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associate the hazard to its safety goal, its trigger conditions and to the mitigation partition by 
means of individual hazard associations. Hazard associations are depicted using simple, undi-
rected UML class diagram-type associations. Hazard associations bear no role and multiplicity 
information, as the roles are determined by the respective modeling elements (e.g. a hazard can 
only have the role of a hazard) and multiplicity is implicitly always “1”. 
 Example of the Visual Notation 
Figure 5-2 shows an example of all notational elements (with the exception of fork nodes and 
merge nodes) used in a Hazard Relation Diagram.  
 
Figure 5-2 Example of a Hazard Relation Diagram featuring Hazard H1 from Table 2-1. 
The Hazard Relation Diagram in this example features the ACC example from Section 2.1 and 
the hazard-mitigating requirements suggested in Section 2.1. As explained above, the hazard-
inducing requirements of the adaptive cruise control system from Figure 2-1 have been modeled 
using the notational elements of conventional UML activity diagrams. In Section 2.1, the func-
tional requirement “Compute Brake Force” has been determined to induce the hazard “Yaw 
5 – Modeling Concepts of Hazard Relation Diagrams 
64 
Momentum Causes Oversteering” (H1 in Table 2-1). This hazard is depicted using the lightning 
symbol from Table 5-1 and the associated safety goal “Prevent Loss of Control in Curves” (SG1 
in Table 2-1) is depicted a UML class stereotyped <<Safety Goal>>. The tree trigger conditions 
from Table 2-1 have been documented as a binary tree using a Trigger Condition Conjunction 
as well as a Trigger Condition Disjunction. In Section 2.1, it was suggested to limit the brake 
force depending on the rate of yaw in order to mitigate hazard H1. This conceptual mitigation 
has been refined into one partial mitigation containing several hazard-mitigating requirements 
surrounded by the bold, dashed, rounded-edge mitigation partition. In Figure 5-2, the mitigation 
partition hence comprises the added input pin, which queries the car’s yaw rate sensor, and the 
added decision node, which checks if the brake force was appropriately limited. 
5.4. Relationship Types between Hazards and Conceptual Mitigations  
In Section 1.2, we have discussed the typical relationships between hazard-mitigating require-
ments and hazards, as outlined in [US DOD 2010] (see p. 101). These relationships are more 
complicated in Hazard Relation Diagrams. In the following subsections, these cases are sum-
marized and applied on Hazard Relation Diagrams.  
 Case 1: One Hazard and One Conceptual Mitigation Documented in One Partial 
Mitigation 
In this case, hazard-mitigating requirements which implement the conceptual mitigation were 
added locally within that activity diagram using a single mitigation partition. The example for 
the Hazard Relation Diagram from Figure 5-2 shows an example of this case. This case corre-
sponds to the “One-to-One” multiplicity discussed in Section 1.2. However, as outlined in Sec-
tion 1.1, the multiplicity between hazards and the conceptual mitigation is rarely 1:1, because 
diagrams depicting functional requirements are not “cut” according to potential hazards, but 
according to the level of detail needed for the specific development situation (see, e.g., [Conway 
1967; Finkelstein et al. 1992]). 
 Case 2: One Hazard and One Conceptual Mitigation Documented in Several Par-
tial Mitigations, Within the Same Activity Diagram 
In these cases, several hazard-mitigating requirements that pertain to the same conceptual mit-
igation for exactly one hazard were added to different locations of one activity diagram. Albeit 
in principle, Hazard Relation Diagrams contain only one conceptual mitigation specific to one 
hazard (see Section 5.5), a conceptual mitigation in the sense of Definition 7 comprises several 
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hazard-mitigating requirements. This case hence corresponds to the “One-to-Many” multiplic-
ity in Section 1.2. Other than the counterpoint that all these hazard-mitigating requirements 
specific to some hazard must necessarily be part of the same conceptual mitigation, there is no 
ontological constraint (see Figure 5-1, Well-Formedness Rule 12, and Well-Formedness Rule 
15) that there is any other relationship between these hazard-mitigating requirements (e.g. that 
they must be documented in the same diagram, see Well-Formedness Rule 13). To allow for 
such non-trivial relationships between hazard-mitigating requirements, their conceptual miti-
gations, and hazards, the visual notation (see Section 5.3) of Hazard Relation Diagrams differ-
entiates between the term “conceptual mitigation” according to Definition 7 and the term “par-
tial mitigation” according to Definition 6. Moreover, in Section 5.3, the notational element 
“mitigation partition” was introduced to visually represent a partial mitigation. This allows as-
sociating multiple mitigation partitions (which comprise hazard-mitigating requirements per-
taining to the same conceptual mitigation, see Well-Formedness Rule 15) to the Hazard Rela-
tion of a Hazard Relation Diagram. An example of such a case is shown in Section 5.4.8. 
 Case 3: One Hazard and One Conceptual Mitigation Documented in Several Par-
tial Mitigations, Within the Several Activity Diagrams 
In these cases, several hazard-mitigating requirements that pertain to the same conceptual mit-
igation for exactly one hazard were added to different locations of several activity diagrams. 
This case is an extension of Case 2 and hence also corresponds to the “One-to-Many” multi-
plicity in Section 1.2. The difference to Case 2 is that in this particular case, one or more miti-
gation partitions surround hazard-mitigating requirements, which have been added to different 
activity diagrams. This case also comprises combinations of Case 2 and Case 3. For example, 
in some Hazard Relation Diagram, three mitigation partitions exist. Two mitigation partitions 
have been added to one activity diagram, whilst the third mitigation partition has been added to 
a second activity diagram. The example in Section 5.4.8 shows exactly this combination case 
to illustrate Case 2 and Case 3 together. 
 Case 4: Several Hazards and One Conceptual Mitigation  
In this case, several hazards exist that are addressed by the same conceptual mitigation. Since 
the purpose of Hazard Relation Diagrams is to visualize the dependencies of one conceptual 
mitigation and the hazard-mitigating requirements subsumed therein with respect to a specific 
hazard, the conceptual mitigation must be validated with respect to each hazard it is meant to 
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mitigate (see Well-Formedness Rule 14). Hence, for Case 4, the ability of the conceptual miti-
gation to mitigate a hazard must be validated in individual Hazard Relation Diagrams. In con-
sequence, for every combination of conceptual mitigation and hazard, one Hazard Relation Di-
agram must be created and subjected to validation. This case hence corresponds to the “Many-
to-One” multiplicity in Section 1.2.  
 Case 5: One or More Hazards and Several Conceptual Mitigations 
In this case, several hazards exist that are addressed by several, alternative conceptual mitiga-
tions (possibly with varying degrees of adequacy). This case corresponds to the “Many-to-
Many” multiplicity in Section 1.2. During development, combinations of Case 4 and 5 may 
occur frequently: For example, three hazards could be addressed by four conceptual mitigations, 
where one conceptual mitigation addresses two of the identified hazards and the other three 
conceptual mitigations address the last hazard. Like in Case 4, each combination of hazard and 
conceptual mitigation must be depicted in a dedicated Hazard Relation Diagram and subse-
quently subjected to validation. An example for this case is outlined in Section 2.1, where two 
conceptual mitigations were suggested for the same hazard. Hence, like illustrated in Section 
2.1, it must be noted that Cases 5 is limited to conceptual mitigation alternatives, i.e. conceptual 
mitigations that each address the same hazard entirely, regardless of the respective other con-
ceptual mitigations for other hazards. The purpose of validation in this case would be to assess 
not only adequacy of the conceptual mitigations, but also to assess optimality of conceptual 
mitigations, for instance to find a conceptual mitigation that is (1) adequate, (2) takes the least 
time to implement, or (3) is the most cost effective to implement. These are beyond the scope 
of this research.  
 Combination Cases 
As outlined in Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.5, combinations of the above cases are possible and likely 
quite common during development. For example, the case could exists, where multiple mutu-
ally dependent hazards, which require one or more mutually dependent conceptual mitigations 
exist. This might occur when one hazard “causes” another hazard. Albeit this might happen in 
practice, typically, Fault Tree Analysis is used to identify such interactions (i.e. to identify 
"minimal cut-sets" of hazards and their causes, see [Ericson 2005]). This is beyond the scope 
of this article. In principle, this can be addressed by integrating the top-most hazard from the 
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fault tree into the Hazard Relation Diagram, in satisfaction of Well-Formedness Rule 1. Mutu-
ally dependent conceptual mitigations can then be represented as several partial mitigations, 
similarly to Case 2. 
 Other Cases 
In any other case, i.e. in cases which do not conform to Case 1 through Case 5, no syntactically 
valid Hazard Relation Diagram can be created, as in these cases, at least one of the well-formed-
ness rules from Section 5.5 is violated. This might be the case, for example, if a Hazard Relation 
Diagram consists of several activity diagrams, is meant to contain a single conceptual mitiga-
tion for some hazard, but the Hazard Relation Diagram does not contain a mitigation partition. 
Such a case would be in violation of Well-Formedness Rule 13. For another example, if a Haz-
ard Relation Diagram contains several mitigation partitions within the same activity diagram, 
but no hazard, this would violate Well-Formedness Rule 1.  
 Summary and Example of Non-Trivial Relationships in Hazard Relation Dia-
grams 
Table 5-3 summarized the cases outlined in the previous subsections. An example for Case 2 
and 3 is given in Figure 5-3. In this example, the conceptual mitigation aims at detecting the 
actual yaw rate by querying individual wheels and delimiting the brake force accordingly (i.e. 
Mitigation 2 suggested in Section 2.1). As can be seen in Figure 5-3, the conceptual mitigation 
consists of hazard-mitigating requirements, which were depicted using three mitigation parti-
tions, where one belongs to the ACC and two belong to the electronic stability program (ESP). 
The hazard-mitigating requirements for the ACC comprise functionality to query the current 
yaw rate as well as the current yaw momentum and comprise functionality to compute the op-
timal brake force for each individual wheel (see Section 2.1). In addition, hazard-mitigating 
requirements have been included in the functional requirements of the ESP (Figure 5-3 shows 
an excerpt of a simplified ESP based on [Reif 2010]). Specifically, a function to compute the 
current yaw momentum has been introduced, which not only submits the current yaw momen-
tum to the function Compute Yaw Momentum Set Point, but also submits the yaw momentum 
to the ACC. Furthermore, the ESP accepts input from the ACC regarding the necessary brake 
force for each wheel and the ESP double-checks the brake force distribution for each wheel 
before initiating the deceleration through the wheels’ brake actuators. 
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Table 5-3 Types of Relationships between Hazards and Conceptual Mitigations. 
Case 
# 
Hazards 
# 
Conceptual 
Mitigations 
#  
Mitigation 
Partitions 
#  
Activity 
Diagrams 
Description Impact on HRDs 
1 1 1 1 1 
Exactly one hazard is addressed by exactly 
one conceptual mitigation and comprised 
in exactly one mitigation partition. The 
conceptual mitigation comprises hazard-
mitigating requirements which were added 
to exactly one activity diagram. 
Default case shown in Figure 5-2. 
2 1 1 2..* 1 
Exactly one hazard is addressed by exactly 
one conceptual mitigation, but the concep-
tual mitigation comprises hazard-mitigat-
ing requirements which are scattered 
across geometrically distant areas within 
the same activity diagram. 
Multiple partial mitigations are de-
fined for the conceptual mitigation. 
For each partial mitigation, a mitiga-
tion partition is included in the Haz-
ard Relation Diagram. 
3 1 1 2..* 2..* 
Exactly one hazard is addressed by exactly 
one conceptual mitigation, but the concep-
tual mitigation comprises hazard-mitigat-
ing requirements which are scattered 
across multiple activity diagrams. 
Extension of Case 2:  
Multiple partial mitigations are de-
fined for the conceptual mitigation. 
At least one partial mitigation is de-
fined for each activity diagram. The 
partial mitigations contain hazard-
mitigating requirements pertaining to 
the same conceptual mitigation. For 
each partial mitigation, the activity 
diagram and the corresponding miti-
gation partition is included in the 
Hazard Relation Diagram. 
4 2..* 1 1..* 1..* 
More than one hazard is addressed by the 
same conceptual mitigation, regardless 
whether the hazard-mitigating require-
ments are scattered across one or more ac-
tivity diagrams. 
The adequacy of the candidate con-
ceptual mitigation must be validated 
with regard to each hazard, hence re-
quiring one Hazard Relation Diagram 
for each hazard. 
5 1 2..* 1..* 1..* 
Multiple conceptual mitigations exist for 
the same hazard. Conceptual mitigations 
are independent from one another, i.e. 
comprise alternative hazard-mitigating re-
quirements, which might be scattered 
across different or the same activity dia-
gram. 
Reverse case of Case 4:  
The adequacy of each candidate con-
ceptual mitigation must be reviewed 
with regard to the same hazard. Just 
like in Case 4, this requires one Haz-
ard Relation Diagram for each con-
ceptual mitigation. 
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Figure 5-3 Example of a Hazard Relation Diagram featuring Multiple Mitigation Partitions. 
5.5. Well-Formedness Rules 
A number of well-formedness rules have been defined in order to check if Hazard Relation 
Diagrams are syntactically correct. The strength of Hazard Relation Diagrams lies in their abil-
ity to visualize the dependency between hazard-mitigating requirements with regard to their 
ability to mitigate one particular hazard. We define the following well-formedness rule:  
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Well-Formedness Rule 1: 
A Hazard Relation Diagram contains exactly one hazard documented in hazard 
analysis worksheets. 
However, since during certification, the safety of a system is argued by means of the adequate 
fulfillment of a safety goal (see Definition 3), which was put in place in response to a hazard. 
Therefore, that safety goal must be contained in a Hazard Relation Diagram:  
Well-Formedness Rule 2: 
A Hazard Relation Diagram contains exactly one safety goal documented in hazard 
analysis worksheets. 
At least one hazard-mitigating requirement must be defined to fulfill the safety goal into a con-
ceptual mitigation (see Section 2.1). However, missing hazard-mitigating requirements are 
likely to cause the fulfillment to be inadequate and hence the conceptual mitigation to be inad-
equate, which must be ascertained during validation. The adequacy of hazard-mitigating re-
quirements depends on the adequate fulfillment of the safety goal that corresponds to the haz-
ard, since it can only be judged whether or not the conceptual mitigation adequately fulfills the 
safety goal, if the safety goal and the hazard match:  
Well-Formedness Rule 3: 
The safety goal in a Hazard Relation Diagram is specific to the conceptual mitiga-
tion of the hazard depicted in the Hazard Relation Diagram. 
In addition, whether or not a hazard still occurs during operation depends on the circumstance 
of in the operational context (see Definition 2). Therefore, validation must consider the hazard’s 
specific trigger conditions: 
Well-Formedness Rule 4: 
A Hazard Relation Diagram contains the trigger condition identified during hazard 
analyses that are document the Boolean conditions from the operational context in 
which the hazard occurs.  
In practice, however, trigger conditions are rarely Boolean atomic states, but a list of operational 
conditions (see [Ericson 2005], p. 276), which may or may not occur together in order to induce 
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a hazard. A trigger condition can hence be viewed as a tree of atomic states consisting of con-
junctions and disjunctions in root nodes and atomic states in leave nodes: 
Well-Formedness Rule 5: 
The trigger conditions are represented in a Hazard Relation Diagram in a tree 
structure. 
In principle, n-ary tree structures may be permissible. However, for the purpose of creating 
Hazard Relation Diagrams (see Section 5.5), we restrict the tree structure to that of a binary 
tree, where the root of the binary trigger condition tree is either a Trigger Condition Conjunction 
or a Trigger Condition Disjunction (see Table 5-1). Since it is an inherent property of binary 
trees that there are at most two leaves, we define the following well-formedness rule: 
Well-Formedness Rule 6: 
The nodes of the binary trigger condition tree must be either a Trigger Condition 
Conjunction or a Trigger Condition Disjunction and there must be at most two 
leafs.  
Since a trigger condition can in turn be caused by some other trigger condition in a cascaded 
fashion [Leveson 1995], a binary trigger condition tree might contain further subtrees:  
Well-Formedness Rule 7: 
The leafs of the binary trigger condition tree must be atomic states from the oper-
ational context of the system under development identified during hazard analyses 
or the root for a subtree. 
During validation, it is assessed whether the hazard-mitigating requirements, which are special 
types of functional requirements (see Definition 5). In Section 5.1, it was outlined that hazard-
mitigating requirements in Hazard Relation Diagrams shall be documented using the same no-
tational elements as conventional UML activity diagrams. We therefore define the following 
well-formedness rule: 
Well-Formedness Rule 8: 
The hazard-mitigating requirements depicted in a Hazard Relation Diagram are 
documented using the notational elements of UML activity diagrams. 
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The hazard-mitigating requirements in a Hazard Relation Diagram must be syntactically cor-
rect, as syntactic correctness can be seen as a prerequisite for semantic validity (see Montague’s 
View of the role of syntax as described in [Heim and Kratzer 1998]). We hence define the 
following well-formedness rules. 
Well-Formedness Rule 9: 
There are no unconnected (“dangling”) activity edges in a Hazard Relation Dia-
gram. 
 
Well-Formedness Rule 10: 
There are no unconnected (“orphaned”) activities, control nodes, or pins in a Haz-
ard Relation Diagram. 
 
Well-Formedness Rule 11: 
There are no cliques of circularly connected, but otherwise unconnected activities 
and control nodes in a Hazard Relation Diagram. 
 
In order to be able to assess whether the hazard is adequately mitigated, the hazard-mitigating 
requirements for this particular hazard must be contained in the Hazard Relation Diagram. Ac-
cording to Definition 6, these hazard-mitigating requirements must hence pertain to the same 
conceptual mitigation. Since the conceptual mitigation represents merely one possible way to 
render the hazard sufficiently improbable to occur during operation, there may be multiple can-
didate conceptual mitigations which address the same hazard (see Section 5.4). Furthermore, as 
indicated above, the conceptual mitigation may be scattered across the underlying activity dia-
gram (a more detailed discussion of the relationships between hazard-mitigating requirements 
and hazards can be found in Section 5.4). In Section 5.3, we have introduced the modeling 
element of mitigation partitions for this purpose. Therefore, the following well-formedness 
rules follow:  
Well-Formedness Rule 12: 
A Hazard Relation Diagrams contains exactly one conceptual mitigation docu-
mented in at least one mitigation partition. 
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Well-Formedness Rule 13: 
A Hazard Relation Diagrams contains all mitigation partitions pertaining to the 
same conceptual mitigation. 
 
Well-Formedness Rule 14: 
The conceptual mitigation depicted in a Hazard Relation Diagram is specific to the 
hazard depicted in the Hazard Relation Diagram. 
 
Well-Formedness Rule 15: 
The mitigation partitions depicted in a Hazard Relation Diagram subsume all haz-
ard-mitigating requirements specific to the hazard depicted in the Hazard Relation 
Diagram. 
 
The most central concept in Hazard Relation Diagrams is the Hazard Relation. It serves as a 
graphical representation of the dependencies between the hazard (see Well-Formedness Rule 
1), safety goal (see Well-Formedness Rule 3), the trigger conditions (see Well-Formedness Rule 
4), and the hazard-mitigating requirements (see Well-Formedness Rule 15). In consequence, 
there can only be one Hazard Relation in a Hazard Relation Diagram that connects hazard, 
safety goal, trigger conditions, and mitigation partitions, as otherwise the dependencies would 
be ambiguous: 
Well-Formedness Rule 16: 
A Hazard Relation Diagram contains exactly one Hazard Relation. 
 
Well-Formedness Rule 17: 
The Hazard Relation contained in a Hazard Relation Diagram is associated with 
the hazard, the safety goal, the top-most element of the binary trigger condition 
tree, and all mitigation partitions depicted in the Hazard Relation Diagram. 
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6. Creation Approach for Hazard Relation Diagrams 
In this section, we outline the creation of Hazard Relation Diagrams. Section 6.1 gives an over-
view over the approach. Section 6.2 discusses the canonical artifact type formalizations that the 
approach is based on. Section 6.3 discusses the creation of Hazard Relation Diagrams based on 
the artifact type formalizations. 
6.1. Overview  
The approach to create Hazard Relation Diagrams makes use of the artifacts and their onto-
logical dependencies shown in Figure 4-1. In order to create Hazard Relation Diagrams, it is 
therefore necessary to first canonically formalize the artifacts as well as their dependencies 
before a two-step process can be applied to create Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
 Artifacts 
The following artifacts must hence be formalized: 
1. Functional Requirements. Functional requirements are UML activity diagram modeling 
elements, which are used to depict hazard-mitigating, hazard-inducing requirements, as 
well as other functional requirements with no impact on safety (but which are necessary 
to describe the system’s functionality). This artifact type is formalized in Section 6.2.1. 
2. Hazard Analysis Results. Hazard Analysis Results comprise the identified hazards, the 
hazards’ respective trigger conditions, and conceived safety goal. This artifact type is for-
malized in Section 6.2.2. 
3. Partial Mitigations. In order to formalize the dependency types depicted in Figure 4-1, 
this dissertation proposes a mitigation template, which allows stakeholders to document 
the dependencies between hazard-mitigating requirements, hazards, trigger conditions, 
and safety goals. The purpose of the mitigation template is therefore not only define the 
dependencies for a Hazard Relation Diagram, but also the hazard-mitigating requirements 
depicted therein. Hence, a mitigation template is defined for each partial mitigation to be 
contained in the Hazard Relation Diagram. This artifact type is formalized in Section 
6.2.3. 
4. Hazard Relation Diagrams. This is the artifact type to be created. It is formalized in 
Section 6.2.4. 
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 Creation Steps 
Mitigation templates therefore facilitate the creation process of Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
They contain the transformation steps necessary to obtain hazard-mitigating requirements. 
Moreover, they contain the dependencies to the hazard, trigger conditions, and the safety goal. 
Creation of Hazard Relation Diagrams can hence be enacted using two steps: 
1. Create Hazard-Mitigating Requirements. Functional requirements are changed by en-
acting the transformation steps to add, remove, or substitute model elements from an UML 
activity diagram. This is done for each mitigation template that pertains to the same 
conceptual mitigation (see Case 1, 2, and 3 in Section 5.4). The result of this step is a set 
of UML activity diagrams, which have been changed to contain hazard-mitigating 
requirements. This step is described in Section 6.3.1. 
2. Create Hazard Relation Diagrams. The UML activity diagrams resulting from Step 1 
are merged into one Hazard Relation Diagram and Hazard Analysis Results are appended. 
This is done based on the dependencies specified in the corresponding mitigation tem-
plates. This step is described in Section 6.3.2 
Figure 6-1 gives an overview over the creation process.  
 
Figure 6-1 Exemplary Overview over the Creation of Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
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In Figure 6-1, one mitigation template, i.e. Mitigation 1, specifies the conceptual mitigation for 
hazard Haz 1, consisting of the transformation steps HMR 2, HMR 3, and HMR 4. In Step 
1, hazard-mitigating requirements HMR 2, HMR 3, and HMR 5 are created (cogwheel labeled 
“1” in Figure 6-1). In Step 2, following the dependency to the hazard analysis worksheet from 
Mitigation 1, hazard Haz 1, its trigger conditions TC1 and TC2, as well as its safety goal SG1 
are appended (cogwheel labeled “2” in Figure 6-1). The Hazard Relation Diagram therefore 
contains the hazard-mitigating requirements specified in Mitigation 1 as well as the hazard Mit-
igation 1 is meant to mitigate, along with that hazard’s trigger conditions.  
 Well-Formedness Rule Satisfaction 
Using this process, the well-formedness rules from Section 5.5 can be satisfied. Their satisfac-
tion is summarized in Section 6.4.  
6.2. Canonical Artifact Type Formalization 
There is a number of artifacts which are either necessary inputs to create Hazard Relation Dia-
grams or are intermediate results of the approach. In the following, we provide formalizations 
of these artifacts’ canonical representations in order to present an approach to create Hazard 
Relation Diagrams in Section 6.3.  
 Functional Requirements 
In the following, we simplify the UML activity diagrams proposed in [OMG 2015b] to incor-
porate only those concepts needed to express system functionality that is input for hazard anal-
ysis worksheets (i.e. activities and actions, see [Ericson 2005]). Since these are equivalent with 
regard to their consideration in hazard analyses, we use the term “activity” to describe opaque 
actions, activities, events, etc. In addition, it is to note that in contrast to semantic formalization 
of UML activity diagrams, e.g., as proposed in [Eshuis and Wieringa 2001], the following for-
malism represents a purely canonical form of simplified UML activity diagram representations. 
Formalization 
For this work, every activity diagram 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 can be described as a tuple 
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 =  (𝑎𝑑, 𝐴𝑎𝑑 , 𝐸𝑎𝑑 , 𝑃𝑎𝑑 , 𝐶𝑎𝑑) (6.1) 
where 𝑎𝑑 is a unique, user-defined name of the activity diagram, 𝐴𝑎𝑑 = {𝑎1
𝑎𝑑
,
𝑎2
𝑎𝑑, … , 𝑎𝑛
𝑎𝑑} is a 
set of activities in that activity diagram, 𝐸𝑎𝑑 = {𝑒1
𝑎𝑑 , 𝑒2
𝑎𝑑 , … , 𝑒𝑛
𝑎𝑑} is a set of activity edges, 
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𝑃𝑎𝑑 = {𝑝1
𝑎𝑑, 𝑝2
𝑎𝑑 , … , 𝑝𝑛
𝑎𝑑} is a set of input/output ports, and 𝐶𝑎𝑑 = 𝐹𝑎𝑑 ∪ 𝐽𝑎𝑑 ∪ 𝐷𝑎𝑑 ∪ 𝑋𝑎𝑑  is 
a set of control nodes, which consists of a set of fork nodes 𝐹𝑎𝑑 = {𝑓1
𝑎𝑑, 𝑓2
𝑎𝑑 , … , 𝑓𝑛
𝑎𝑑}, a set 
of join nodes 𝐽𝑎𝑑 = {𝑗1
𝑎𝑑 , 𝑗2
𝑎𝑑, … , 𝑗𝑛
𝑎𝑑}, a set of decision nodes 𝐷𝑎𝑑 = {𝑑1
𝑎𝑑 , 𝑑2
𝑎𝑑 , … , 𝑑𝑛
𝑎𝑑}, and 
a set of merge nodes 𝑋𝑎𝑑 = {𝑥1
𝑎𝑑 , 𝑥2
𝑎𝑑 , … , 𝑥𝑛
𝑎𝑑}. An activity edge can be described as a tuple  
𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑒, 𝑚𝑒 , 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒)|𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑒 , 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒 ∈ (𝐴𝑎𝑑 ∪ 𝑃𝑎𝑑 ∪ 𝐶𝑎𝑑) (6.2) 
where the source 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑒 and the target 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒 is an activity, a port, or a control node, respectively, 
with a message 𝑚𝑒 being transmitted over the activity edge. An activity edge is called a control 
flow if 𝑚𝑒 = 𝜀 and a data flow if 𝑚𝑒 ≠ 𝜀. A port 𝑝 is called an input port if it is the source of 
a data flow 𝑒, i.e. 
𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝑎𝑑 ⊆ 𝑃𝑎𝑑|∀𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑎𝑑: ∃𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑒, 𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒) ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑑  
∧ 𝑝 = 𝑠r𝑐𝑒 ∧ 𝑚 ≠ 𝜀 
(6.3) 
A port 𝑝 is called an output port if it is the target of a data flow 𝑒, i.e. 
𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑎𝑑 ⊆ 𝑃𝑎𝑑|∀𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑎𝑑: ∃𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑒, 𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒) ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑑  
∧ 𝑝 = 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒 ∧ 𝑚 ≠ 𝜀 
(6.4) 
To further simplify the following formalizations, it is assumed that Activities are specified with-
out ActivityParameterNodes and that function parametrization is achieved through the message 
on an activity edge. 
A fork node 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝑎𝑑 is a control node that has one incoming activity edge and at least two 
outgoing activity edges which carry the same message, i.e. 
∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝑎𝑑: ∃𝑒𝑖𝑛 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛, 𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛) ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑑 ∧ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛 = 𝑓 
∧ ∃𝐸′ = {𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛} ⊆ 𝐸
𝑎𝑑 ∧ 𝑛 ≥ 2 
∧ ∀𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡) ∈ 𝐸′: 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝑓 ∧ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡 
(6.5) 
A join node is a control node with multiple incoming edges and one outgoing edge: 
∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑎𝑑: ∃𝐸′ = {𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛} ⊆ 𝐸
𝑎𝑑 ∧ 𝑛 ≥ 2 
∧ ∀𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛, 𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛) ∈ 𝐸′ ∧ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛 = 𝑗 
∧ ∃𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡) ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑑 ∧ 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡 = j 
(6.6) 
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A decision node 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑎𝑑 is a control node that has one incoming activity edge and at least two 
outgoing activity edges carrying the same message, and where each outgoing edge has a differ-
ent guard:  
∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷𝑎𝑑: ∃𝑒𝑖𝑛 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛, 𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑔𝑖𝑛, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛) ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑑  
∧ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛 = 𝑑 ∧ ∃𝐸′ = {𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛} ⊆ 𝐸
𝑎𝑑 ∧ 𝑛 ≥ 2 
∧ ∀𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡, 𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡, 𝑔𝑜𝑢𝑡, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡) ∈ 𝐸′ ∧ 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝑑 
∧ 𝑔𝑛−1
𝑜𝑢𝑡 ≠ 𝑔𝑛
𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∧ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑛
𝑜𝑢𝑡 
(6.7) 
In (6.2), we defined activity edges as a 3-tuple without a guard, as the guard plays no role for 
the remainder of the formalization. However, in order to differentiate decision nodes from fork 
nodes, it is necessary to specify activity edges as a 4-tuple, as shown in (6.7). 
A merge node is a control node merging multiple incoming edges after a decision node into 
one outgoing activity edge, i.e. 
∀x ∈ 𝑋𝑎𝑑: ∃𝐸′ = {𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛} ⊆ 𝐸
𝑎𝑑 ∧ 𝑛 ≥ 2 
∧ ∀𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛, 𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛) ∈ 𝐸′ ∧ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛 = x 
∧ ∃𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑡, 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡) ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑑 ∧ 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑡 = x 
(6.8) 
Example 
The activity diagram in Figure 2-1 in Section 2.1 is repeated in the following Figure 6-2 shows 
the excerpt of the functional requirements of the Adaptive Cruise Control.  
 
Figure 6-2 Excerpt of the Functional Requirements of the Example ACC from Figure 2-1. 
The activity diagram in Figure 6-2 can be written as: 
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𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝t𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = 
(
 
 
𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,
𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 ,
𝐸𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 ,
 𝑃𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 ,
𝐶𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣e 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 )
 
 
 (6.9) 
In order to increase readability of the example equations hereinafter, we introduce an abbrevi-
ated notation of the equations. In the following, the superscript indicating the name of an entity 
shall be left out if the references name is the name of the entity defined in the tuple. Therefore, 
(6.9) can be written in the following abbreviated form:  
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 =  (𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙, A, E, P, C) (6.10) 
The name of this activity diagram can be any unique ID or human-readable designation, e.g.: 
𝑎𝑑 = 𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 (6.11) 
As can be seen, the activity diagram contains five activities, three input ports, two output ports, 
and two control nodes, one decision node and one fork node. In order to create Hazard Relation 
Diagrams, it is necessary to provide a unique name to control nodes, although UML does not 
prescribe control nodes to have an identity. In the following, we use anonymous unique names 
for ports, fork nodes, join nodes, and merge nodes as well as the human-readable decision. 
𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = 
{
 
 
 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑞𝑢e }
 
 
 
 
 (6.12) 
𝑃𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = {𝑖1, 𝑖2, 𝑖3, 𝑜1, 𝑜2} (6.13) 
𝐷𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜l = {𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛? } (6.14) 
𝐹𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = {𝑓1} (6.15) 
𝐶𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 
= 𝐹𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 ∪ 𝐷𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 
(6.16) 
Activity edges describe data flows and control flows between activity, ports, and control nodes. 
The activity diagram in Figure 2-1 contains the following eleven activity edges:  
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𝐸𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = (6.17) 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (
𝑖1, 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟
′𝑠 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
) , (
𝑖2, 𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒
′𝑠 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
) ,
(
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑, 𝑓1
) , (𝑖3, 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑,𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒),
(
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,
𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑, 𝑓1
) , (
𝑓1, 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 +
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑙o𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
) ,
(
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒,
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛?
) , (
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛? ,
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑔i𝑛𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒
) ,
(
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒,
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒, 𝑜1
) , (
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛? ,
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
) ,
(
𝐶𝑜m𝑝u𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒, 𝑜2
)
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hazard Analysis Results 
The term “hazard analysis result” has thus far been used as an umbrella term which describes 
the output of some type of hazard analysis, documented in a hazard analysis worksheet (see 
Assumption 6 in Section 1.3). A “hazard analysis result” yields potential hazards which may be 
induced by hazard-inducing requirements, the trigger conditions for each hazard, and a possible 
safety goal which has been defined in response to the hazard. Hazard Relation Diagrams extend 
the functional requirements of the system (see Section 6.2.1) by the information elicited during 
hazard analysis.  
Formalization 
A hazard analysis result can hence be described as a function on some activity diagram which 
yields a hazard list, i.e. 
𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷) = 𝐻 (6.18) 
with 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 being the activity diagram according to (6.1) and 𝐻 being the resulting hazard list 
consisting of a number of hazards, 𝐻 = {ℎ1, ℎ2, … , ℎ𝑛}. A hazard can be described as a tuple: 
ℎ = ( 𝑎, 𝑡𝑐, 𝑠𝑔) (6.19) 
with a unique hazard name ℎ, which has an associated tuple consisting of an activity 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 
that gives rise to the hazard, a trigger condition 𝑡𝑐, and the safety goal 𝑠𝑔 that has been con-
ceived in response to the hazard.  
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The trigger conditions pertaining to a hazard are described as a binary tree, in which, like in the 
example in [Lehman et al. 2016], nodes AND- or OR-nodes associate exactly two binary trigger 
condition subtrees: 
𝑡𝑐 = (𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡, 𝑟, 𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡): 𝑟 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑗, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑗} 
∨ (𝑟 = 𝑐) ⟶ 𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡, 𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = ∅ 
(6.20) 
In (6.20), 𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡, 𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 represent the left and right binary trigger condition subtree, respec-
tively, which are associated through the root 𝑟. The root may be a conjunction (i.e. AND-node) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑗, indicating that both the left and right subtree must evaluate to true for the entire tree 𝑡𝑐 
to evaluate to true. Alternatively, the root may be a disjunction (i.e. OR-node) 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑗, in which 
either or both subtrees must evaluate to true for the entire tree 𝑡𝑐 to evaluate to true. If the root 
is neither a conjunction nor a disjunction, the root may be is a human-definable condition in the 
operational context of the system 𝑐, in which case it is implied that there are not further subtrees 
(i.e. 𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡, 𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = ∅).  
Example 
In Table 6-1, an excerpt of the Functional Hazard Analysis from Table 2-1 is shown, featuring 
only hazard H1 and both of its associated safety goals and its trigger conditions. 
Table 6-1 Excerpt of the Functional Hazard Analysis from Table 2-1 featuring Hazard H1. 
System Adaptive Cruise Control Functional Hazard Analysis 
Hazard-Inducing 
Requirement 
Hazard 
Effect Trigger Condition 
Safety Goal 
ID Description ID Description 
Compute Brake 
Force 
H1 
Yaw Momentum 
Causes Oversteering 
Loss of Control, caus-
ing Crash 
Driving through Curve 
and (High Vehicle Veloc-
ity or Low Road Surface 
Friction) 
SG1 
Prevent Loss of Control in 
Curves 
SG3 
Adjust Brake Force In-de-
pendently for All Four 
Wheels 
 
In this example, 𝑛 refers to the description of the hazard in Table 6-1, i.e. Yaw Momentum 
Causes Oversteering. Since there are two safety goals associated with hazard H1, 𝑠𝑔 could refer 
the description of either, i.e. Prevent Loss of Control in Curves (SG1 in Table 6-1) or Adjust 
Brake Force Independently for All Four Wheels (SG2 in Table 6-1).  
The trigger condition from Table 6-1 is shown in Figure 6-3.  
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Figure 6-3 Trigger Condition of Hazard H1 from Table 6-1 as a Binary Tree. 
In this example, the conditions Driving through Curve, High Vehicle Velocity, as well as Low 
Road Surface Friction have been defined. There is one disjunction associating High Vehicle 
Velocity with Low Road Surface Friction, thereby forming a subtree. This subtree is conjoined 
with the condition Driving through Curve. This binary trigger condition tree can be formalized 
a follows: 
𝑡𝑐ℎ1 = (
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑗, 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒,
(
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑗,
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
)
) (6.21) 
The remainder of the hazard analysis result table in Table 2-1 in Section 2.1 for the activity 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 from Figure 2-1, can hence be written as follows: 
𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) = {ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3} (6.22) 
ℎ1
𝑌𝑎𝑤 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟
=
(
 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
(
𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑗,
(
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑗,
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
)
) ,
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒)
 
 
  
(6.23) 
ℎ2
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
= (
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
(
𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑗,
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
) ,
𝑈𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖 − 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑑
) 
(6.24) 
ℎ3
𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
= (
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒, 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐e 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑠
) 
(6.25) 
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 Partial Mitigations 
Partial mitigations in the sense of Definition 6 subsume the hazard-mitigating requirements that 
are meant to mitigate a hazard. We have there introduced the modeling concept “mitigation 
partition” in Section 5.3 as the notational element to highlight hazard-mitigating requirements 
within a Hazard Relation Diagram (see Table 5-1 in Section 5.3). In Section 6.1, we introduced 
the concept “mitigation template” to document the ontological dependencies between hazards, 
trigger conditions, safety goals, and hazard-mitigating requirements from Section 5.1. Mitiga-
tion templates are used to document transformation steps to be enacted on activity diagrams 
containing hazard-inducing requirements in order to create activity diagrams containing hazard-
mitigating requirements with are enriched with hazard analysis results in order to create Hazard 
Relation Diagrams (see Section 6.1). A mitigation template hence represents a mitigation par-
tition in the created Hazard Relation Diagram. Table 6-2 shows a mitigation template that serves 
this purpose.  
Table 6-2 Mitigation Template to Specify Changes to Activity Diagrams Containing Functional Requirements in or-
der to Create Hazard-Mitigating Requirements. 
Mitigation Name Conceptual Mitigation name 
Reference Source Activity Diagram name  
Hazard Hazard name 
Insert Activity ID Activity Name 
  
Insert Activity 
Edge 
ID Source  Message Guard Target 
     
Insert Pin ID Pin Name 
  
Insert Control 
Node 
ID Node Type Node Name 
   
Remove Activity ID Activity Name 
  
Remove Activity 
Edge 
ID Source Message Guard Target 
     
Remove Pin ID Pin Name 
  
Remove Control 
Node 
ID Node Name 
  
Substitute Activ-
ity 
ID Old Activity Name New Activity Name 
   
Substitute Activ-
ity Edge 
ID Old Source Old  
Message 
Old Guard Old Target New Source New  
Message 
New Guard New Target 
         
Substitute Pin ID Old Pin Name New Pin Name 
   
Substitute Con-
trol Node 
ID Old Node Name New Node Type New Node Name 
    
 
In Section 5.4, we outlined that in practice, it might be the case that a hazard is mitigated by 
introducing hazard-mitigating requirements to different locations within the same activity dia-
gram, across multiple activity diagrams, or both. This means that multiple mitigation templates 
Canonical Artifact Type Formalization – 6.2 
85 
may be needed in order to visualize the hazard’s conceptual mitigation in the created Hazard 
Relation Diagram, i.e. one mitigation template for each mitigation partition.  
Formalization 
It follows, that the modeling concept “conceptual mitigation” from Section 5.1 is a collective 
set of partial mitigations, each of which represents a set of removed, inserted, or substituted 
activity diagram modeling elements: 
𝐶𝑀 = {𝑝𝑚1, 𝑝𝑚2, … , 𝑝𝑚𝑛} (6.26) 
Each partial mitigation 𝑝𝑚 is a tuple consisting of a human-readable name 𝑚𝑛 identifying the 
common conceptual mitigation in the sense of Definition 7. This means that all partial mitiga-
tions with the same name make up the conceptual mitigation. In addition, the partial mitigation 
𝑝𝑚 consists of a source activity diagram 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 according to (6.1) upon which the partial miti-
gation shall be committed, and a hazard ℎ according to (6.19) that shall be mitigated. A partial 
mitigation furthermore consists of a set of elements removed, inserted, or substituted, respec-
tively. For some partial mitigation 𝑝𝑚, it follows: 
𝑝𝑚 = (𝑚𝑛, 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷, ℎ, 𝑅, 𝐼, 𝑆) (6.27) 
Any type of element 𝑒𝑙 of the referenced activity diagram can be inserted, removed, or substi-
tuted (i.e. 𝑒𝑙 ∈ 𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 ∪ 𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 ∪ 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 ∪ 𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷). To simplify the following formalizations, sub-
stitutions are expressed as a remove operation followed by an insertion operation. Hence, ele-
ments to be removed, inserted, or substituted can be written as  
𝑅 = {𝑒𝑙1, 𝑒𝑙2, … , 𝑒𝑙𝑛} (6.28) 
𝐼 = {𝑒𝑙1, 𝑒𝑙2, … , 𝑒𝑙𝑛} (6.29) 
𝑆 = {(𝑒𝑙1
𝑜𝑙𝑑, 𝑒𝑙1
𝑛𝑒𝑤), (𝑒𝑙2
𝑜𝑙𝑑, 𝑒𝑙2
𝑛𝑒𝑤),… , (𝑒𝑙𝑛
𝑜𝑙𝑑, 𝑒𝑙𝑛
𝑛𝑒𝑤)} (6.30) 
It must also be noted, that insertion, removal, and substitution operations may result in syntac-
tically invalid activity diagrams. For example, if an activity is removed, any activity edge that 
had the removed activity as a source or target will be “dangling” in the sense of Well-formed-
ness Rule 9. For this reason, we have defined several well-formedness rules in Section 5.5 per-
taining to the syntactic correctness of the activity diagrams underlying Hazard Relation Dia-
grams. However, these well-formedness rules only pertain to syntactic correctness as it is rele-
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vant for the creation of Hazard Relation Diagram and do not cover any case of syntactic incor-
rectness of activity diagrams. It therefore remains the responsibility of the developer to ensure 
that that hazard-mitigating requirements are specified in a syntactically correct manner. 
In case there are two or more partial mitigation with the same name 𝑚𝑛, in which the same 
hazard ℎ and the same activity diagram 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 are referenced, but where the elements to be 
inserted, removed, or substituted differ, the following holds: 
∀(𝑝𝑚𝑖, 𝑝𝑚𝑗)|𝑝𝑚𝑖 = (𝑚𝑛𝑖, ℎ𝑖, 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖, 𝐼𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖) ∧ 
𝑝𝑚𝑗 = (𝑚𝑛𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 , 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑗 , 𝑅𝑗 , 𝐼𝑗 , 𝑆𝑗) ∧ 𝑚𝑛𝑖 = 𝑚𝑛𝑗 ∧ 
 ℎ𝑖 = ℎ𝑗 ∧ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑖 = 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑗 ∧ (𝑅𝑖 ∪ 𝐼𝑖 ∪ 𝑆𝑖) ∩ (𝑅𝑗 ∪ 𝐼𝑗 ∪ 𝑆𝑗) = ∅ 
(6.31) 
In this case, all partial mitigations belong to the same conceptual mitigation and must be enacted 
on the activity diagram 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷. This corresponds to Case 2 from Table 5-3. If there are two or 
more partial mitigations with the same name 𝑚𝑛, in which different hazards are referenced, 
regardless of the activity diagrams referenced therein, this represents an example of Case 4 from 
Table 5-3. This means the same conceptual mitigation is a candidate to mitigate multiple, inde-
pendent hazards. In this case, the changes from all partial mitigations belong to the same con-
ceptual mitigation, but must be enacted on each respective activity diagram for the conceptual 
mitigation to be completely enacted. This corresponds to Case 3 from Table 5-3. 
If there are two or more partial mitigations with the same name 𝑚𝑛, in which different 
hazards are referenced, regardless of the activity diagrams referenced therein, the following 
must hold: 
∀(𝑝𝑚𝑖, 𝑝𝑚𝑗)|𝑝𝑚𝑖 = (𝑚𝑛𝑖, ℎ𝑖, 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖, 𝐼𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖) ∧ 
𝑝𝑚𝑗 = (𝑚𝑛𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 , 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑗 , 𝑅𝑗 , 𝐼𝑗 , 𝑆𝑗) ∧ 𝑚𝑛𝑖 = 𝑚𝑛𝑗 ∧ ℎ𝑖 ≠ ℎ𝑗  
(6.32) 
This case corresponds to Case 4 from Table 5-3 and is indicative of the same conceptual miti-
gation being a candidate to resolve multiple, independent hazards. 
In case two or more partial mitigations have different names, they pertain to two or more 
conceptual mitigations (see above). If in all of these partial mitigation, the same hazard ℎ is 
referenced, regardless of the activity diagrams referenced therein, the partial mitigations repre-
sent an example of Case 5 from Table 5-3, where alternative conceptual mitigations to resolve 
the same hazard, for which the following holds (see also Well-Formedness Rule 12): 
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∀(𝑝𝑚𝑖, 𝑝𝑚𝑗)|𝑝𝑚𝑖 = (𝑚𝑛𝑖, ℎ𝑖, 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖, 𝐼𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖) ∧ 
𝑝𝑚𝑗 = (𝑚𝑛𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 , 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑗 , 𝑅𝑗 , 𝐼𝑗 , 𝑆𝑗) ∧ 𝑚𝑛𝑖 ≠ 𝑚𝑛𝑗 ∧ ℎ𝑖 = ℎ𝑗  
(6.33) 
Partial mitigation can be documented using mitigation templates. Mitigation templates docu-
ment the specific changes that are enacted on the source activity diagram containing the hazard-
inducing requirements in order to create a new activity diagram containing the hazard-mitigat-
ing requirements.  
Example 
The example in Table 6-3 shows the partial mitigation for the hazard-mitigating requirements 
in Figure 5-2 for Hazard H1 from Table 2-1.  
Table 6-3 Example of a Specified Mitigation Template to Mitigate Hazard H1 from Table 2-1 according to Mitigation 
1 from Section 2.1. 
Mitigation Mitigation for Hazard H1 
Reference ACC Functional Requirements 
Corresponding 
Hazard 
Yaw Momentum Causes Oversteering 
Insert Activity 
Edge 
ID Source  Message Guard Target 
4 i4 Yaw Rate true Compute Brake Force 
5 Compute Brake Force Limited Brake Force true 
max𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
1
𝑦𝑎𝑤 
6 
max𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
5
𝑦𝑎𝑤 
Limited Brake Force yes o2 
7 
max𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
5
𝑦𝑎𝑤 
Limited Brake Force no Compute Brake Force 
Insert Pin ID Pin Name 
3 i4 
Insert Control 
Node 
ID Node Type Node name 
2 Decision max𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
5
𝑦𝑎𝑤 
Remove Activity 
Edge 
ID Source  Message Guard Target  
1 Compute Brake Force Required Brake Force true o2 
 
As can be seen, the partial mitigation in in Table 6-3 bears the human-readable name “Mitiga-
tion for Hazard H1.” Furthermore, the partial mitigation references the activity diagram name 
given in (6.11) and the hazard from (6.23). Therefore: 
𝑚𝑛 = 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 (6.34) 
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 = 𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  (6.35) 
ℎ = 𝑌𝑎𝑤 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 (6.36) 
No element is substituted in Table 6-3. One activity edge is removed, namely the data flow 
from the activity “Compute Brake Force” to the output pin 𝑜2:  
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𝑒1
𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = (
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒, 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑜2
) (6.37) 
In consequence, the set of activity edges to be removed is as follows: 
𝑅 = {𝑒1
𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒} (6.38) 
In addition, several elements are inserted. Specifically, one additional input pin called 𝑖4 is 
added along with an activity edge that transmits the yaw rate to the activity “Compute Brake 
Force.” Furthermore, a decision node is inserted along with three data flows as follows: 
𝑒1
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝑖4 (6.39) 
𝑒2
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 = (𝑖4, 𝑌𝑎𝑤 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒) (6.40) 
𝑒3
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 = (max 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
5
𝑦𝑎𝑤) (6.41) 
𝑒4
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 = (
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒, 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
max 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
5
𝑦𝑎𝑤
) (6.42) 
𝑒5
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 = (max 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
1
𝑦𝑎𝑤 , 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
𝑛𝑜, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
) (6.43) 
𝑒6
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 = ( max 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
5
𝑦𝑎𝑤 ,
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒, 𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑜2
) (6.44) 
𝐼 = {𝑒1
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 , 𝑒2
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡, 𝑒3
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡, 𝑒4
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡, 𝑒5
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡, 𝑒6
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡} (6.45) 
The partial mitigation 𝑝𝑚𝑖 in Table 6-3 can hence be written as 
𝑝𝑚1 = (
𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1,
𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,
ℎ1, 𝑅, 𝐼, 𝑆
) (6.46) 
with 𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 = ∅ because Table 6-3 does not specify any elements to be sub-
stituted. Since there is only one mitigation partition in Figure 5-2, the partial mitigation from 
Table 6-3 is the only in order to mitigate hazard H1. Therefore, the conceptual mitigation for 
this hazard is the set containing 𝑝𝑚1
𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1
: 
Canonical Artifact Type Formalization – 6.2 
89 
𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 = {𝑝𝑚1} (6.47) 
Each partial mitigation belonging to the same conceptual mitigation must be contained in a 
Hazard Relation Diagram in the form of one mitigation partition (see Section 5.3). It is to note 
however, that mitigation partitions do not depict the human-readable name, as this is merely 
used to group those partial mitigations that belong to the same conceptual mitigation. 
 Hazard Relation Diagram 
The artifact type “Hazard Relation Diagram” is the output artifact produced by the creation 
steps outlined in Section 6.1. On the one hand, they contain UML activity diagrams containing 
hazard-mitigating requirements, hazard-inducing requirements, and other functional require-
ments without impact on safety. On the other hand, they contain hazard-analysis results, i.e. 
hazards, trigger conditions, and safety goals. Moreover, Hazard Relation Diagrams visualize 
the dependencies between these modeling concepts. 
Formalization 
A Hazard Relation Diagram ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 is described as the following tuple: 
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = (ℎ𝑟𝑑, 𝐴𝐷, ℎ, 𝑡𝑐ℎ, 𝑠𝑔ℎ , 𝐶𝑀, ℎ𝑟, 𝐻𝐴) (6.48) 
where ℎ𝑟𝑑 is a unique designation of the Hazard Relation Diagram. In a Hazard Relation Dia-
gram, a set of activity diagrams 𝐴𝐷ℎ𝑟𝑑 = {𝑎𝑑1
ℎ𝑟𝑑, 𝑎𝑑2
ℎ𝑟𝑑, … , 𝑎𝑑𝑛
ℎ𝑟𝑑} according to (6.1) is asso-
ciated with exactly one hazard ℎℎ𝑟𝑑 from (6.19), its trigger condition 𝑡𝑐ℎ in its Boolean repre-
sentation according to (6.20), and the safety goal 𝑠𝑔ℎ. Figure 6-4 shows the Hazard Relation 
Diagram from Figure 5-2 overlaid with the formal elements from (6.48). 
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Figure 6-4 Hazard Relation Diagram from Figure 5-2 overlaid with the formal elements from (6.48). 
Since the well-formedness rules from Section 5.5 prescribe that the trigger condition and the 
safety goal pertain to the hazard, we define4 the following relationship:  
𝑡𝑐ℎ ∈𝑡 ℎ (6.49) 
𝑠𝑔ℎ ∈𝑡 ℎ (6.50) 
In addition to trigger conditions, safety goals, and the hazard they pertain to, Hazard Relation 
Diagrams comprise a conceptual mitigation 𝐶𝑀ℎ𝑟𝑑 according to (6.47) which in turn consists 
of a set of partial mitigations according to (6.27). For each partial mitigation 𝑝𝑚 ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ𝑟𝑑, the 
activity diagram referenced in the partial mitigation must correspond to one of the activity dia-
grams in 𝐴𝐷ℎ𝑟𝑑: 
∀𝑝𝑚 ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ𝑟𝑑|∃𝑎𝑑 ∈ 𝐴𝐷ℎ𝑟𝑑: 𝑎𝑑 ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚 (6.51) 
                                                 
4  Here and in the following, we use the operator 𝑥 ∈𝑡 𝑈 to denote that some element 𝑥 is element of some tuple 
𝑈, regardless of its index within 𝑈. Since the tuples in this research are unambiguous due to their membership 
order and type-specificity, the following holds as a simplification of [Awodey 2011]: 
∈𝑡  ≔ ∃𝑥|𝑈 = (𝑢1,  𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑛) ∧ 𝑥 = 𝑢𝑡 , 0 < 𝑡 < 𝑛 
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As outlined in Section 6.2.3, each partial mitigation is depicted in the Hazard Relation Diagram 
using a mitigation partition. However, in contrast to the partial mitigation, the mitigation parti-
tion in the Hazard Relation Diagram will not include items that have been removed from the 
source activity diagram containing the hazard-inducing requirements. This is because a mitiga-
tion partition signifying removed elements would be empty, which may introduce ambiguity as 
to what information is highlighted in the mitigation partition. Yet, validation will not take into 
account individual changes, but instead will consider whether the collective impact of all en-
acted changes on the requirements are adequate to mitigate a hazard (see Section 6.2.2).  
Hazard Relation Diagram consists furthermore of a Hazard Relation ℎ𝑟ℎ𝑟𝑑 and a set of 
hazard associations 𝐻𝐴 = {ℎ𝑎1, ℎ𝑎2, … , ℎ𝑎𝑛}. Hazard associations can be seen as tuples con-
necting the Hazard Relation with either the hazard, the trigger condition, the safety goal, or the 
mitigation partitions: 
ℎ𝑎ℎ𝑟𝑑 = (𝑠𝑟𝑡, 𝑒𝑛𝑑)|𝑠𝑟𝑡 = ℎ𝑟ℎ𝑟𝑑 ∨ (
𝑒𝑛𝑑 = ℎℎ𝑟𝑑
∧ 𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝑡𝑐ℎ ∧ 𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝑠𝑔ℎ ∧
𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝑝𝑚ℎ: ∀𝑝𝑚 ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ𝑟𝑑
) (6.52) 
Example 
In Figure 5-2, we have shown a Hazard Relation Diagram which contains a conceptual mitiga-
tion for Hazard H1 from Table 2-1. The hazard-mitigating requirements upon which this Hazard 
Relation Diagram is based are created by applying the changes from the partial mitigation in 
Table 6-3 on the activity diagram in Figure 5-2 (see Section 6.3.1). According to (6.48), the 
Hazard Relation Diagram in Figure 5-2 can hence be written as:  
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = (
𝐻𝑅𝐷 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀1,
𝐴𝐷, ℎ, 𝑡𝑐ℎ , 𝑠𝑔ℎ, 𝐶𝑀, ℎ𝑟, 𝐻𝐴 
) (6.53) 
As the name for this Hazard Relation Diagram, the following human-readable designation was 
assigned: 
ℎ𝑟𝑑 =  𝐻𝑅𝐷 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀1 (6.54) 
The hazard depicted in Figure 5-2 is hazard H1 in Table 6-1, which has the safety goal “Prevent 
Loss of Control in Curve,” and the trigger conditions from (6.21). The hazard in this Hazard 
Relation Diagram is therefore the same as the one in as shown in (6.23) and the trigger condi-
tions are the same as in (6.21), 
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ℎ𝐻𝑅𝐷 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀1 = ℎ1  (6.55) 
𝑡𝑐ℎ = 𝑡𝑐ℎ1 (6.56) 
while the safety goal is: 
𝑠𝑔ℎ = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒 (6.57) 
According to (6.47), the conceptual mitigation in the Hazard Relation Diagram from in Figure 
5-2 is a set consisting of exactly one partial mitigation: 
𝐶𝑀 = {𝑝𝑚𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1} (6.58) 
Therefore, the set of activity diagrams in Figure 5-2 is also a set, specifically the activity dia-
gram containing hazard-inducing requirements (upon which the partial mitigation is applied), 
as shown in Figure 2-1: 
𝐴𝐷 = {𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝐴𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙}  (6.59) 
Since there is only one mitigation partition in the Hazard Relation Diagram in Figure 5-2, this 
means that there are exactly four hazard associations, which connect the Hazard Relation, ℎ𝑟, 
to the hazard, the safety goal, the trigger conditions, and the mitigation partition, respectively: 
ℎ𝑎1 = (ℎ𝑟 , h) (6.60) 
ℎ𝑎2 = (ℎ𝑟, 𝑠𝑔
ℎ) (6.61) 
ℎ𝑎3 = (ℎ𝑟, 𝑡𝑐ℎ) (6.62) 
ℎ𝑎4 = (ℎ𝑟, 𝑝𝑚
𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1) (6.63) 
𝐻𝐴 = {ℎ𝑎1, ℎ𝑎2, ℎ𝑎3, ℎ𝑎4,}  (6.64) 
6.3. Artifact Creation 
Creation of Hazard Relation Diagrams makes use of OMG’s Query/View/Transformation Op-
erational Mappings language (QVTo, see [OMG 2016]). QVTo is a transformation language, 
which allows enacting UML model transformations by either manipulating specific model ele-
ments (i.e. adding, removing, or substituting model elements), or by converting diagrams on an 
ontological level. In Section 6.1, we have outlined that creating Hazard Relation Diagrams is a 
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two-step process. Both steps involve the use of QVTo and is explained in the following subsec-
tions. Specifically, in Section 6.3.1, we outline how an intermediate activity diagram containing 
hazard-mitigating requirements can be created using the mitigation templates from Section 
6.2.3. This corresponds to the cogwheel labeled “1” in Figure 6-1 (see Section 6.1). Subse-
quently in Section 6.3.2, we explain how to append the contextual hazard information from the 
hazard analyses results (see Section 6.2.2), thereby creating the Hazard Relation Diagram. This 
corresponds to the cogwheel labeled “2” in Figure 6-1 (see Section 6.1). Moreover, in the fol-
lowing subsections, we will demonstrate how the satisfaction of the formalized well-formed-
ness rules for Hazard Relation Diagrams from Section 5.5 can be ensured.  
 Creating Hazard-Mitigating Requirements 
As outlined in Section 5.1, hazard-mitigating requirements documented in activity diagrams are 
the basis of Hazard Relation Diagrams. Hazard-mitigating requirements can be understood as 
specific changes to the functional requirements.  
Principle Mechanism to Create Hazard-Mitigating Requirements 
In the example in Figure 6-5, the principle mechanism to create hazard-mitigating requirements 
from transformation steps specified by means of the mitigation template from Table 6-2 is 
shown. 
 
Figure 6-5 Simplified Example of Transformation Steps to Create Hazard-Mitigating Requirements. 
In this example, an activity edge bearing a specific message (panel (1) in Figure 6-5) is replaced 
by a new activity and corresponding incoming and outgoing activity edges. As can be seen in 
panel (2), the stakeholder first specifies a transformation step to remove the old activity edge. 
Next, as can be seen in panel (3), the stakeholder specified an insertion operation to add a new 
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activity. Finally, in panel (4), the stakeholder specifies two new activity edges with new mes-
sages to add a “context” (in the sense of the call order indicated by incoming and outgoing 
activity edges according [OMG 2015b]) to the new activity. This example also illustrates the 
case, where a hazard-mitigating requirements corresponds to the change of a parameter for an 
activity. In accordance with [OMG 2015b], parameter nodes for UML activities and opaque 
actions are represented in a simplified manner using the message payload on activity edges. 
This means that in a case, where a hazard-mitigating requirement consists of a changed param-
eter for an activity (e.g., the substitution of a value, tolerance, worst case execution time, etc.) 
can be represented using mitigation templates by substituting activity edges with modified mes-
sages. 
QVTo Script to Enact Transformation Steps 
Documenting these changes is done using partial mitigation (see Section 6.2.3). These changes 
are automatically enacted on the activity diagram containing the functional requirements 𝑎𝑑𝑓𝑟 
in order to create an activity diagram containing the hazard-mitigating requirements 𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑚𝑟: 
(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟, 𝐶𝑀ℎ)
𝑞ℎ𝑚𝑟
→   𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑟 (6.65) 
where 𝐶𝑀ℎ = {𝑝𝑚1, 𝑝𝑚2, … , 𝑝𝑚𝑛} is a set of all partial mitigations referencing hazard ℎ. En-
acting these specific changes is done using a QVTo script 𝑞ℎ𝑚𝑟 which contains code operations 
𝑜𝑝 to systematically perform all insertions, removals, and substitutions of elements in all partial 
mitigations 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ that pertain to the same conceptual mitigation. It follows: 
𝑞ℎ𝑚𝑟 = (𝑠𝑖𝑔, 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡, 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒, 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒 , 𝑐ℎ𝑘)| 
𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝐼𝑐𝑚1 ∪ 𝐼𝑝𝑚2 ∪ …∪ 𝐼𝑝𝑚𝑛  
∧ 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = 𝑅𝑝𝑚1 ∪ 𝑅𝑝𝑚2 ∪ …∪ 𝑅𝑝𝑚𝑛  
∧ 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒 = 𝑆𝑝𝑚1 ∪ 𝑆𝑝𝑚2 ∪ …∪ 𝑆𝑝𝑚𝑛  
∧ 𝑝𝑚𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀
ℎ ∧ 0 < 𝑖 < |𝐶𝑀| 
(6.66) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑔 is QVTo script signature, i.e. the head of every QVTo script which specifies input 
and output models and selects their meta-models (see [OMG 2016] for more details on QVTo 
code) and 𝑐ℎ𝑘 is code needed to ensure that the resulting hazard-mitigating requirements are 
syntactically correct according to Well-Formedness Rule 9 through Well-Formedness Rule 11.  
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Script Signature 
Listing 1 below shows QVTo-style pseudo code which can be used for 𝑠𝑖𝑔.  
--- select meta-model types of input and output 1 
modeltype AD uses 'http://www.eclipse.org/uml2/5.0.0/UML'; 2 
modeltype mitigation uses 'http://sse.uni-due.de/mitigationtemplate'; 3 
--- define transformation function signature 4 
--- 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟is the activity diagram containing hazard-inducing requirements to be 5 
--- changed to hazard-mitigating requirements 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑟.  6 
--- 𝐶𝑀ℎ is a set of partial mitigations 7 
transformation generateHazardMititgatingReqs 8 
    (in 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟:AD, in 𝐶𝑀ℎ:mitigation, out a𝑐𝑡𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑟:AD); 9 
 10 
main() { 11 
    --- select mitigated hazard by checking which hazard is referenced in first  12 
    --- mitigation template in the array 13 
    Let ℎ𝑎𝑧 = ℎ ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚1
ℎ|𝑝𝑚1
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ  14 
    --- check if all templates reference same hazard 15 
    foreach 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ { 16 
        if ℎ ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ≠ ℎ𝑎𝑧 { 17 
            throw error(“Multiple Conceptual Mitigations detected. Aborting”); 18 
            return 𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑚𝑟 = ∅; 19 
        } 20 
    } 21 
Listing 1 Pseudo-Code Signature 𝒔𝒊𝒈of the QVTo Script 𝒒𝒉𝒎𝒓. 
As can be seen, QVTo requires the meta-models of the input and output artifacts to be specified. 
Conventionally, the fictitious URI shown in line 2 of Listing 1 is used to point to the UML 
superstructure for use in QVTo scripts to be executed using the QVT Operational Mapping 
Plugin [Eclipse QVT v3.5.0] available for the Eclipse Modeling Tool project [Eclipse Modeling 
Tools]. The fictitious URI given in line 3 points to the URI of an Ecore model representing the 
meta-model for the partial mitigations 𝑝𝑚𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀
ℎ which must be part of the implementation. 
In line 9, the source activity diagram containing hazard-inducing requirements 𝑎𝑑𝑓𝑟 and the set 
of mitigation templates 𝐶𝑀ℎ are defined as inputs and the target activity diagram that will con-
tain the hazard-mitigating requirements 𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑚𝑟 is referenced. Line 10 designates the beginning 
of the transformation script before the pseudo-code in lines 14 to 20 check if every mitigation 
template references the same hazard. If not, an error is thrown and transformation is aborted by 
returning 𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑚𝑟 = ∅. If the references hazards are all the same Well-Formedness Rule 13 is 
satisfied. 
Inserting Diagram Elements 
The next elements of the QVTo script 𝑞 are the insertion, removal, and substitution operations 
𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡, 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒, and 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒, respectively.  
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    --- insert activity diagram elements from each mitigation template 1 
    foreach partial mitigation 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ { 2 
        foreach operation 𝑜𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 |𝐼 ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ { 3 
            foreach element to be inserted 𝑒𝑙 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖
ℎ { 4 
                if 𝑒𝑙 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖
ℎ
 is of type activity { 5 
                --- insert new activity by computing new set of activities 6 
                    𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
𝑓𝑟
∪ el } 7 
                if 𝑒𝑙 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖
ℎ
 is of type pin { 8 
                --- insert new pin by computing new set of pins 9 
                    𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
𝑓𝑟𝑎 ∪ el } 10 
                if 𝑒𝑙 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖
ℎ
 is of type control node { 11 
                --- insert new control node by computing new set of control nodes 12 
                    𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐶𝑎𝑐t𝐷
𝑓𝑟
∪ el } 13 
                if 𝑒𝑙 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖
ℎ
 is of type activity edge { 14 
                ---insert new activity edge by computing new set of activity edges 15 
                --- make sure source and target of the activity edge exist 16 
                   𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
𝑓𝑟
∪ el| 17 
                   el = (src,m, tar): 𝑠𝑟𝑐, 𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∈ 𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
∪ 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
∪ 𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
 } 18 
             } 19 
        } 20 
    } 21 
Listing 2 Pseudo-Code of insertion operation 𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒕of the QVTo Script 𝒒𝒉𝒎𝒓. 
Listing 2 shows the insertion of elements. In line 2, the insertion operations are conducted for 
every partial mitigation in 𝐶𝑀ℎ. As can be seen, for every insertion operation (line 3), it is 
checked what type the element to be inserted is (lines 5, 8, 11, and 14, respectively) and the 
appropriate set of diagram elements is created by unifying the old set of activities (line 7), pins 
(line 10), control nodes (line 13), or activity edged (line 17). For activity edges, however, the 
activity edge to be inserted must have a source and a target that is already part of the hazard-
mitigating requirements (see line 18), as otherwise there is a chance that “dangling” activity 
edges may be inserted into the diagram. Hence, before inserting activity edges, all other activity 
diagram elements are inserted, thereby partly satisfying Well-Formedness Rule 9. 
Example 
The result of the application of the partial mitigation from Table 6-3 by means of the pseudo-
code in Listing 2 is shown in Figure 6-6.  
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Figure 6-6 Result of Applying the Partial Mitigation from Table 6-3 by Means of Listing 2. 
As can be seen, one anonymous input pin i4 has been inserted, along with the decision node 
maxbrake force ∗ 0.855 yaw⁄ . Furthermore, a number of activity edges where inserted, con-
necting the newly inserted pin and control node to the activity “Compute Brake Force.” As can 
be seen, the activity edge “Required Brake Force” from “Compute Brake Force” to the output 
pin o2 is still in place, as the remove operation specified in Table 6-3 hasn’t been enacted yet. 
Removing Diagram Elements 
Listing 3 shows the pseudo-code to remove elements. As can be seen, removing elements from 
the activity diagram is similar to their insertion: depending on what type the element to be 
removed is, a new set of such elements is computed that does not include the element to be 
removed. However, in contrast to insertion operations, when elements are removed, any activity 
edge that had the removed element as a source or a target must be removed as well in order to 
avoid dangling activity edges to remain in the hazard-mitigating requirements once removing 
operations have completed. Therefore, an additional removing operation is contained in Listing 
3 in line 18 in partial satisfaction of Well-Formedness Rule 9. 
    --- remove activity diagram elements from each mitigation template 1 
    foreach partial mitigation 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ { 2 
        foreach operation 𝑜𝑝𝑖 ∈𝑡 𝑅 |𝑅 ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ { 3 
            foreach element to be removed 𝑒𝑙 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖
ℎ { 4 
                if 𝑒𝑙 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖
ℎ
 is of type activity { 5 
                --- remove activity by computing new set of activities 6 
                    𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑑
𝑓𝑟
\el } 7 
                if 𝑒𝑙 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖
ℎ
 is of type pin { 8 
                --- remove pin by computing new set of pins 9 
                    𝑃a𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑑
𝑓𝑟
\el } 10 
                if 𝑒𝑙 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖
ℎ
 is of type control node { 11 
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                --- remove control node by computing new set of control nodes 12 
                    𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
𝑓𝑟
\el  } 13 
                if 𝑒𝑙 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖 𝑖
ℎ
 is of type activity edge { 14 
                ---remove activity edge by computing new set of activity edges 15 
                   𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑖𝑟
\el } 16 
                --- remove activity edges connected to the removed element 17 
                𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
𝑓𝑟
\ex | ∀𝑒𝑥 ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
: 𝑠𝑟𝑐 𝑒𝑥 ∨ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑥 = 𝑒𝑙  18 
             } 19 
        } 20 
    } 21 
Listing 3 Pseudo-Code of remove operation 𝒐𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒗𝒆of the QVTo Script 𝒒𝒉𝒎𝒓.  
Example 
The result of applying the remove operations specified in Table 6-3 by means of the pseudo-
code in Listing 3 is shown in Figure 6-7. The superfluous activity edge “Required Brake Force” 
from “Compute Brake Force” to the output pin o2 has now been removed, leaving only those 
hazard-mitigating requirements in place that were newly inserted. 
 
Figure 6-7 Result of Applying the Partial Mitigation from Table 6-3 by Means of Listing 2 and Listing 3. 
Substituting Diagram Elements 
In the following Listing 4, pseudo-code to substitute elements is outlined. For simplicity, it is 
assumed Listing 4 that only elements of the same type can be substituted with one another (see 
lines 6, 12, 18, and 24) albeit in principle non-homogenous substitutions may be permitted. As 
can be seen, substitution is basically an insertion operation followed by a removing operation 
as outlined in Listing 2 and Listing 3, respectively. However, in contrast to the pseudo-code in 
Listing 2 and Listing 3, some additional effort must be spent in order to identify whether the 
substituted element was a source of an activity edge (see line 33) or a target of an activity edge 
(see line 45). All activity edges for which this is the case must be must be replaced by new ones 
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which connect to the substituting element in as source or target, respectively. Again, doing so 
results in partial fulfillment of Well-Formedness Rule 9. 
    --- substitute activity diagram elements from each mitigation template 1 
    foreach partial mitigation 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ { 2 
        --- for each two elements to be substituted… 3 
        foreach operation 𝑜𝑝𝑖 ∈𝑡 𝑅 |𝑅 ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ { 4 
            foreach element to be removed 𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖
ℎ { 5 
                if 𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖
ℎ are of type activity { 6 
                --- insert new activity by computing new set of activities 7 
                    𝐴′ = 𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
𝑓𝑟
∪ 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑤 8 
                --- remove old activity by computing new set of activities 9 
                    𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐴′\el𝑜𝑙𝑑 10 
                } 11 
                if 𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖
ℎ are of type pin { 12 
                --- insert new pin by computing new set of pins 13 
                    𝑃′ = 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
𝑓𝑟𝑎 ∪ 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑤 14 
                --- remove pin by computing new set of pins 15 
                    𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝑃′\el𝑜𝑙𝑑 16 
                } 17 
                if 𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖
ℎ are of type control node { 18 
                --- insert new control node by computing new set of control nodes 19 
                    𝐶′ = 𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
𝑓𝑟
∪ 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑤 20 
                --- remove control node by computing new set of control nodes 21 
                    𝐶𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐶′\𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑑 22 
                } 23 
                if 𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∈𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑖
ℎ are of type activity edge { 24 
                ---insert new activity edge by computing new set of activity edges 25 
                --- make sure source and target of the activity edge exist 26 
                   𝐸′ = 𝐸𝑎𝑑
𝑓𝑟
∪ el𝑛𝑒𝑤| 27 
                   el𝑛𝑒𝑤 = (src,m, tar): 𝑠𝑟𝑐, 𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∈ 𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
∪ 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
∪ 𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
  28 
                ---remove activity edge by computing new set of activity edges 29 
                   𝐸𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐸′\el𝑜𝑙𝑑 30 
                } 31 
            --- find all activity edges that have 𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑑 as source 32 
            𝐸′𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
𝑓𝑟
= 𝐸a𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑖𝑟
\𝑒|∀𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐,𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟) ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
𝑓𝑟
: 𝑠𝑟𝑐 ∈𝑡 𝑒𝑙
𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∨ 𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∈𝑡 𝑒𝑙
𝑜𝑙𝑑  33 
            --- for every element that has 𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑑 as source 34 
            foreach (𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑑 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐,𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟) ∈𝑡  𝐸
′𝑎𝑐t𝐷
𝑓𝑟
|𝑠𝑟𝑐 = 𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑑) { 35 
                --- make a new activity edge to connect to the new element 36 
                --- with same message, guard, and target 37 
                𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐,𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟)|𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟 ∈𝑡 𝑒
𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∧ 𝑠𝑟𝑐 = 𝑒𝑙n𝑒𝑤  38 
                --- insert new activity edge into set of activity edges 39 
                𝐸′ = 𝐸𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
∪ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 40 
                ---remove activity edge by computing new set of activity edges 41 
                𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐸′\e𝑜𝑙𝑑 42 
            } 43 
            --- for every element that has 𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑑 as target 44 
            foreach (𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑑 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐,𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟) ∈  𝐸′𝑎𝑑|𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑑) { 45 
                --- make a new activity edge to connect to the new element 46 
                --- with same source and message 47 
                𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐,𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟)|𝑠𝑟𝑐,𝑚 ∈𝑡 𝑒
𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∧ 𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑒𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑤  48 
                --- insert new activity edge into set of activity edges 49 
                𝐸′ = 𝐸𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
∪ 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 50 
                ---remove activity edge by computing new set of activity edges 51 
                𝐸𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐸′\e𝑜𝑙𝑑 52 
                ---remove activity edge by computing new set of activity edges 53 
                𝐸𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐸′\e𝑜𝑙𝑑 54 
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            } 55 
        } 56 
    } 57 
Listing 4 Pseudo-Code of substitution operation 𝒐𝒑𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒕𝒆of the QVTo Script 𝒒𝒉𝒎𝒓. 
Example 
When applying the pseudo-code in Listing 4, all substitute operations specified in some partial 
mitigation is enacted in a similar fashion to the insert and remove operation from Listing 2 and 
Listing 3. However, since the partial mitigation from Table 6-3 does not contain any substituted 
elements, the result of applying that partial mitigation to the result from 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 using the 
pseudo-code in 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒  will not change the hazard-mitigating requirements any further and 
yield the same diagram as shown in Figure 6-7.  
Additional Well-Formedness Rule Checks 
When Listing 1 through Listing 4 have been executed, the hazard-mitigating requirements will 
consist of activity diagram modeling elements. In complete satisfaction of Well-Formedness 
Rule 9 as well as in order to satisfy Well-Formedness Rule 10 and Well-Formedness Rule 11, 
checks must be performed, as the developer that specified the mitigation template may have 
made a mistake resulting in incorrect diagram syntax. In Listing 5, pseudo-code for such checks 
are shown. Albeit some effort was undertaken in Listing 1 through Listing 4 to avoid dangling 
activity edges, doing so only captures dangling activity edges, where the source or the target of 
an existing activity edge was manipulated. Since in principle, it could be possible for the devel-
oper to intentionally add (albeit most likely by accident) activity edges that are not connected 
to some other modeling element, this check must be repeated after all insertion, remove, or 
substitution operations are complete. In Listing 5, this is shown in lines 1 through 6, where it is 
checked if there is any activity edge that has no source or no target, thereby satisfying com-
pletely. The following section of pseudo-code from line 7 to 20 is checking for orphaned cliques 
of circularly connected, but otherwise unconnected activities or control nodes in satisfaction of 
Well-Formedness Rule 11. This is done by checking every possible subset of sequential activity 
edges (i.e. where the target of one activity edge is the source of the next activity edge, see line 
10) can be traced to an input pin and an output pin. This is done by first assuming that the 
sequence of activity can neither be traced to either an input or an output and then checking for 
every activity edge, if its source is an input pin or the target is an output pin. If either an input 
pin or an output pin cannot be detected as a source or target of any activity edge in the clique, 
then the clique is considered orphaned and removed from the hazard-mitigating requirements. 
It is to note that removing the clique only extends to removing the associated activity edges. 
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Therefore, it has to be checked next, if removing these activity edges orphaned activities, pins, 
or control nodes. This is done Listing 5 from lines 21 to 63 in fulfillment of Well-Formedness 
Rule 10. First, it is assumed that all activities (lines 22 to 35), pins (lines 36 to 49), and control 
nodes (lines 49 to 63) are orphaned. Next, for each activity, pin, or control node, it is checked 
if there is at least one activity edge in the hazard-mitigating requirements that has the current 
activity, pin, or control node as either the source or the target. If one such activity edge was 
found, the current modeling element is not orphaned. Orphaned modeling elements are removed 
from the hazard-mitigating requirements. 
    --- check for dangling edges 1 
    --- find all activity edges where source or target is null 2 
    foreach  𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐,𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟)|𝑒 ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
 { 3 
        if 𝑠𝑟𝑐 = ε ∨ 𝑡𝑎𝑟 = ε { 4 
            𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
\𝑒 } 5 
    } 6 
    --- check for orphaned cliques  7 
    --- select all possible cliques where at least one activity edge has a target  8 
    --- that is the same also the source of some other activity edge  9 
    foreach 𝑉 ⊆ 𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
|𝑉 = {𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛}: 𝑒𝑖 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐
𝑒𝑖 ,m𝑒𝑖 , 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖) ∧ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖+1 10 
        --- assume 𝑉 is an orphaned clique 11 
        boolean 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 12 
        boolean 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 13 
        foreach 𝑒𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 { 14 
            --- check if a path can be traced to at least one input pin 15 
            if 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑎𝑑 { 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 } 16 
            if 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑎𝑑 { 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 } 17 
        } 18 
        if 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛d ∨ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 { 𝐸𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐸𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
\𝑉 } 19 
    } 20 
    --- check for orphaned activities, pins, control nodes 21 
    --- find all activities that are not source or target of an activity edge 22 
    foreach  𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎm𝑟
 { 23 
        --- assume 𝑎 is orphaned 24 
        boolean 𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 25 
        foreach 𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐,𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟)|𝑒 ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
 { 26 
           --- if 𝑠𝑟𝑐 or 𝑡𝑎𝑟 point to 𝑎, then 𝑎 isn’t orphaned 27 
           if 𝑠𝑟𝑐 =  𝑎 ∨ 𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑎 { 28 
               𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒  29 
           } 30 
        --- if no activity edge with pointing to 𝑎 was found, it will be removed 31 
       if 𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑:= 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 { 32 
           𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐴𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
\𝑎  33 
       } 34 
    } 35 
    --- find all pins that are not source or target of an activity edge 36 
    foreach  𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑎𝑑
ℎ𝑚𝑟
 { 37 
        --- assume 𝑝 is orphaned 38 
        boolean 𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 39 
        foreach 𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐,𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟)|𝑒 ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
 { 40 
           --- if 𝑠𝑟𝑐 or 𝑡𝑎𝑟 point to 𝑝, then 𝑝 isn’t orphaned 41 
           if 𝑠𝑟𝑐 =  𝑝 ∨ 𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑝 { 42 
               𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒  43 
           } 44 
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        --- if no activity edge with pointing to 𝑝 was found, it will be removed 45 
       if 𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 { 46 
           𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
\𝑝  47 
       } 48 
    } 49 
    --- find all control nodes that are not source or target of an activity edge 50 
    foreach  𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
 { 51 
        --- assume 𝑐 is orphaned 52 
        boolean 𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 53 
        foreach 𝑒 = (𝑠𝑟𝑐,𝑚, 𝑡𝑎𝑟)|𝑒 ∈ 𝐸𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
 { 54 
            --- if 𝑠𝑟𝑐 or 𝑡𝑎𝑟 point to 𝑐, then 𝑐 isn’t orphaned 55 
            if 𝑠𝑟𝑐 =  𝑐 ∨ 𝑡𝑎𝑟 = 𝑐 { 56 
                𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒  57 
            } 58 
        --- if no activity edge with pointing to 𝑝 was found, it will be removed 59 
        if 𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 { 60 
            𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
= 𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷
ℎ𝑚𝑟
\𝑐  61 
        } 62 
    } 63 
    return 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑟 64 
} 65 
Listing 5 Pseudo-Code Signature 𝒄𝒉𝒌 of the QVTo Script 𝒒𝒉𝒎𝒓. 
Example 
Listing 5 hence constitutes the last constituent 𝑐ℎ𝑘 of the QVTo script 𝑞ℎ𝑚𝑟, and would change 
the output of 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒  by removing orphaned individual modeling elements, cliques thereof, 
or dangling activity edges. In the case of the partial mitigation in Table 6-3, the pseudo-code in 
𝑐ℎ𝑘 would not find any such modeling elements and therefore not change the hazard-mitigating 
requirements any further, thereby rendering the same output as 𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒, i.e. again the same 
diagram as shown in Figure 6-7. 
Result of QVTo Script Application 
In practice, all listings can be written into one code file (as signified by the return statement and 
closing curly brace in Listing 5, lines 64 and 65. Executing all listings will hence result in 
applying the changes specified in the partial mitigation to the hazard-inducing requirements 
formalized in Section 6.2.1, yielding hazard-mitigating requirements from Figure 6-7, which 
can be formally written as outlined in the following. 
Since 𝑞ℎ𝑚𝑟 does not override the name, the name can be freely chosen, e.g.: 
ad = 𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (6.67) 
As can be seen from Figure 6-7, the activity diagram contains five activities and three control 
nodes, two of which are decision nodes and one is a fork node after Table 6-3. In order to create 
Hazard Relation Diagrams in the next step (see Section 6.3.2), it is necessary to provide a unique 
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name to control nodes, although UML does not prescribe control nodes to have an identities. In 
the following, anonymous unique names will refer to the fork, join, and merge nodes as well as 
the human-readable name will refer to the decision node added by the partial mitigation. 
A𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 
{
 
 
 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒,
C𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑞𝑢𝑒 }
 
 
 
 
 (6.68) 
P𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = {𝑖1, 𝑖2, 𝑖3, 𝑖4, 𝑜1, 𝑜2} (6.69) 
D𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
{
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛? ,
 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ≤ (max 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
5
𝑦𝑎𝑤)
} 
(6.70) 
F𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = {𝑓1} (6.71) 
C𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 
 F𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∪ D𝐴C𝐶 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
(6.72) 
Furthermore, application of partial mitigation in Table 6-3, the following fourteen activity edges 
are part of the set of activity edges in the hazard-mitigating requirements:  
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E𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (6.73) 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (
𝑖1, 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟
′𝑠 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
) , (
𝑖2, 𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒
′𝑠 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒n𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
) ,
(
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦,
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑, 𝑓1
) , (𝑖3, 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑,𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒),
(
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,
𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑, 𝑓1
) , (
𝑓1, 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 +
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
) ,
(
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒,
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛?
) , (
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛? ,
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒
) ,
(
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒,
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑛𝑔i𝑛𝑒 T𝑜𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒, 𝑜1
) , (
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑛? ,
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
) ,
(
 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ≤
 (max 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
5
𝑦𝑎𝑤)
)
 
 
,
(
 
 
𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ≤ 
(max 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
5
𝑦𝑎𝑤) ,
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 )
 
 
,
(
 
 
𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ≤ 
(max𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.85
5
𝑦𝑎𝑤) ,
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒, 𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑜2 )
 
 
, (𝑖4, 𝑌𝑎𝑤 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒)
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is to note, that albeit the pseudo-code above does create activity diagrams containing hazard-
mitigating requirements, dependence checks of operations have not been included as they are 
beyond the scope of this research. Yet, in some cases, such checks might be desirable, for ex-
ample, to avoid that no element is removed twice, inserted and immediately removed, etc., or 
to verify other coherence issues between subsequent operations. In Chapter 8, we will critically 
review such issues.  
 Creating Hazard Relation Diagrams 
In Section 6.3.1, we have presented an approach which allows for the creation of hazard-miti-
gating requirements from conceptual mitigations specified in mitigation templates. Since Haz-
ard Relation Diagrams are extensions of activity diagrams containing hazard-mitigating re-
quirements 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑟, a Hazard Relation Diagram ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 can be created by means of the QVT 
Operational Mappings language as well. 
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QVTo Script to Create Hazard Relation Diagrams 
The QVTo Script to create Hazard Relation Diagrams can be described as:  
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = (ℎ𝑟𝑑, 𝐴𝐷, ℎ, 𝑡𝑐ℎ, 𝑠𝑔ℎ, 𝐶𝑀, ℎ𝑟, 𝐻𝐴)| 
ℎ ∈ 𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑟) ∧ (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑟 , 𝑝𝑚𝑖)
𝑞ℎ𝑚𝑟
→   𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑟 
∧ ∀𝑝𝑚𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑀 ∧ ∀𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑟 ∈ 𝐴𝐷: 
(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑟 , 𝐶𝑀ℎ, 𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟))
𝑞ℎ𝑟𝑑
→  ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 
(6.74) 
where 𝐶𝑀ℎ = {𝑝𝑚1
ℎ, 𝑝𝑚2
ℎ, … , 𝑝𝑚𝑛
ℎ} is the set of all partial mitigations referencing hazard ℎ, 
which have been used to create the hazard-mitigating requirements 𝑎𝑑ℎ𝑚𝑟 out of the functional 
requirements 𝑎𝑑𝑓𝑟. Furthermore, 𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑑𝑓𝑟) is a hazard analysis conducted on the functional 
requirements 𝑎𝑑𝑓𝑟 yielding a list of Hazards that contains the hazard ℎ referenced by the partial 
mitigations in 𝐶𝑀ℎ. The purpose of the QVTo script 𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑟 is to append contextual information 
about hazard ℎ, thereby creating a Hazard Relation Diagram. Similarly to the QVTo script from 
Section 6.3.1, the QVTo script 𝑞ℎ𝑑𝑟 can hence be defined as: 
𝑞ℎ𝑟𝑑 = (
𝑠𝑖𝑔, 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐴𝐷 , 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑ℎ, 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑔, 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑐,
𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑ℎ𝑟 , 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐶𝑀, 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐻𝐴
) (6.75) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑔 is QVTo script signature head and 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑋 are operations to append the activity 
diagrams containing hazard-mitigating requirements, 𝑥 = 𝐴𝐷, the hazard, 𝑥 = ℎ, the safety 
goal 𝑥 = 𝑠𝑔, the trigger conditions 𝑡𝑐 specific to ℎ, 𝑥 = 𝑡𝑐, a set of mitigation partitions for the 
partial mitigations, 𝑥 = 𝐶𝑀, the Hazard Relation, 𝑥 = ℎ𝑟, and hazard associations, 𝑥 = 𝐻𝐴.  
Script Signature 
Listing 6 shows pseudo-code for the QVTo script signature head 𝑠𝑖𝑔. As can be seen, the script 
takes three input parameters: an activity diagram containing hazard-mitigating requirements, a 
set of specified mitigation templates specific for one hazard, and the results of a hazard analysis, 
which contain contextual information about the mitigated hazard (among others). The output of 
the script is a Hazard Relation Diagram. In lines 22 to 27, the same check for hazard specificity 
is conducted like in Listing 1, thereby fulfilling Well-Formedness Rule 14. After this check is 
complete, lines 28 to 39 check whether the hazard part of the hazard analysis results 
𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟). If the hazard is not part of 𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟), contextual information about the haz-
ard cannot be added to the Hazard Relation Diagram and creation fails. 
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--- select meta-model types of input and output 1 
modeltype AD uses 'http://www.eclipse.org/uml2/5.0.0/UML'; 2 
modeltype mitigation uses 'http://sse.uni-due.de/mitigationtemplate'; 3 
modeltype hazardanalysis uses 'http://sse.uni-due.de/FHA'; 4 
modeltype HRD uses 'http://sse.uni-due.de/HRD'; 5 
--- define transformation function signature 6 
--- 𝐴𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑟 is the set of activity diagrams containing  7 
--- hazard-mitigating requirements out of which a 8 
--- Hazard Relation Diagram ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 is to be created.  9 
--- 𝐶𝑀ℎ is a set of partial mitigations needed to append mitigation partitions 10 
--- 𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟) is the results of the hazard analyses that was conducted on the  11 
--- on the hazard-inducing requirements 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟 which yield contextual information 12 
--- about the hazard ℎ that was mitigated in 𝐶𝑀ℎ 13 
transformation generateHazardRelationDiagram 14 
    (in 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑟:AD, in 𝐶𝑀ℎ:template, in 𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟): hazardanalysis, out ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷:HRD); 15 
 16 
main() { 17 
    --- select mitigated hazard by checking which hazard is referenced in first  18 
    --- partial mitigation in the array 19 
    let ℎ𝑎𝑧 = ℎ ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚1
ℎ|𝑝𝑚1
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ  20 
    --- check if all templates reference same hazard 21 
    foreach 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ { 22 
        if ℎ ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ≠ ℎ𝑎𝑧 { 23 
            throw error(“Multiple Conceptual Mitigations detected. Aborting”); 24 
            return ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = ∅; 25 
        } 26 
    } 27 
    --- check if the mitigated hazard is part of the hazard analysis results 28 
    --- assume the mitigated hazard is not part of the hazard analysis results 29 
    boolean ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 30 
    foreach 𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∈ 𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟) { 31 
        if 𝑟𝑒𝑠 = ℎ𝑎𝑧 { ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 } 32 
    } 33 
    --- if hazard wasn’t found, Hazard Relation Diagram cannot be created 34 
    if ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 { 35 
        throw error 36 
        (“Mitigated Hazard is not part of Hazard Analysis Result Set. Aborting.”); 37 
        return ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = ∅; 38 
    } 39 
    --- check if hazard-mitigating requirements are referenced  40 
    --- in some mitigation template. 41 
    foreach 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑟 ∈ 𝐴𝐷ℎm𝑟 { 42 
        --- assume activity diagram is not referenced in mitigation template 43 
        boolean 𝑎𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 44 
        foreach 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ { 45 
            if 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑚𝑟 ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ  { 46 
                𝑎𝑑𝑅𝑒fe𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 47 
            } 48 
        } 49 
        if 𝑎𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 { 50 
            throw error(“No Mitigation Template available for Hazard-Mitigating  51 
                Requirements. Cannot create mitigation partition. Aborting.”); 52 
        return ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = ∅; 53 
        } 54 
    } 55 
Listing 6 Pseudo-Code Signature 𝒔𝒊𝒈of the QVTo Script 𝒒𝒉𝒓𝒅. 
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Similarly, in lines 40 to 55, it is checked whether or not the activity diagrams containing hazard-
mitigating requirements have at least one equivalent mitigation template. This is necessary in 
order to ensure a mitigation partition can be added to the Hazard Relation Diagram subsuming 
modeling elements that are part of some activity diagram (see Section 5.4). If at least one ac-
tivity diagram has no referencing mitigation template, creation of the Hazard Relation Diagram 
result in an error. 
Example 
Listing 6 hence checks the prerequisites in order to create a Hazard Relation Diagram. For ex-
ample, in order to create the Hazard Relation Diagram from Figure 5-2, it is checked whether 
all partial mitigations reference the same hazard, and whether that hazard is part of the Func-
tional Hazard Analysis result. According to (6.47), 𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1 contains only one 
single partial mitigation 𝑝𝑚1
𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐻1
.  
Appending Hazard Relation Diagram Extensions 
The partial mitigation references a hazard that has been identified by subjecting the same activ-
ity diagram containing hazard-inducing requirements (i.e. 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑝𝑚, see (6.35)) to functional 
hazard analyses (see (6.22) and (6.23)) that is also referenced in the partial mitigation (see 
(6.54)). Therefore, the pseudo-code will allow for performing the append operations in the fol-
lowing, as shown in the following Listing 7. In this listing, pseudo-code to create the compo-
nents of Hazard Relation Diagrams by performing the appending actions 
𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐴𝐷, 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑ℎ, 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑔, 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑐, 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑ℎ𝑟 , and 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝐶𝑀 from (6.75). As can be 
seen, in line 4, the hazard-mitigating requirements are added from the input parameters from 
Listing 6. Since this must be a set of activity diagrams, the hazard-mitigating requirements are 
depicted using the notational elements of UML activity diagrams such that Well-Formedness 
Rule 8 is satisfied. Subsequently, in line 6, the hazard that is referenced in the partial mitigations 
is added to the Hazard Relation Diagram. Since Listing 6 has ensured that all hazards referenced 
in the partial mitigations are the same, Listing 7 line 4 simply takes the hazard referenced by 
the first partial mitigation in 𝐶𝑀ℎ, thereby satisfying Well-Formedness Rule 1. In Lines 5 to 
13, the safety goals and trigger conditions specific to the hazard that was appended to the Hazard 
Relation Diagram in line 4 are appended as well, thereby fulfilling Well-Formedness Rule 2 to 
Well-Formedness Rule 4. This is done by looking up the hazard from line 4 in the hazard anal-
ysis results passed as an argument to Listing 6, retrieving the safety goal and the trigger condi-
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tions, respectively, and storing them in a local variable. Moreover, since for the trigger condi-
tions in 𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟), (6.20) holds, thereby fulfilling Well-Formedness Rule 5 to Well-
Formedness Rule 7. After all contextual information about the hazard form line 4 are added to 
the Hazard Relation Diagram, the pseudo-code in Listing 7, lines 14 to 19 creates a mitigation 
partition for each partial mitigation in 𝐶𝑀ℎ such that all inserted or substituted elements are 
subsumed by the mitigation partition. This way, Well-Formedness Rule 12 and Well-Formed-
ness Rule 15 are satisfied. Lastly, exactly one Hazard Relation is created in Listing 7, line 21, 
thereby fulfilling Well-Formedness Rule 16. 
    --- assign the hazard-mitigating requirements 1 
    let 𝐴𝐷ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = 𝐴𝐷ℎ𝑚𝑟 2 
    --- assign the mitigated hazard from 𝐶𝑀ℎ from Listing 6 3 
    let ℎℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = ℎ𝑎𝑧 4 
    --- assign safety goal and trigger conditions specific to ℎℎ𝑟𝑑
ℎ
 5 
    let 𝑡𝑐ℎ = ε 6 
    let 𝑠𝑔ℎ = ε 7 
    foreach 𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∈ 𝑓ℎ𝑎(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑓𝑟) { 8 
        if 𝑟𝑒𝑠 = ℎ𝑎𝑧 { 9 
            𝑠𝑔ℎ = 𝑠𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑧|𝑠𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑧 ∈𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠 10 
            𝑡𝑐ℎ = 𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑧|𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑧 ∈𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠 11 
        } 12 
    } 13 
    --- create mitigation partitions for each partial mitigation 14 
    let 𝐶𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = ∅ 15 
    foreach 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ { 16 
        let 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ\𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷|𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ∧ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐷 ∈𝑡 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ𝑠 17 
        𝐶𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = 𝐶𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 ∪ (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡) 18 
    } 19 
    --- create Hazard Relation 20 
    let ℎ𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 21 
 22 
Listing 7 Pseudo-Code Signature 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝑿of the QVTo Script 𝒒𝒉𝒓𝒅. 
Example 
The result of applying Listing 7 to the example of hazard H1 from Table 2-1 is shown in Figure 
6-8. As can be seen, the hazard from (6.23), its safety goal and the trigger conditions (see (6.21)) 
have been appended to the hazard-mitigating requirements from Figure 6-7. The Hazard Rela-
tion has been inserted and a mitigation partition was created for the partial mitigation in (6.47). 
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Figure 6-8 Preliminary Hazard Relation Diagram without Appended Hazard Associations. 
Appending Hazard Associations 
When Listing 7 completes execution, all Hazard Relation Diagram components of have been 
created with the exception of the set of hazard association 𝐻𝐴ℎ𝑟𝑑
ℎ
. This is done in the below 
pseudo-code Listing 8. According to Well-Formedness Rule 17, there must be at least four 
hazard associations: Between the hazard, the safety goal, the trigger conditions, and at least one 
mitigation partition, respectively, and the Hazard Relation. The hazard associations between 
the hazard, the safety goal, and the trigger conditions are created in Listing 8 in lines 4, 6, and 
9, respectively. It is to note, however, that the hazard association between the trigger conditions 
and the Hazard Relation must be made with the top-most element of the binary trigger condition 
tree, which is enforced in line 9 as well. Since Hazard Relation Diagrams can contain any num-
ber of mitigation partitions (however, at least one, see Well-Formedness Rule 12), all mitigation 
partitions must be associated with the Hazard Relation. This is done in lines 12 to 16, where for 
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each mitigation partition (see Listing 7), a hazard association to the Hazard Relation is created 
and appended to the set of all hazard associations. When line 16 completes execution, Well-
Formedness Rule 17 is satisfied. All components are then appended into a tuples denoting the 
complete Hazard Relation Diagram (line 18), which is subsequently returned by the script.  
    --- create hazard associations from each Hazard Relation Diagram 1 
    --- component to the Hazard Relation.  2 
    --- first, create hazard association between hazard and Hazard Relation 3 
    let ℎ𝑎1
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = (ℎℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 , ℎ𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷) 4 
    --- second, create hazard association between safety goal and Hazard Relation 5 
    let ℎ𝑎2
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = (𝑠𝑔ℎ , ℎ𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷) 6 
    --- third, create hazard association between top-most  7 
    --- trigger condition and Hazard Relation 8 
    let ℎ𝑎3
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = (𝑡𝑐ℎ , ℎ𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷) 9 
    --- subsume all three hazard association into one set of Hazard Relations 10 
    let 𝐻𝐴ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = {ℎ𝑎1
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 , ℎ𝑎2
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 , ℎ𝑎3
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷} 11 
    --- fourth (to n-th), create hazard association between every mitigation  12 
    --- partition and the Hazard Relation and add to set of Hazard Associations 13 
    foreach 𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ ∈ 𝐶𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷{ 14 
        let 𝐻𝐴ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = 𝐻𝐴ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 ∪ ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑝
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷|ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑝
ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = (𝑝𝑚𝑖
ℎ , ℎ𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷) 15 
   } 16 
    --- create a Hazard Relation Diagram tuple from all components 17 
   let ℎ𝑟𝑑 = "𝐻𝑅𝐷 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑" + ℎℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 18 
   ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 = (ℎ𝑟𝑑, 𝐴𝐷ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 , ℎℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 , 𝑇ℎ , 𝑠𝑔ℎ , 𝐶𝑀ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷, ℎ𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 , 𝐻𝐴ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷) 19 
    return ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑅𝐷 20 
}. 21 
Listing 8 Pseudo-Code Signature 𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝑯𝑨of the QVTo Script 𝒒𝒉𝒓𝒅. 
Result of QVTo Script Application 
Just like with 𝑞ℎ𝑚𝑟, Listing 6 to Listing 8 form the complete pseudo-code script for 𝑞ℎ𝑟𝑑, which 
yields a Hazard Relation Diagram fulfilling all well-formedness rules. For example, when pass-
ing the hazard-mitigating requirements from Figure 6-7, the mitigation template from Table 
6-3, as well as the Functional Hazard Analysis results from Table 2-1 as an input, the result is 
the Hazard Relation Diagram from Figure 5-2, which corresponds to (6.53).  
6.4. Summary of the Satisfaction of Well-Formedness Rules 
If the approach presented in Section 6.3 is used to create Hazard Relation Diagrams all well-
formedness rules defined in Section 5.5 are satisfied. In Section 6.3, satisfaction of individual 
well-formedness rules have already been explained. In the following Table 6-4, we summarize 
the satisfaction of these rules. In this table, the “line” refers to the line in the respective listing, 
in which the pseudo-code specific for the respective well-formedness rule can be found. 
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Table 6-4 Summary of Well-Formedness Rules and their Satisfaction. 
Rule No. Description Listing, Line(s) 
1 A Hazard Relation Diagram contains exactly one hazard documented in hazard analysis worksheets. Listing 7, Line 4 
2 
A Hazard Relation Diagram contains exactly one safety goal documented in hazard analysis work-
sheets. 
Listing 7, Lines 5 to 13 3 
The safety goal in a Hazard Relation Diagram is specific to the conceptual mitigation of the hazard 
depicted in the Hazard Relation Diagram. 
4 
A Hazard Relation Diagram contains the trigger condition identified during hazard analyses that are 
document the Boolean conditions from the operational context in which the hazard occurs. 
5 The trigger conditions are represented in a Hazard Relation Diagram in a tree structure. 
Listing 7, Line 11 
6 
The nodes of the binary trigger condition tree must be either a Trigger Condition Conjunction or a 
Trigger Condition Disjunction and there must be at most two leafs. 
7 
The leafs of the binary trigger condition tree must be atomic states from the operational context of 
the system under development identified during hazard analyses or the root for a subtree. 
8 
The hazard-mitigating requirements depicted in a Hazard Relation Diagram are documented using 
the notational elements of UML activity diagrams. 
Listing 7, Line 2 
9 There are no unconnected (“dangling”) activity edges in a Hazard Relation Diagram. Listing 5, Lines 1-6. 
10 
There are no unconnected (“orphaned”) activities, control nodes, or pins in a Hazard Relation Dia-
gram. 
Listing 5,  
Lines 22-35;  
Lines 36-49;  
Lines 49-63 
11 
There are no cliques of circularly connected, but otherwise unconnected activities and control nodes 
in a Hazard Relation Diagram. 
Listing 5, Lines 7-20, 
12 
A Hazard Relation Diagrams contains exactly one conceptual mitigation documented in at least one 
mitigation partition. 
Listing 7, Lines 14-19 
13 
A Hazard Relation Diagrams contains all mitigation partitions pertaining to the same conceptual mit-
igation. 
Listing 1, Lines 14-20 
14 
The conceptual mitigation depicted in a Hazard Relation Diagram is specific to the hazard depicted 
in the Hazard Relation Diagram. 
Listing 6, Lines 19-24 
15 
The mitigation partitions depicted in a Hazard Relation Diagram subsume all hazard-mitigating re-
quirements specific to the hazard depicted in the Hazard Relation Diagram. 
Listing 7, Lines 17-18 
16 A Hazard Relation Diagram contains exactly one Hazard Relation. Listing 7, Line 21 
17 
The Hazard Relation contained in a Hazard Relation Diagram is associated with the hazard, the 
safety goal, the top-most element of the binary trigger condition tree, and all mitigation partitions de-
picted in the Hazard Relation Diagram. 
Listing 8, Lines 1-16 
 
It is to note, that the manual activity of conceiving a mitigating and the automatic activity of 
creating hazard-mitigating requirements could in principle be done simultaneously by manually 
modeling a new hazard-mitigating activity diagram directly. However, in that case, Well-
Formedness Rule 13 and Well-Formedness Rule 15 must be ensured manually. 
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7. Tool Support for Hazard Relation Diagrams 
In this chapter, we discuss the tool support for Hazard Relation Diagrams. Section 7.1 presents 
an overview over the purpose of the developed tools and rationales for the chosen technologies. 
Section 7.2 presents the profile for Enterprise Architect and Section 7.3 presents the tool pro-
totype for the creation of Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
7.1. Purpose and Rationales of Technology Choices 
The purpose of the tool support for Hazard Relation Diagrams is to provide stakeholders with 
the ability to create Hazard Relation Diagrams during development. This can in principle be 
done in two different ways: manually, using a suitable modeling tool, and automatically, using 
the approach from Chapter 5.5. In both cases, it is necessary to implement the modeling con-
cepts of Hazard Relation Diagrams from Chapter 5. To do so, the following two tool support 
components were implemented: 
 Hazard Relation Diagram Profile for Enterprise Architect. Enterprise Architect (see 
[Enterprise Architect]) is a UML-compatible modeling tool. It was chosen to implement a 
Hazard Relation Diagram profile due to its profile extension mechanism. The extension 
mechanism allows implementing conceptual UML profiles, like the ontological foundation 
of Hazard Relation Diagrams from Section 5.1, into technical profiles. This allows simple 
implementation of Hazard Relation Diagrams into Enterprise Architect such that Hazard 
Relation Diagrams can be easily modeled manually by stakeholders during development. 
The Hazard Relation Diagram Profile for Enterprise Architect is described in Section 7.2. 
 A Tool Prototype to Create Hazard Relation Diagrams for Eclipse. The tool prototype 
was implemented using Eclipse UML2 tools [Eclipse UML2 Tools]. Eclipse UML2 tools 
provides an Eclipse Modeling Framework based implementation of the UML2 specifica-
tion [OMG 2015b] as well as the Meta Object Facility [OMG 2015a]. It does not only 
provide the graphical representations of UML modeling components, it also allows enforc-
ing syntactic and semantic rules of UML. Furthermore, Eclipse UML2 tools can be used 
alongside other Eclipse plugins, such as Eclipse Papyrus [Eclipse Papyrus]. For Eclipse 
Papyrus, Eclipse an implementation of OMG’s Query/View/Transformation Operational 
Mappings language [OMG 2016] is available [Eclipse QVT v3.5.0], which provides an 
environment to execute implemented QVTo scripts. Section 7.3 describes the tool proto-
type to create Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
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7.2. Hazard Relation Diagram Profile 
In this section, the Hazard Relation Diagram Profile for Enterprise Architect is described. Sec-
tion 7.2.1 describes the systematic approach for creating the profile. Section 7.2.2 describes the 
resulting profile5. 
 Systematic Definition of the Conceptual Profile 
In the context of UML/SysML, the term “profile” describes a conceptual extension of the lan-
guage features defined in the Meta Object Facility [OMG 2015a]. In order to implement con-
ceptual UML/SysML profiles into tools, the conceptual UML/SysML profile must be imple-
mented in a technical profile using the mechanisms provided by the implementation tool. In 
order to achieve this, the systematic approach proposed in [Lagarde et al. 2007; Lagarde et al. 
2008] was tailored and applied (see [Tenbergen et al. 2013] for a more detailed discussion of 
the tailored approach). The approach consists of the following steps: 
1. Step 1: Identification and Documentation of the relevant Modeling Concepts. In this 
step, the modeling concepts of Hazard Relation Diagrams that must be implemented in 
the profile are identified and the relationships with one another are documented. The pur-
pose is to ensure that the profile is going to be complete and consistent with regard to the 
ontological foundations of Hazard Relation Diagrams from Section 5.1.  
2. Step 2: Quality Assurance and Completion of the Profile Ontology. This step entails 
refining associations between the profile components are refined into those relationships 
specified by the well-formedness rules of Hazard Relation Diagrams (see Section 5.5). 
The purpose of this step is to ensure that the profile is adequate with regard to the visual 
notation and the syntactic relationships of Hazard Relation Diagrams.  
3. Step 3: Transposing the Profile Ontology into a Preliminary Profile Metamodel. In 
this step, the profile ontology further refined into a preliminary profile metamodel for the 
conceptual Hazard Relation Diagram profile. This step entails importing existing UML 
modeling concepts and UML packages that is reused in the profile.  
4. Step 4: Refining the Preliminary Profile Metamodel into the final Conceptual Profile 
Metamodel. In the final step, the preliminary profile metamodel is completed by allocat-
                                                 
5 The Hazard Relation Diagram Profile for Enterprise Architect as well as a guide to install and use the profile is 
available at http://goo.gl/MdxJie. 
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ing appropriate Meta Object Facility metaclasses to the Hazard Relation Diagram model-
ing elements, thereby creating the profile’s stereotypes. This entails that for every profile 
element that denotes a visual notational element in Hazard Relation Diagrams and that 
cannot make use of imported UML packages, appropriate metaclasses from the Meta Ob-
ject Facility must be found and inherited from in accordance with the ontological founda-
tions of Hazard Relation Diagrams (see Section 5.1).  
The resulting conceptual profile for the technical implementation is shown in Figure 7-1.  
 
Figure 7-1 Conceptual Metamodel of the Hazard Relation Diagram Profile. 
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As can be seen by the white boxes, the stereotype “Hazard Relation” specializes the metaclass 
“n-ary Association.” Similarly, the stereotype “Hazard Association” now inherits from the 
UML metaclass “Association.” The stereotypes “Hazard” and “Safety Goal” specialize the met-
aclass “Class,” while atomic trigger conditions inherit from the UML metaclass “State.” Since 
there is no direct correspondence between trigger condition disjunctions, trigger condition con-
junctions and some UML metaclass, the metaclass “Junction” has been used as a close approx-
imation with regard to allowable static and dynamic associations [OMG 2015b]. The stereotype 
“Mitigation Partition” inherits from the UML metaclass “ActivityRegion” due to the similar 
visual representation. 
 Description of the Technical Profile for Enterprise Architect 
Based on the conceptual profile from Section 7.2.1, the technical profile for Hazard Relation 
Diagrams was implemented into Enterprise Architect. Specifically, each implemented concep-
tual profile in Enterprise Architect consists of the following three packages.  
The “diagram profile” package trivially defines a new technical Enterprise Architect meta-
class representing Hazard Relation Diagrams as a new diagram type. This metaclass inherits 
from Enterprise Architect’s built-in metaclass representing the diagram type “Diagram_Dy-
namic,” which represents UML activity diagrams. This way, Hazard Relation Diagrams are 
established as an extension of UML activity diagrams within Enterprise Architect. 
The “toolbox profile” package defines the user interface to allow users of Enterprise Archi-
tect to place Hazard Relation Diagram modeling elements onto the newly defined diagram type. 
For this purpose, element types and association types of UML activity diagrams and Hazard 
Relation Diagrams, respectively, are represented by technical metaclasses within the package. 
These metaclasses are then aggregated to the built-in metaclass “ToolboxPage.” 
The “Hazard Relation Diagram Profile” package defines the stereotypes, association types, 
and dependencies from the conceptual UML/SysML profile from Section 7.2.1 into Enterprise 
Architect (see Figure 7-1). In order to integrate them into Enterprise Architect, it was necessary 
to define new classes for each modeling concept and inherit from the appropriate built-in En-
terprise Architect metaclass representation of the Meta Object Facility element. This yields the 
technical profile for Hazard Relation Diagrams. In contrast to Figure 7-1, where the stereotype 
“Hazard Relation” only inherits from the metaclass “n-ary Association,” implementing this re-
lationship in the technical profile is insufficient, as Enterprise Architect strictly enforces the 
separation between static and dynamic UML diagram types [SparxSystems 2014]. To accom-
modate this limitation, a second generalization was added for the stereotype “Hazard Relation” 
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such that it also inherits from the metaclass “MergeNode,” thereby implementing the semantics 
of the n-ary association (see Section 5.1) with the syntax of dynamic UML diagrams 
[Rumbaugh et al. 2004]. Furthermore, each stereotype defines the attributes “_image” and 
“_metatype.” These attributes are built-in tagged values to be added to the custom stereotypes 
[OMG 2015a] of Enterprise Architect [SparxSystems 2014]. The attribute “_metatype” can be 
used to define the human-readable name of the stereotype, while the attribute “_image” can be 
used to define the specific visual appearance of the stereotype (see Section 5.3) using built-in 
Enterprise Architect shape scripts.  
7.3. Tool Prototype to Create Hazard Relation Diagrams 
In Section 6.3, we have presented the approach to create Hazard Relation Diagrams. The ap-
proach consists of two steps: 
1. Create hazard-mitigating requirements from activity diagrams containing functional 
requirements. In this step, the functional requirements of the system under development 
are changed by executing transformation steps documented in mitigation templates. This 
is done for every activity diagram, in which the conceptual mitigation must be integrated 
(cf. Cases 2 and 3 from Section 5.4). The result is a collection of activity diagrams con-
taining hazard-mitigating requirements making up a partial mitigation for a hazard. 
2. Create Hazard Relation Diagrams by appending contextual information about the haz-
ard (i.e. the hazard, its trigger conditions, and its safety goal) to the hazard-mitigating 
requirements from the previous step. The necessary dependencies to achieve this are spec-
ified in the mitigation template. Since the mitigation templates correspond to the mitiga-
tion partitions to be included in the Hazard Relation Diagram, in this step, the Hazard 
Relation as well as all hazard associations are appended as well. The result is a completed 
Hazard Relation Diagram for one conceptual mitigation specific for one hazard. 
In order to implement the tool prototype, it was necessary to implement the QVTo scripts from 
Section 6.3, as transformations can be executed within the runtime environment provided by 
the Eclipse QVT plugin. To be able to execute these scripts, several other components were 
also necessary. An overview over their logical structure and the functional interplay is given in 
Figure 7-2. As can be seen, four types of components that are part of the tool prototype: existing 
components provided by the Eclipse platform (dark grey classes in Figure 7-2), implemented 
artifact types (light grey classes in Figure 7-2), instantiated artifact types (white classes in Fig-
ure 7-2), and implemented QVTo scripts (black classes in Figure 7-2). The implemented artifact 
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types represent the formalized artifact types from Section 6.2. In particular, Hazard Analysis 
Results (see Section 6.2.2) as well as mitigation templates (see Section 6.2.3) have been imple-
mented by as an Eclipse Ecore model by extending the Eclipse Ecore Metamodel. Furthermore, 
a profile for Hazard Relation Diagrams (see Section 6.2.4) has been implemented based on 
Eclipse Ecore as well. As can be seen, the functional requirements (see Section 6.2.1) have not 
been implemented. Since functional requirements are depicted as UML activity diagrams (see 
Section 5.1), the respective activity diagram metamodel provided by Eclipse UML2 was reused. 
Reused Eclipse components also include PapyrusUML, and the QVT Operational Runtime. The 
QVTo scripts (black classes in Figure 7-2) represent the implementation of the scripts from 
Section 6.3. The QVTo scripts consume the instantiated artifacts (white classes in Figure 7-2).  
 
Figure 7-2 Structure and Technical Interplay of the Tool Prototype Components. 
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In the following Section 7.3.1 the principles of how the QVTo scripts from Section 6.3 must be 
implemented is explained. Section 7.3.2 presents the functional interplay of the implementation 
of the QVTo scripts in Section 6.3.1. Section 7.3.3 then presents the functional interplay of the 
implementation of the QVTo scripts in Section 6.3.2. Section 7.3.4 discusses additional support 
that was necessary in order to be able to create Hazard Relation Diagrams with multiple Miti-
gation Partitions, as described in Section 5.46. 
 Principles of Implementation of the Transformation Scripts 
Due to the manner in which Eclipse Ecore maintains UML diagrams, it was necessary to im-
plement the creation scripts from Section 6.3 using a collection of six QVTo scripts (black 
elements in Figure 7-2). This is because in Eclipse, a graphical diagram is part of a file structure 
representing a “model.” An Eclipse model consists of three parts: 
 a .uml file describing the conceptual elements, relationships, and stereotypes in the model, 
 a .notation file describing the visual representation of the conceptual model elements, and 
 a .di file which associates the visual representation and the conceptual elements to a com-
mon diagram. 
It is hence sufficient to apply the scripts outlined in Section 6.3 to only the .uml file. This would 
not yield a corresponding visual representation. Therefore, each QVTo transformation must be 
applied twice, once on the .uml file and once equivalently on the .notation file, which requires 
individual implementations of the script for the .uml file and not .notation file as well. 
 Implementation of the QVTo Scripts to Create Hazard-Mitigating Requirements  
Figure 7-3 shows the functional interplay between the implementation of the approach to create 
hazard-mitigating requirements (see Section 6.3.1) and the required input and output artifacts. 
As can be seen, the first QVTo script to be executed is “GenerateMitigation.qvto.” In accord-
ance with in Section 6.3.1, the script implementation takes two inputs: a partial mitigation doc-
umented using a mitigation template (see Section 6.2.3) as well as the .uml file of some activity 
diagram containing hazard-inducing requirements. The script will execute all transformation 
steps specified in the partial mitigation.  
                                                 
6  Implemented and executable copies of the QVTo scripts are available at http://goo.gl/yfjMy9. 
The tool to automatically create Hazard Relation Diagrams is available at http://goo.gl/MdxJie.  
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Figure 7-3 Functional Interplay of “GenerateMitigationImpl ”from Figure 7-2. 
The output of “GenerateMitigation.qvto” is an .uml file containing the hazard-mitigating re-
quirements specified in the partial mitigation. Once the .uml file is created, the script imple-
mentation “GenerateMitigationNotation.qvto” is applied using the same partial mitigation as 
well as .notation file for the same activity diagram containing hazard-inducing requirements 
that were input for “GenerateMitigation.qvto.” As outlined in Section 7.3.1, this scripts enacts 
the same transformations specified in the partial mitigation on the visual representation of the 
diagram. The output of “GenerateMitigationNotation.qvto” is a .notation file corresponding to 
the .uml file for the activity diagram containing hazard-mitigating requirements. 
 Implementation of the QVTo Scripts to Create Hazard Relation Diagrams  
In Figure 7-4 the functional interplay between QVTo scripts and artifacts to create a Hazard 
Relation Diagram with one mitigation partition is shown. The process in Figure 7-4 creates 
Hazard Relation Diagrams that correspond to Case 1 in Table 5-3.  
 
Figure 7-4 Functional Interplay of “GenerateHRDImpl” from Figure 7-2. 
The QVTo script to create the Hazard Relation Diagram’s .uml file “GenerateHRD.qvto” takes 
three inputs: the .uml file of the activity diagram containing the hazard-mitigating requirements 
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that was creates using the process depicted in Figure 7-3, a partial mitigation according to which 
the activity diagram containing the hazard-mitigating requirements was creates, and a hazard 
analysis result table. However, since this the output to be created must conform to the Hazard 
Relation Diagram stereotypes, “GenerateHRD.qvto” requires a reference to the .uml file for the 
Hazard Relation Diagram Ecore profile as a fourth input. The QVTo script will append the 
contextual hazard information from the hazard analysis result table to the activity diagram and 
create a mitigation partition for the hazard-mitigating requirements specified in the partial mit-
igation. The output is an .uml file for the created Hazard Relation Diagram. The notational 
elements must subsequently be defined in correspondence with the stereotypes in the .uml file 
for the Hazard Relation Diagram. Therefore, the QVTo script “GenerateHRDNotation.qvto” 
will take the .uml file for the Hazard Relation Diagram as well as the partial mitigation as input 
and produce the corresponding .notation file. However, in contrast to the process depicted in 
Figure 7-3, the input diagram is not changed, but a new diagram (including .di file) is created. 
 Creating Hazard Relation Diagrams with Multiple Mitigation Partitions 
Using the process depicted in Figure 7-3, Hazard Relation Diagrams which contain one mitiga-
tion partition and one activity diagram can be created. Such Hazard Relation Diagrams corre-
spond to Case 1 in Table 5-3. In order to create Hazard Relation Diagrams with two or more 
mitigation partitions and one activity diagram (Case 2 in Table 5-3), or two or more mitigation 
partitions and two or more activity diagrams (Case 3 in Table 5-3), two additional QVTo scripts 
had to be implemented: 
 mergePMs.qvto creates one mitigation partition within a Hazard Relation Diagram for 
each mitigation template that was specified, and 
 mergeADs.qvto merges multiple individual activity diagrams into the same Hazard Rela-
tion Diagram. 
To create a Hazard Relation Diagram according to Case 3 in Table 5-3, these two scripts take 
the .uml files of two activity diagrams containing hazard-mitigating requirements as input and 
merges the activity diagrams specified therein into a new .uml file for the merged activity dia-
grams. This new .uml file for the merged activity diagrams is used as input for the process 
shown in Figure 7-4. In order to create a Hazard Relation Diagram according to Case 2 in Table 
5-3, the QVTo script “mergeADs.qvto” can simply be left out. If more than two activity dia-
grams shall be merged, the process must be repeated. 
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8. Discussion of the Solution Approach 
In Part II, we have presented Hazard Relation Diagrams and their creation. In this section, we 
discuss the our solution  
Execution Order of Transformation Steps 
As illustrated in the example in Figure 6-5, the execution order of transformation steps directly 
impacts the well-formedness of activity diagrams. For example, if an activity edge is inserted, 
but the target activity hasn’t been inserted yet, the insertion of the activity edge might fail. The 
script proposed in Section 6.3.1 does not prescribe or restrict the order in which transformation 
steps have to be specified or executed. As a consequence, it is possible for the transformation 
steps to be defined in the mitigation templates in such an order, that their execution results in 
syntactically invalid activity diagram and/or incomplete hazard-mitigating requirements.  
Since we currently do not provide any support to check the correct order of the transfor-
mation steps, it is the responsibility of the human stakeholder to define a correct order, which 
yields well-formed activity diagrams and complete hazard-mitigating requirements (with regard 
to the conceptual mitigation). The stakeholder can define the order of the execution of the steps 
by using the ID attribute of the mitigation template depicted in Table 6-2. 
Conflicts within Transformation Steps 
The script presented in Section 6.3.1 does not consider conflicts within the specified transfor-
mation steps. For example, if the stakeholder specifies an insertion operation of an input pin 
and, at a later point in the execution sequence, specifies a removal operation of the previously 
inserted input pin, the two transformation steps effectively cancel each other out. This obviously 
results in semantically incorrect hazard-mitigating requirements for a conceptual mitigation. 
Albeit such conflicts might be detected during validation, it remains the responsibility of the 
stakeholders to specify conflict-free transformation steps. 
Optimization 
When realizing the tool prototype we did not put in any effort in optimizing the execution of 
the scripts defined in Section 7.3. 
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Well-Formedness of Activity Diagrams 
The script presented in Section 6.3.1 does not enforce syntactically valid activity diagrams. 
Albeit Well-Formedness Rule 9 through Well-Formedness Rule 11 provide some consideration 
of syntactic validity of the activity diagrams containing hazard-mitigating requirements, these 
well-formedness rules merely pertain to errors in notation stemming from insertion, removal, 
or substitution of modeling elements. For example, it is still possible that the stakeholder spec-
ifies the insertion of a join node, but neglects to specify any incoming activity edges for the 
inserted join node. The implication is a syntactically incorrect activity diagram containing se-
mantically incorrect hazard-mitigating requirements. Albeit such issues might be detected dur-
ing validation, it is the responsibility of the stakeholder to specify transformation steps yielding 
syntactically valid activity diagrams and the responsibility of the implementation to conduct 
syntactic validity checks (see also Section 6.3.1) and involve the stakeholder in order to remedy 
syntactic incorrectness. 
Layouting of Activity Diagrams and Hazard Relation Diagrams 
The tool support does not support layouting of the created diagrams. However, the stakeholder 
can change the layout of the diagram using our prototype tool. 
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9. Overview  
In this part, Hazard Relation Diagrams are empirically evaluated. To foster reproducibility and 
comparability to other studies, we adhere to the structure proposed in [Jedlitschka et al. 2008], 
as outlined in the following subsections.  
9.1. Experimental Design 
The empirical evaluation consists of four experiments, which were designed in order to inves-
tigate the impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams on the challenges described in Section 1.2. Re-
search questions are derived and systematically refined into an evaluation strategy, hypotheses, 
and metrics. Chapter 10 outlines the experimental design in detail. In particular, purpose and 
differences between the four experiments are explained in order to increase comparability be-
tween the experiments.  
9.2. Experimental Results 
The experimental results are presented in Chapter 11. The acceptance and rejection criteria for 
each hypotheses in each experiment are stated and the results of the data analyses are presented. 
The implications of the results are discussed with regard to each hypotheses.  
9.3. Threats to Validity 
The chosen evaluation strategy, experimental design, as well as data preparation and analysis 
procedure may have impacted the results of the experiments presented in Chapter 11. In order 
to be able to draw valid conclusions from the data, Chapter 13 discusses the threats to validity 
of the experimental design, the measures taken to mitigate these threats, and remaining threats.  
9.4. Discussion of the Results 
Based on the threats to validity, we critically discusses the results of the empirical evaluation. 
We summarize the results for each hypotheses across the experiments and draw conclusions for 
each research question with regard to the impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams on the challenges 
from Section 1.2.  
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10. Experimental Design 
In Section 10.1 we define research questions based on the challenges outlined in Section 1.2 
and define a suitable evaluation strategy consisting of four experiments (see Section 10.2.). 
Section 10.3 presents the stimuli used in all experiments. Section 10.4 outlines the hypotheses 
derived from the research questions and discusses differences in their investigation across the 
four experiments. Sections 10.5 through 10.8 outline the experimental procedure for each ex-
periment. These procedures were partly reported in [Tenbergen et al. 2017]. The data prepara-
tion procedure is explained in Section 10.9. Section 10.10 discusses participant experience lev-
els in all experiments to support the comparability of the experimental results. 
10.1. Research Questions 
It was argued throughout this dissertation that using Hazard Relation Diagrams during valida-
tion of hazard-mitigating requirements improves stakeholders’ ability to: 
 ascertain how specific hazards have been mitigated (Challenge 1), 
 ascertain how hazard-mitigating requirements avoid, control, or reduce the occurrence of 
trigger conditions for a specific hazard (Challenge 2), and 
 differentiate hazard-mitigating requirements from other functional requirements that are 
not part of the conceptual mitigation for a specific hazard (Challenge 3). 
We define the following research questions: 
 RQ1: What is the impact on the adequacy judgements when validating hazard-mitigating 
requirements using Hazard Relation Diagrams? 
 RQ2: What is the impact on validation efficiency and effectiveness when using Hazard 
Relation Diagrams? 
Albeit manual reviews are the most frequently applied requirements validation technique 
[Flynn and Warhurst 1994], inspection-like group reviews have received a considerable amount 
of attention in the literature (see, e.g., [Aurum et al. 2002]). We therefore define the following 
research question: 
 RQ3: What is the impact on the validation technique when validating hazard-mitigating 
requirements using Hazard Relation Diagrams? 
To investigate research questions RQ1 and RQ2, a number of experimental hypotheses have 
been defined. These are discussed in detail in Section 10.4. To investigate research question 
RQ3, the empirical evaluation consists of four experiments that differ in validation technique 
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as well as experimental design type was conducted. The following Section 10.1 outlines the 
experimental strategy in this respect. 
10.2. Evaluation Strategy 
The experimental evaluation to investigate the research questions from Section 10.1 consisted 
of two between-subjects experiments and two within-subjects experiments for a total of four 
experiments. Table 10-1 summarizes the experimental configurations.  
Table 10-1 Summary of the Experimental Configuration in the Four Experiments. 
Property Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
Validation Technique Individual Reviews Fagan Inspections Individual Reviews Fagan Inspections 
Design Type Between-Subjects Within-Subjects 
Groups 2 1 2 
Conditions 1 per Group 2 per Participant 
No. of Participants  
(see Section 10) 
137 40 31 52 
Relative Experience 3rd Semester Undergraduate Graduate Students 5th Semester Undergraduate 
5th Semester Undergrad-
uate and Graduate 
Experimental Stimuli 
10 conceptual mitigations in either 
  10 activity diagrams with FHA excerpts (control group/condition) or 
  10 Hazard Relation Diagrams (control group/condition) 
 
In order to investigate research question RQ3, Experiment 1 investigates RQ1 and RQ2 using 
reviews as the validation technique, while Experiment 2 investigates RQ1 and RQ2 using Fagan 
Inspections. Both experiments were conducted first and a between-subjects experiments was 
chosen in an effort to minimize training overhead. In order to increase confidence in and gen-
eralizability of the results, both experiments were repeated using a within-subjects design, i.e. 
in Experiment 3 and 4. In consequence, Experiments 1 and 3 investigate the impact of Hazard 
Relation Diagrams in the sense outlined in RQ1 and RQ2 using reviews as the validation tech-
nique, while Experiments 2 and 4 investigate the impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams in the 
sense outlined in RQ1 and RQ2 using Fagan Inspections.  
To maintain comparability of results regarding RQ1 and RQ2 and to be able to draw con-
clusions regarding RQ3, the same experimental stimuli are used in all experiments and an ex-
perimental design was pursued that only differed with regard to the validation technique. Fur-
thermore, the data preparation and analysis procedure was kept consistent across all experi-
ments, albeit differences in experimental design required minor deviations. 
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10.3. Experimental Stimuli 
In all experiments, we used an excerpt of a requirements specification for the ACC system 
shown in Figure 2-1 as the basis for the experimental material. This entailed one activity dia-
gram comprising five hazard-inducing requirements, for which a Functional Hazard Analysis 
was conducted and documented in a hazard analysis worksheet (see Table 2-1 for an excerpt). 
A total of ten hazards were identified during the Functional Hazard Analysis, five of which 
were randomly selected and adequately mitigated. To do so, for each hazard, a variation of the 
activity diagram from Figure 2-1 was derived containing hazard-mitigating requirements that 
mitigate the hazard during operation. This yielded five activity diagrams containing adequate 
hazard-mitigating requirements. The other five hazards were inadequately mitigated. To do so, 
for each hazard, a variation of the activity diagram from Figure 2-1 was derived containing 
hazard-mitigating requirements with semantic mistakes allowing the hazard to still occur during 
operation. This yielded five activity diagrams containing inadequate hazard-mitigating require-
ments. All ten activity diagrams were used for the control condition of the experiments (see 
Sections 10.5.3, 10.6.3, 10.7.3, and 10.8.3, respectively). For the treatment condition, each ad-
equate and inadequate activity diagram was extended into a corresponding Hazard Relation 
Diagram. Deliberate semantic mistakes, which would not influence the safety of the ACC in 
operation, were included into the Hazard Relation Diagrams and activity diagrams, respec-
tively, and some FHA safety goals for inadequately mitigated hazards were replaced with non-
sense safety goals. This was done to allow for decoy defects such that for every activity diagram 
and Hazard Relation Diagram, at least one correct rationale would exist which pertains to dia-
gram semantics, diagram syntax, trigger conditions, safety goal, and the conceptual mitigation 
itself. The introduced decoy defects were the same for treatment and control conditions. In 
summary, the experimental material consisted hence of ten activity diagrams for the control 
condition and ten Hazard Relation Diagrams for the treatment condition. The control condition 
furthermore included hazard analysis worksheets7.  
10.4. Hypotheses and General Metrics 
The primary aim of the experimental evaluation of Hazard Relation Diagrams is to investigate 
the influence of explicitly documented dependencies between hazard-mitigating requirements, 
                                                 
7 For researchers interested in replicating our experiments, the experimental material can be found at 
https://goo.gl/XwJJQu. 
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hazard, trigger conditions, and safety goals on validation judgement (RQ1 in Section 10.1). We 
assume that explicitly documented dependencies in Hazard Relation Diagrams improve valida-
tion judgments insofar that the rationales of adequacy judgements are more concerned with 
contextual hazard information than with other diagram properties. In the following, if a ra-
tionale mentions the conceptual mitigation, the trigger conditions, of the safety goal, we say 
that this rationale mentions “contextual hazard information.” If a it mentions any other diagram 
properties (i.e. the diagram’s semantics or syntax), we say that this rationale mentions “other 
diagram properties.” We defined the following two-tailed hypothesis to investigate RQ1: 
Hypothesis 1: 
There is a difference in rationale between treatment condition and control condi-
tion regarding adequacy judgments when validating hazard-mitigating require-
ments. 
Since Hazard Relation Diagrams integrate contextual hazard information with the functional 
requirements within the activity diagram, we predict that the rationale is more likely to be con-
cerned with the hazard-mitigating requirements, the trigger conditions, or the safety goal, in the 
treatment condition than with diagram semantics or diagram syntax. 
Challenge 2 in Section 1.2 indicates that without Hazard Relation Diagrams stakeholders’ 
ability to ascertain how hazard-mitigating requirements impact the trigger conditions of a haz-
ard is impaired. It is therefore necessary to consider the impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams 
with regard to their ability to increase effectiveness (RQ2 in Section 10.1). Effectiveness in this 
sense means that stakeholders are more capable to make correct judgements with regard to the 
hazard-mitigating requirements’ ability to mitigate a hazard’s trigger conditions. We hence de-
fine the following two-tailed hypothesis for RQ2: 
Hypothesis 2: 
There is a difference in effectiveness between treatment condition and control con-
dition when validating hazard-mitigating requirements. 
We predict that using Hazard Relation Diagrams for validation leads to more correct judge-
ments and therefore to higher effectiveness than using conventional activity diagrams and haz-
ard analysis worksheets. For each diagram depicting an adequate conceptual mitigation, we 
recorded whether or not the participants indicated “adequate” during review. This was consid-
ered a true positive answer (i.e. the answer was supposed to be “adequate” and the participants 
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answered correctly). If participants indicated “adequate” during review of a diagram that de-
picted an inadequate conceptual mitigation, this was considered a false positive answer (i.e. the 
answer was supposed to be “inadequate” and the participants answered incorrectly). Equiva-
lently, we recorded true negative answers (i.e. the answer was supposed to be “inadequate” and 
the participants answered correctly) and false negative answers (i.e. the answer was supposed 
to be “adequate” and the participant answered incorrectly) as well. The participants’ effective-
ness can hence be determined by the amount of true positive, false positive, true negative, and 
false negative answers. We specifically opted not to determine effectiveness by means of the 
number of identified defects in the rationales, as giving at least one rationale was mandatory 
(see Sections 10.5.3, 10.6.3, 10.7.3, and 10.8.3, respectively) in order to correctly measure hy-
pothesis H1, which could have led to skewed effectiveness measurements. 
However, Hazard Relation Diagrams must also be evaluated with regard to their efficiency. 
This means that validation using Hazard Relation Diagrams ought to require at least as much 
time to complete the validation task as validation using conventional activity diagrams and 
hazard analysis worksheets (also see RQ2 in Section 10.1). If validation using Hazard Relation 
Diagrams takes more time than validation using conventional activity diagrams, a possible im-
provement in terms of rationale. To investigate these relationships, we defined the following 
two-tailed hypotheses to further investigate RQ2:  
Hypothesis 3: 
There is a difference in efficiency between treatment condition and control condi-
tion when validating hazard-mitigating requirements. 
We predict that that using Hazard Relation Diagrams for validation requires comparably much 
times as validation using conventional activity diagrams and hazard analysis worksheets. In 
order to measure efficiency of reviews (i.e. Experiments 1 and 3), we measured the time needed 
for true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative answers (see Sections 10.5.1 
and 10.7.1). However, since in Experiment 2 and 4, multiple individuals were involved, we 
computed the effort in person-minutes in inspection-based experiments (see Section 10.6.1 and 
Section 10.8.1). 
In addition to the rationales, effectiveness, and efficiency, we also investigated the individ-
ual stakeholders’ confidence in their own review judgments, as confidence further impacts the 
validation performance (RQ2 in Section 10.1). To account for this, we defined the following 
two-tailed hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 4: 
There is a difference in self-reported confidence between treatment condition and 
control condition when validating hazard-mitigating requirements. 
To measure the validators’ confidences, we applied the Goal/Question/Metric Method [van So-
lingen and Berhout 1999] in order to systematically select suitable items from the technology 
acceptance model version 3 (TAM3, see [Venkatesh and Bala 2008]) and the task-technology 
fit model (TTF, see [Goodhue 1998]), as summarized in Table 10-2.  
Table 10-2 TAM3 and TTF Item Selection using a Template based on [van Solingen and Berhout 1999]. 
Object Purpose Metric for Role Development Situation 
Hazard Relation 
Diagram 
Evaluate Subjective Confidence Requirements Engineer Validation of the adequacy of haz-
ard-mitigating requirements. 
Quality Focus Source Adapted TAM3 / TTF Definitions 
Perceived Usefulness TAM3 
The degree to which someone believes that using Hazard Relation Diagrams or activity dia-
grams with hazard analysis worksheets to validate hazard-mitigating requirements adequacy 
enhances her performance. 
Self-Efficacy TAM3 
The degree to which an individual believes that she has the ability to validate hazard-mitigat-
ing requirements adequacy using Hazard Relation Diagrams or activity diagrams with hazard 
analysis worksheets. 
Result Demonstrability TAM3 
The degree to which an individual believes that the validation results using Hazard Relation 
Diagrams or activity diagrams with hazard analysis worksheets are tangible, observable, and 
communicable. 
“The Right Data” TTF 
The degree to which the needed information to validate hazard-mitigating requirements ade-
quacy is maintained when using Hazard Relation Diagrams or activity diagrams with hazard 
analysis worksheets. 
Meaning TTF 
The ease of determining what a modeling element in a Hazard Relation Diagram, activity dia-
gram, or hazard analysis worksheet means, or what information is depicted therein. 
Presentation TTF 
The degree to which a Hazard Relation Diagram or an activity diagram with an hazard analysis 
worksheet is understandable. 
Training TTF 
The amount of available training in order to use Hazard Relation Diagrams or activity dia-
grams with hazard analysis worksheets to validate hazard-mitigating requirements adequacy. 
Confusion TTF 
The degree to which the user is confused in using Hazard Relation Diagrams or activity dia-
grams with hazard analysis worksheets to validate hazard-mitigating requirements adequacy. 
 
To measure the quality foci of subjective confidence, we compiled a post-hoc questionnaire8, 
randomized the questions pertaining to each selected TAM3 and TTF item, and measured par-
ticipant responses on a 5-point-Likert scale [1: “disagree”; 2: “somewhat disagree”; 3: “neither 
agree nor disagree”; 4: “somewhat agree”; 5: “agree”]. We adapted questionnaire questions to 
be neutral with regard to the used notations in order to minimize the validity threat of hypothesis 
guessing [Wohlin et al. 2012]. We calculated the degree of agreement for each quality focus by 
the sum of the answers for each question pertaining to the respective quality focus (adding the 
inverse ordinate for negated questions) and dividing the sum by the number of questions in the 
respective quality focus.  
                                                 
8 The post-hoc questionnaire is available at https://goo.gl/XwJJQu 
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Table 10-3 lists the independent variable (IV) as well as the dependent variables (DVs) that 
result from the measurements pertaining to the hypotheses stated above. Please note, that the 
dependent variable IDs contain a placeholder “x”, which is replaced in Chapter 11 by the re-
spective experiment number in order to be able to compare the results from each experiment 
more easily. 
Table 10-3 General Metrics for each Hypothesis. 
Assoc 
Hypo. 
Variable 
ID Type Definition Scale 
- IV 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
Presentation Mode used during Validation.  
Two Levels: Using Hazard Relation Diagram (treatment) vs.  
Using activity diagrams and hazard analysis worksheets (control) 
- 
H1.x 
DV1.x 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
Number of rationales mentioning semantics 
R
at
io
 DV2.x Number of rationales mentioning syntax 
DV3.x Number of rationales mentioning trigger conditions 
DV4.x Number of rationales mentioning safety goals 
DV5.x Number of rationales mentioning conceptual mitigations 
H2.x 
DV6.x Number of true positive answers 
In
te
rv
al
 
DV7.x Number of true negative answers 
DV8.x Number of false positive answers 
DV9.x Number of false negative answers 
H3.x 
DV10.x time needed for true positive answers 
R
at
io
 
DV11.x time needed for true negative answers 
DV12.x time needed for false positive answers 
DV13.x time needed for false negative answers 
H4.x 
DV14.x degree of agreement of questions pertaining to “Perceived Usefulness” 
R
at
io
 
DV15.x degree of agreement of questions pertaining to “Self-Efficacy” 
DV16.x degree of agreement of questions pertaining to “Result Demonstrability” 
DV17.x degree of agreement of questions pertaining to “The Right Data” 
DV18.x degree of agreement of questions pertaining to “Meaning” 
DV19.x degree of agreement of questions pertaining to “Presentation” 
DV20.x degree of agreement of questions pertaining to “Training” 
DV21.x degree of agreement of questions pertaining to “Confusion” 
 
In the following, we will discuss the experimental designs of each individual experiment. 
10.5. Experiment 1: Individual Reviews (Between-Subjects) 
Experiment 1 was designed as a one-way between-subjects experiment [Wohlin et al. 2012] in 
order to investigate the impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams on validation results when using 
individual reviews to validate hazard-mitigating requirements. This experimental design was 
initially favored over a repeated measures design since most participants required pre-hoc in-
troduction into the fundamentals of safety engineering, hazard analyses, and Hazard Relation 
Diagrams. This way, the participants were separated into a treatment group (reviews using Haz-
ard Relation Diagrams) and a control group (reviews using conventional activity diagrams and 
hazard analysis worksheets). Hence, participants only had to be instructed in one, rather than 
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two representation forms. This study design has been validated by means of a pilot test (see 
[Tenbergen et al. 2015]). 
 Specific Metrics 
In Experiment 1, every participant either reviewed ten Hazard Relation Diagrams or ten Activ-
ity Diagrams with respective hazard analysis results. Review judgments hence dependent on 
each participant’s understanding of the respective diagrams. We measured the hypotheses from 
Section 10.4 as follows: 
 Hypothesis H1: Rationales. In order to measure rationale objectivity, we asked partici-
pants to judge whether or not a specific hazard was either adequately mitigated (i.e. the 
hazard no longer occurs during operation), or inadequately mitigated (i.e. the hazard might 
still occur during operation). In addition, participants were asked to provide a rationale by 
means of a simple written statement detailing why they judged that a hazard was adequately 
or inadequately mitigated. During post-experimental analyses, this rationale was qualita-
tively analyzed and a differentiation was made whether a rationale pertained to contextual 
hazard information or not (see Section 10.9 for details on the qualitative analysis). 
 Hypothesis H2: Effectiveness. In order to determine effectiveness in Experiment 1, we 
measured the number of correctly judged adequate conceptual mitigations (true positive 
answers), the number of correctly judged inadequate conceptual mitigations (true negative 
answers), the number of incorrectly judged adequate conceptual mitigations (false positive 
answers), and the number of incorrectly judged inadequate conceptual mitigations (false 
negative answers). Since every participant was subjected to five adequate and five inade-
quate conceptual mitigations, a perfect score was hence five true positive and five true 
negative answers. 
 Hypothesis H3: Efficiency. Each participant’s review efficiency was measured by deter-
mining the time needed in seconds. Depending if a diagram was judged correctly or incor-
rectly, and depending in whether or not the respective diagram contained an adequate or 
inadequate conceptual mitigation, the response time was aggregated into true positive, false 
positive, true negative, and false negative response times as well as the total time needed 
for all reviews. Efficiency measurements considered the time needed to review a diagram 
and indicate either “adequate” or “inadequate,” not the time needed to write the review 
rationale. 
 Hypothesis H4: Self-Reported Confidence. Since we aimed to compare subjective con-
fidence of the treatment group with that of the control group in Experiment 1, we adapted 
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the definition of the original instrument items and questions pertaining thereto to reflect 
the notation used by the respective group.  
 Participants 
Participants for Experiment 1 were recruited from an undergraduate requirements engineering 
course at the University of Duisburg-Essen in fall 2014. The author of this thesis was responsi-
ble for conducting the lab sections in this course. Among others, the course instructed the fun-
damentals of conceptual modeling in preparation of a grade-determining final exam. This ex-
periment was part of the course and participation (in the sense that it was immediately relevant 
for the students’ individual learning success and exam grade, see [Hart et al. 2000; Carver et al. 
2008]) was mandatory. However, students were informed that albeit participation is mandatory 
for their own benefit, they had the option to discontinue at any point without penalty (other than 
the self-inflicted penalty of missing out on exam preparation).  
A total of 123 students participated in Experiment 1. These were undergraduate (n = 110) 
or graduate students (n = 13) enrolled in Systems Engineering or Business Information Systems 
degree programs. Given the pilot study presented in [Tenbergen et al. 2015] yielded a sound 
methodology and only small changes (e.g., typos) were undertaken prior to onset of Experiment 
1, pilot study participants were included in this sample of Experiment 1 (see [Thabane et a. 
2010]). These were mainly members of the author’s research group. The total population of 
Experiment 1 was hence 133 participants (ntreatment = 67, ncontrol = 65). Although gender and age 
were not assumed to impact the results of the experiment, we recorded a total of 117 male 
participants, sixteen female participants, and a participants’ age between 18 and 36 years (μ = 
23.9, σ = 3.66). 
 Experimental Procedure 
The experiment was implemented using the survey website SoSci Survey [SoSci Survey]. A 
short briefing was administered during a class session, which instructed participants on the fun-
damentals of safety engineering including hazard analyses, embedded software, and function 
modeling. The unaltered ACC specification excerpt was used during these pre-experimental 
briefings. In addition, the task of how to perform the reviews was briefly illustrated by means 
of two example hazards, which were different from the hazards depicted in the experimental 
material. After all students were briefed, a link to the survey website was made available and 
the students were given five days to complete the experiment. In order to minimize interaction 
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effects between participants, data collection was scheduled to take place between course meet-
ings. The experimental procedure consisted of the following steps, as shown in Figure 10-1. 
 
Figure 10-1 Experimental Procedure for Experiment 1. 
Step 1: Introduction, Provide Informed Consent, & Demographics. Experiment 1 began 
with a short introduction, where informed consent as well as demographic data were collected. 
In this step, students were informed again of their right to discontinue participation and assured 
that data would be treated anonymously.  
Step 2: Separation into Groups. Participants were randomly assigned to the treatment group, 
which conducted reviews using Hazard Relation Diagrams, and to the control group, which 
conducted reviews using conventional activity diagrams and hazard analysis result tables. As-
signment took into consideration the participants’ self-reported experience levels, such that both 
groups contained an approximately equal number of participants with corresponding experience 
levels. 
Step 3: Instructions & “Dry Run.” Both groups were presented with written instructions on 
how to review the experimental material. These instructions summarized the information given 
in the pre-experimental briefing. Furthermore, two example runs were performed in which the 
participants could rehearse the review task. 
Step 4: Review of Hazard Mitigation. In this step, participants were asked to review concep-
tual mitigations pertaining to one randomly selected hazard. In order reduce primacy, to re-
cency, and carry-over effects [Wohlin et al. 2012], the sequence in which the ten activity dia-
grams or Hazard Relation Diagrams were presented was randomized for each participant. To 
ensure that both participant groups reviewed approximately equally many information items, 
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the control group was only shown the one row from the hazard analysis result table relevant to 
the hazard being mitigated in the activity diagram currently being displayed. Participants could 
review each activity diagram of Hazard Relation Diagram for an indeterminate amount of time. 
Nevertheless, response times were recorded for this step. Participants were asked to indicate 
“yes” if they are of the opinion that the hazard may still occur during operation and “no” oth-
erwise. Participants were able to change their assessment as often as they wished before ad-
vancing to the next step. We recorded the reviewer confidence for this step. 
Step 5: Self-Report Rationale. Participants were asked to state a brief reason why they chose 
“yes” or “no” in the previous step. Due to technical reasons, this rationale could not be recorded 
in the step as adequacy judgments and confidence of Step 4. Therefore, participants were given 
the opportunity to return to the previous step and change their answer if thinking about the 
rationale made them change their mind. The experimental material along with their decision 
was shown for reference.  
Step 6: Answer Post-Hoc Questionnaire. After all ten conceptual mitigations were reviewed, 
both groups were presented with the post-hoc questionnaire in order to record participants’ 
subjective confidence when conducting reviews using the groups’ respective notation (see Sec-
tion 10.1). The order in which questionnaire items were displayed was randomized to avoid that 
similar questions pertaining to the same quality focus were adjacent to one another. 
10.6. Experiment 2: Fagan Inspections (Between-Subjects) 
Experiment 2 focused on Fagan inspections [Fagan 1976; Fagan 1986] rather than reviews. We 
aimed to keep the experimental design as close to Experiment 1 as possible. We used a one-
way between-subjects design and reused the experimental material from Experiment 1. How-
ever, since inspections are a group activity requiring all participants to be present at the same 
time, this yielded differences with regard to measurements, recruited participants, and the ex-
perimental procedure.  
 Specific Metrics in Experiment 2 
For Experiment 2, we defined the following measurements: 
 Hypothesis H1: Rationales. Like in Experiment 1, we measured differences in rationales 
by recording written rationales for each adequacy judgment. Rather than asking for at least 
one rationale from each participant, we recorded group consensus, i.e. rationales given by 
at least one participant that other participants agreed with (see Section 10.6.3). Like in 
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Experiment 1, we have qualitatively analyzed the rationales in order to determine whether 
a rationale pertained to contextual hazard information or not (see Section 10.5.1). 
 Hypothesis H2: Effectiveness. We used the same measure as in Experiment 1. 
 Hypothesis H3: Efficiency. Since the efficiency in Experiment 2 was a group effort rather 
than an individual effort, it was necessary to measure the time invested by the group as a 
whole. We did so by dividing the amount of true positive, true negative, false positive, and 
false negative answers for the measurements for hypothesis H2 by the effort invested by 
the group in person-minutes. We multiplied the result with an appropriate constant in order 
to map the result onto a more easily comparable interval. Albeit this is in accordance with 
commonly applied efficiency metrics for inspections, which, however, is sensitive to une-
qual group sizes [Liggesmeyer 2002]. Table 10-4 shows the differences for the dependent 
variables for hypothesis H3 in Experiment 2.  
Table 10-4 Specific Metrics for Hypothesis H2.3 in Experiment 2. 
Assoc 
Hypo. 
Variable 
ID Type Definition Scale 
H2.3 
DV2.10 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 1000 * (number of true positive answers / (number of group members * time)) 
R
at
io
 
DV2.11 1000 * (number of true negative answers / (number of group members * time)) 
DV2.12 1000 * (number of false positive answers / (number of group members * time)) 
DV2.13 1000 * (number of false negative answers / (number of group members * time)) 
 
 Hypothesis H4: Self-Reported Confidence. Just like in Experiment 1, subjective confi-
dence was measured using the TAM3 and TTF items from Table 10-2 using a post-hoc 
questionnaire. Thus, the questionnaire was filled out by each participant individually, ra-
ther than by the group. Thereby we were able to assess individual participants’ subjective 
confidence to reason about the adequacy during the group inspection process. 
 Participants 
Participants were recruited from a graduate software quality assurance course taught by mem-
bers of the authors’ research group at the University of Duisburg-Essen in winter 2014. The 
course covers a wide range of software quality assurance topics, including testing, monitoring, 
and static quality assurance techniques. In particular, inspections are covered during the lecture, 
explaining the phases of Fagan inspections and different reading techniques. Since 2007, the 
lab section of the course has included a live inspection session using an excerpt of a require-
ments specification of a simple system (e.g., a parking garage access system or video rental 
system) with seeded defects. For the purpose of Experiment 2, the requirements specification 
of the past years was replaced with the experimental material from Section 10.1. While attend-
ance in the lab sessions, including the inspection session, was mandatory, participation in the 
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experiment was voluntary: Students were allowed to opt out of data collection without penalty. 
One such request was received, however the student later withdrew her decision on her own 
volition.  
A total of 40 students enrolled in Systems Engineering or Business Information Systems 
degree programs participated; 35 were graduate students and the remaining five were under-
graduate students preliminarily admitted to their respective Master’s program. Since due to ad-
ministrative reasons, group size could not be controlled for (see Section 10.6.3), the treatment 
group had 15 participants, while the control group had 25 participants. In this experiment, nei-
ther gender nor age were assumed to impact the results, yet a total of 31 male and nine female 
participants were recorded, aged between 22 and 32 years (μ = 24.83, σ = 2.41). 
 Experimental Procedure 
In the lecture, students were informed that in the lab sessions, a live inspection would be con-
ducted in order to rehearse the principles of inspections in preparation for the exam. They were 
furthermore informed that in contrast to the previous years, results of the inspection session 
would serve an additional research purpose and that albeit participation in the inspection was 
mandatory (as instructional success depended on participation), participation in the experiment 
was voluntary. Another inspection session using the requirements specifications of the previous 
years was scheduled for students who opted out or had a scheduling conflict and could not 
attend the experimental inspections; data collected therein were not used in this experiment in 
order to honor participatory consent. All students opted to participate voluntarily, hence no non-
experimental inspection was conducted. The experimental procedure outlined in Figure 10-2 
roughly corresponds to the inspection phases proposed in [Fagan 1976]. Specifically, Step 1 
corresponds to Fagan’s “Overview” phase, Step 3 corresponds to the “Preparation” phase and 
Step 4 corresponds to the “Inspection” phase. Fagan’s “Rework” and “Follow-up” phases were 
beyond the scope of Experiment 2. 
Step 1: Introduction, Provide Informed Consent, & Overview. In the next lab after the lec-
ture on static quality assurance, Experiment 2 began with a short introduction and summary of 
the previous lecture. Informed consent was collected and participants were introduced into the 
unaltered ACC specification excerpt, into the principles of safety assessment and Functional 
Hazard Analyses, and were given a list of hazards identified by means of a Functional Hazard 
Analysis (see Section 10.1). Participants were informed that the purpose of the inspection ses-
sion was to judge whether or not certain changes made to the ACC specification would result 
in these hazards possibly occurring during operation or not. This step took place for all students 
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in plenum at the same time. Each student participant was assigned the role of the inspector. In 
the inspection sessions, the role of the moderator and reader was carried out by the experiment-
ers. In addition, another researcher employed with the experimenters’ research group was asked 
to serve as the scribe.  
 
Figure 10-2 Experimental Procedure for Experiment 2. 
Step 2: Self-Selection into Groups. Earlier in the semester, the lab has been separated into two 
sections with about 25 students each. The two sections did not take place simultaneously and 
students were free to attend either section. For Experiment 2, students were asked to self-select 
which lab section they would like to attend. This was done through an online poll using the 
university’s online campus system. It was necessary in order to assign the right experimental 
material to the participants. We decided by coin toss to conduct the treatment condition inspec-
tion session in the earlier lab section and to conduct the control condition inspection one day 
later during the other lab section. This happened before the students were given the opportunity 
to select which one they would like to addend. Due to student availability and the voluntary 
nature of participation, it was not possible to balance the number of participants in each group. 
This caused a larger number of participants in the control condition (ncontrol = 25, ntreatment = 15).  
Step 3: Individual Preparation. After participants self-selected into the treatment or control 
condition, the respective experimental material was made available to them via the university’s 
online campus system and participants were asked to prepare for the inspection session, which 
was scheduled for the next lab section meeting. Preparation included studying material on haz-
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ard analyses and safety assessment and familiarizing oneself in detail with the ACC specifica-
tion and the hazard analysis results, which were already introduced during Step 1. During this 
time period, interaction between students (and groups, for that matter) regarding the experi-
mental material and possible defects therein was not controlled for.  
Step 4: Inspection of Hazard Mitigation, Adequacy Judgment, & Self-Report Rationale. 
Approximately one week after the introductory session (Step 1), the inspection sessions were 
conducted for both the treatment group and the control group, respectively. The inspection ses-
sions started with a brief welcome. The participants were thanked for their willingness to par-
ticipate in the experiment. The moderator showed the original, unaltered specification once 
again and read the diagrams’ meaning out loud. The inspectors were given the opportunity to 
ask questions about the functionality of the ACC, the diagram syntax, etc. After all questions 
were answered, the first conceptual mitigation was shown and read out loud by the moderator. 
The moderator focused on the changed hazard-mitigating requirements in the diagram and com-
pared the changes to how it was in the original specification excerpt. The groups were asked if 
they were of the opinion that the depicted hazard could still occur during operation and why. 
Like in Experiment 1, it was ensured that both participant groups inspected approximately 
equally many information items for each conceptual mitigation by only presenting the one row 
from the hazard analysis worksheet that was relevant to the hazard being mitigated in the activ-
ity diagram. The moderator encouraged open discussion about the depicted Hazard Relation 
Diagram or activity diagram with hazard analysis result, respectively, explicitly allowing any 
adequacy judgment, rationale, or questions that were issued by the participants. The moderator 
guided the resulting discussion by summarizing points, asking controversial questions, and en-
suring that every participant could contribute his or her opinion. Whenever discussion died 
down, the moderator summarized the discussion once again and asked for a vote among the 
inspectors, whether or not the hazard is adequately mitigated. If this vote motivated further 
discussion, the moderator allowed the discussion to continue. If not, the majority vote was rec-
orded by the scribe as the adequacy judgment for that hazard. The moderator then proceeded to 
ask for the reason why inspectors voted the way they did, which was recorded as rationale. A 
rationale was recorded, if at least one participant agreed, no other participant objected to, or 
where after a brief discussion consensus about the rationale was reached. In case, there was no 
immediate consensus, it was decided by voting among the participants if some rationale was 
recorded. 
The author of this dissertation was the moderator of the inspection. This obviously gives 
rise to the risk of experimenter bias. To reduce this threat to validity, the moderator resorted to 
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passively observing and neutrally guiding the discussion in both experimental conditions. In 
particular, for the control condition, it was emphasized to read out loud the contents of the 
hazard analysis worksheet and to emphasize the changed hazard-mitigating requirements. Fur-
thermore, the scribe acted as a neutral observer and was asked to document if he thought the 
moderator influenced the discussion. In case influence was detected, the respective result was 
excluded from further analysis.  
Step 4 continued until all conceptual mitigations were inspected or the allotted lab session 
time of 90 minutes was up. Since most students had other class obligations, the 90 minutes 
duration was a hard time limit. To increase comparability, the order in which conceptual miti-
gations were inspected was not randomized, such that the same conceptual mitigations would 
be inspected by both groups. This was deemed appropriate, in contrast to Experiment 1, as result 
skewing due to primacy, recency, or carry-over effects is not an issue in group activities.  
Step 5: Answer Post-Hoc Questionnaire & Demographics. After Step 4 concluded, partici-
pants were given a paper-based version of the demographic and post-hoc questionnaires already 
used in Experiment 1. The questionnaires were answered by each participant individually, since 
the aim was to measure the self-reported confidence of individuals rather than of the group as 
a whole. 
10.7. Experiment 3: Individual Reviews (Within-Subjects) 
To substantiate the empirical evaluation of Hazard Relation Diagrams, we designed Experiment 
3 as a repetition study to Experiment 1. While Experiment 1 was designed as a between-subjects 
experiment in order to reduce the need for training overhead, Experiment 3 was designed as a 
within-subjects repeated measures experiment [Wohlin et al. 2012]. Since we expected a 
smaller amount of participants, a repeated measures design was favored over a between-sub-
jects design, as repeated measures experiments are more robust against small number of partic-
ipants. In Experiment 3, all participants performed the same task as in Experiment 1, but par-
ticipated in both treatment condition (reviews using Hazard Relation Diagrams) as well as the 
control condition (reviews using conventional activity diagrams and hazard analysis results).  
 Specific Metrics 
Every participant reviewed ten diagrams, but all participants were subjected to both treatment 
and control condition. The measurements for the hypotheses in Experiment 3 is very similar to 
those outlined in Experiment 1: 
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 Hypothesis H1: Rationales. Equivalently to Experiment 1, we asked participants to judge 
whether a hazard was adequately or inadequately mitigated (regardless of presentation 
mode) and asked participants to provide a reason for their decision. These rationales were 
treated the same way during post-experimental analyses as the rationales provided during 
Experiment 1 (see Section 10.5.1 for details). 
 Hypothesis H2: Effectiveness. Just like in in Experiment 1, we measured the number of 
correctly judged adequate (i.e. true positive), correctly judged inadequate (i.e. true nega-
tive), incorrectly judged adequate (i.e. false positive), and incorrectly judged inadequate 
(i.e. false negative) conceptual mitigations. In contrast to Experiment 1, the number of ad-
equate and inadequate conceptual mitigations was not even across both presentation modes 
because participants were shown five Hazard Relation Diagrams and five Activity Dia-
grams and corresponding hazard analysis results. A participant could, for instance, review 
two adequate Hazard Relation Diagrams, three inadequate Hazard Relation Diagrams, 
three adequate Activity Diagrams, and two inadequate Activity Diagrams, for a total of ten 
diagrams. Therefore, rather than measuring the total amount of true positive, true negative, 
false positive, and false negative answers, we calculated the respective ratio for each par-
ticipant. Table 10-5 depicts the differences for the dependent variables for hypothesis H2 
in Experiment 3. 
Table 10-5 Specific Metrics for Hypotheses H3.2 in Experiment 3. 
Assoc 
Hypo. 
Variable 
ID Type Definition Scale 
H3.2 
DV3.6 
D
ep
en
d
en
t ratio of true positive answers 
R
at
io
 
DV3.7 ratio of true negative answers 
DV3.8 ratio of false positive answers 
DV3.9 ratio of false negative answers 
 
 Hypothesis H3: Efficiency. Like in Experiment 1, each participant’s review efficiency 
was measured by determining the time needed in seconds. 
 Hypothesis H4: Self-Reported Confidence. In contrast to Experiment 1, the level of 
agreement with TAM3 and TTF questionnaire items could not be measured on a Likert-
scale. The key reason for this is that in a repeated measures design, participants’ answers 
are compared to their own answers in different conditions. Therefore, we applied the se-
mantic differential technique (see [Osgood et al. 1957; Verhagen et al. 2015]), which po-
larizes ordinates on measurement scales. We therefore adapted the definition of the original 
TAM3 and TTF questions to reflect both notations. The consequence is that this allowed 
assessing participants’ related relative preference of either Hazard Relation Diagrams or 
Activity Diagrams and hazard analysis worksheets. We used Likert-style 5-point ordinates 
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ranging from “1: true for activity diagrams” to “5: true for Hazard Relation Diagrams.” A 
median of “3” hence indicated indifference between both presentation modes. The depend-
ent variables for hypothesis H4 in Experiment 3 are shown in Table 10-6. 
Table 10-6 Specific Metrics for Hypotheses H3.4 in Experiment 3. 
Assoc 
Hypo. 
Variable 
ID Type Definition Scale 
H3.4 
DV3.14 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
relative preference with regard to “Perceived Usefulness” 
R
at
io
 
DV3.15 relative preference with regard to “Self-Efficacy” 
DV3.16 relative preference with regard to “Result Demonstrability” 
DV3.17 relative preference with regard to “The Right Data” 
DV3.18 relative preference with regard to “Meaning” 
DV3.19 relative preference with regard to “Presentation” 
DV3.20 relative preference with regard to “Training” 
DV3.21 relative preference with regard to “Confusion” 
 Participants 
Participants for Experiment 3 were recruited from an undergraduate software engineering 
course instructed by members the author’s department at the Oswego State University in fall 
2015. Prior to recruitment in the course, approval of the institution’s research ethics board was 
sought and granted. The software engineering course is aimed towards upper classmen, i.e. at 
least third year undergraduate students or, in exceptional cases, advanced second semester with 
excellent grade point average. The course featured all aspects of software engineering in indus-
try projects, with a key focus on process models, project phases, and formal as well as semi-
formal languages. Specifically, students were taught UML activity diagrams as a central de-
scription language for system specification and were introduced with the aims of software qual-
ity assurance and safety engineering. The study was administered at a time in the course when 
students would benefit from participation, as the study’s review task would rehearse some of 
the instructed material.  
Student participation was voluntary and a total of 31 students participated, all of which were 
undergraduates enrolled in Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, or Computer Science 
degree programs. The majority of eighteen participants were male with two female participants, 
eleven participants declined to provide gender information. Participants’ age was between 18 
and 45 years (μ = 22.95, σ = 5.995). We assumed that gender and age has no impact on the 
results of the Experiment 3. 
 Experimental Procedure 
Like Experiment 1, Experiment 3 was implemented using the survey website SoSci Survey 
[SoSci Survey]. For this purpose, the implementation was Experiment 1 was copied and adapted 
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for a repeated measures design. The class met three times a week for 55 minutes. An introduc-
tory briefing session was administered during one of those meetings, in which the principles of 
software validation and safety engineering, including hazards analysis of embedded systems, 
as well as UML activity diagrams was briefly reviewed. Then participants were informed that 
during the next class meeting, an experiment would take place, participation in which would 
help them study for an upcoming midterm exam, as the study rehearsed some of the principles 
taught in class. However, students were informed that participation was voluntary and they were 
free to remain absent from the next class meeting for all participants without penalty. After-
wards, the unaltered ACC specification excerpt from Experiment 1 was used to introduce how 
to perform the reviews. The review task was illustrated by means of the two example hazards 
from Experiment 1. After the briefing concluded, students were dismissed and the briefing ma-
terial as well as the study link was made available to all students through an online campus 
system in case students wanted to participate remotely, rather than in the next class meeting. 
No such remote participation was recorded. During the next class meeting, data collection for 
Experiment 3 commenced. It consisted of the steps depicted in Figure 10-3. 
 
Figure 10-3 Experimental Procedure for Experiment 3. 
Step 1: Introduction, Provide Informed Consent, & Demographics. Like Experiment 1, Ex-
periment 3 began with a short introduction, the retrieval of informed consent as well as the 
collection of demographic data. Students were again informed that participation is voluntary, 
anonymous, and that they are free to discontinue and leave at any point.  
Step 2: Instructions & “Dry Run.” In contrast to Experiment 1, participants were not sepa-
rated into groups, as the review task would be conducted for both treatment and control condi-
tion. For this purpose, the review task was explained once again by summarizing the infor-
mation from the briefing session. Two example runs were conducted using both treatment and 
control condition. 
Step 3: Review of Hazard Mitigation. Like in Step 4 of Experiment 1 (see Section 10.5.3), 
this step entailed the review of conceptual mitigations pertaining to one randomly selected haz-
ard. The sequence in which the five activity diagrams and the five Hazard Relation Diagrams 
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were presented was randomized for each participant in order reduce primacy, to recency, and 
carry-over effects [Wohlin et al. 2012]. For each conceptual mitigation, an activity diagram or 
a Hazard Relation Diagram was available (i.e. a total of twenty stimulus diagrams, two for each 
hazard, see Section 10.1). Whether a conceptual mitigation was shown as an activity diagram 
or as a Hazard Relation Diagram was randomized. Randomization ensured that each participant 
would be presented with exactly five activity diagrams and five Hazard Relation Diagrams and 
that each participant would be presented with exactly five adequate conceptual mitigations and 
five inadequate conceptual mitigations (regardless if these conceptual mitigations were pre-
sented as an activity diagram of Hazard Relation Diagram). However, an effort was made to 
balance adequate and inadequate conceptual mitigations across presentation mode, such that no 
participant would, for example, review only adequate conceptual mitigations as Hazard Rela-
tion Diagrams. Thus every participant reviewed either two or three adequate or inadequate con-
ceptual mitigations, respectively, as activity diagrams or Hazard Relation Diagrams, respec-
tively. This step was repeated ten times until all conceptual mitigations from Section 10.1 were 
reviewed. As in Experiment 1, we ensured that both conditions reviewed approximately equally 
many information items. Furthermore, like in Experiment 1, participants could review each 
conceptual mitigation for an indeterminate amount of time while response times were recorded 
and participants were asked to indicate “yes” if they are of the opinion that the hazard may still 
occur during operation and “no” otherwise, allowing for an indeterminate amount of times to 
change such an assessment. Moreover, we recorded the confidence of the participants. 
Step 4: Self-Report Rationale. Like in Experiment 1, participants provided a brief reason why 
they chose “yes” or “no” in the previous step. Participants were able to return to the previous 
step and change their answer if they changed their while reasoning about the conceptual miti-
gation that was shown to them for reference along with their decision from the previous step.  
Step 5: Answer Post-Hoc Questionnaire. After all ten conceptual mitigations were reviewed, 
participants were presented with the post-hoc questionnaire. The order in which questionnaire 
items were displayed was randomized to avoid that similar questions pertaining to the same 
quality focus were adjacent to one another. 
10.8. Experiment 4: Fagan Inspections (Within-Subjects) 
Experiment 4 was designed to investigate in the impact of using Hazard Relation Diagrams 
during Fagan inspections in within-subjects conditions. We kept the experimental design as 
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close to Experiment 2 as possible. However, due to the within-subjects design, there are differ-
ences, as described in the following. 
 Specific Metrics 
We measure the hypotheses from Section 10.4 as follows: 
 Hypothesis H1: Rationales. Like in Experiment 2, we record the rationales achieved 
through group consensus.  
 Hypothesis H2: Effectiveness. We used the same measures as in Experiment 3.These are 
shown in Table 10-7. 
Table 10-7 Specific Metrics for Hypotheses H4.2 in Experiment 4. 
Assoc 
Hypo. 
Variable 
ID Type Definition Scale 
H4.2 
DV4.6 
D
ep
en
d
en
t ratio of true positive answers 
R
at
io
 
DV4.7 ratio of true negative answers 
DV4.8 ratio of false positive answers 
DV4.9 ratio of false negative answers 
 
 Hypothesis H3: Efficiency. Like in Experiment 2, we measured the group’s overall effi-
ciency for each conceptual mitigation, for both the treatment stimuli as well as the control 
stimuli. We counted the respective true positive, true negative, false positive, and false 
negative answers for both stimulus types and dividing that number by the time allotted for 
the inspection session times the amount of inspectors present. Again, we mapped the result 
to a more human-readable interval and, as for Experiment 2, this metric is very sensitive to 
unequal group sizes. Table 10-8 shows the measures for hypothesis H4.3. 
Table 10-8 Specific Metrics for Hypotheses H4.3 in Experiment 4. 
Assoc 
Hypo. 
Variable 
ID Type Definition Scale 
H4.3 
DV4.10 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 1000 * (number of true positive answers / (number of group members * time)) 
R
at
io
 
DV4.11 1000 * (number of true negative answers / (number of group members * time)) 
DV4.12 1000 * (number of false positive answers / (number of group members * time)) 
DV4.13 1000 * (number of false negative answers / (number of group members * time)) 
 
 Hypothesis H4: Self-Reported Confidence. For self-reported confidence, we adopted the 
metric from Experiment 3 (see Section 10.7.1) and applied the TAM3 and TTF items. As 
in Experiment 2, a questionnaire with these items was filled out by each participant, rather 
than by the group as a whole. The specific metrics used for hypothesis H4 in Experiment 
4 are summarized in Table 10-9.  
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Table 10-9 Specific Metrics for Hypotheses H4.4 in Experiment 4. 
Assoc 
Hypo. 
Variable 
ID Type Definition Scale 
H4.4 
DV4.14 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
relative preference with regard to “Perceived Usefulness” 
R
at
io
 
DV4.15 relative preference with regard to “Self-Efficacy” 
DV4.16 relative preference with regard to “Result Demonstrability” 
DV4.17 relative preference with regard to “The Right Data” 
DV4.18 relative preference with regard to “Meaning” 
DV4.19 relative preference with regard to “Presentation” 
DV4.20 relative preference with regard to “Training” 
DV4.21 relative preference with regard to “Confusion” 
 Participants 
The participants for Experiment 4 were recruited from an undergraduate software quality as-
surance course instructed by the author at the Oswego State University in fall 2015. The course 
covered a wide range of quality assurance techniques, such as verification strategies, code-
based testing, and static quality assurance. The lecture of that course has been extended to cover 
Fagan inspections in detail before the experiment sessions took place. During that time, a de-
partment colleague offered to recruit participants from her graduate level human factors course 
for the experiment as well. User requirements validation and usability inspections were part of 
the curriculum in her course. Participation in the experiment would thus offer immediate benefit 
for the students. Hence another inspection session was conducted for the human factors course.  
A total of two inspection sessions took place. One with participants recruited from the soft-
ware quality course (called Session 1), and one with participating students from the human 
factors course (called Session 2). Before recruitment approval of the institution’s research ethics 
board was obtained. In both cases, the inspection session was part of the curriculum. Participa-
tion in the inspection session was hence mandatory, albeit not strictly enforced. Students were 
informed that participation in data collection was voluntary. Moreover, students were free to 
decline surrendering data without penalty. In such a case, a secondary inspection session would 
have been scheduled for students opting out. No such opt-out request was received. 
In Session 1, a total of 24 undergraduate students participated. All students were enrolled 
in Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, or Computer Science degree programs. Albeit 
age and gender is not assumed to influence the performance in the inspection session, we rec-
orded 22 male participants, two female participants, aged between 19 and 34 years (μ = 22.45, 
σ = 4.228).  
In Session 2, a total of 27 students participated, eight were graduate students, eighteen un-
dergraduates, and one participant self-identified as a part time student working in the industry. 
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Graduate participants were exclusively enrolled in a Masters-level Human Computer Interac-
tion degree program. Undergraduate participants were provisionally accepted to the Human 
Computer Interaction degree program. The graduate level human factors course was co-listed 
as an upper division undergraduate psychology course. Therefore, the inspection session en-
compassed a considerable portion of undergraduate students enrolled in Psychology or Human 
Development undergraduate degree programs. In Session 2, six participants were male and the 
remainder was female. Participant’s age ranged between 19 and 53 years (μ = 26.82, σ = 9.548). 
 Experimental Procedure 
In both sessions, Experiment 4 began with a lecture on Fagan inspections as part of the regularly 
scheduled curriculum. Students were informed that in the next class meeting, a live inspection 
would be conducted in order to rehearse the principles of inspections in preparation for the 
exam, similarly to Experiment 2. Students were furthermore informed that data collection 
would take place to serve a research purpose. Mandatory participation in the inspection was 
stressed, but it was made clear that participation in the experiment was voluntary. Figure 10-4 
depicts the experimental procedure. 
 
Figure 10-4 Experimental Procedure for Experiment 4. 
Step 1: Introduction & Overview. In the class meeting after the lecture on Fagan inspections, 
an introductory session was administered, which featured a brief summary of the lecture and 
detailed further information about the validation objective. Participants were introduced into 
the unaltered ACC specification excerpt, received an overview over the principles of safety 
assessment and hazard analysis, and were given a hazard analysis worksheet. Like in Experi-
ment 2, participants were informed that the purpose of the inspection session was to judge 
whether or not conceptual mitigations incorporated into the ACC specification would render 
the system safe with respect to specific hazards. Volunteers for the role of the scribe were 
sought. The role of the moderator and the reader was assigned to the course instructors.  
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Step 2: Individual Preparation. The experimental material (also discussed during Step 1) was 
made available through an online campus system. Participants were asked to familiarize them-
selves with the diagrams until the next class meeting. During that time, interaction between 
participants was not controlled for, but participants were encouraged to take notes about ques-
tions or findings they encounter.  
Step 3: Welcome & Informed Consent. About four days later, the next class meetings in both 
courses commenced the actual inspection session with Step 3. After a brief welcome, partici-
pants were thanked for their participation. Informed consent was collected and the unaltered 
ACC specification was shown and explained one more time. Afterwards, the moderator asked 
if there were any questions for clarification, which were discussed in plenum.  
Step 4: Inspection of Hazard Mitigation, Adequacy Judgment, & Self-Report Rationale. 
The first conceptual mitigation was shown and read out loud by the moderator. Like in Exper-
iment 2, the moderator focused on the changed hazard-mitigating requirements in the diagram 
and compared the changes to the unaltered ACC specification excerpt. The participants were 
asked if they were of the opinion that the depicted hazard could still occur during operation and 
why. The moderator guided the discussion like in Experiment 2. When the discussion came to 
a natural end, the moderator summarized the discussion once again and asked for a vote among 
the inspectors, whether or not the system is now considered safe with respect to the depicted 
hazard. The moderator allowed the discussion to continue if this triggered further opinions. If 
summarization did not prompt additional discussion, the majority vote for the adequacy judg-
ment for that hazard was recorded by the scribe and the moderator ask the participants about 
their rationales for their decision. Like in Experiment 2, every rationale was recorded, where at 
least one participant agreed, no other participant objected to, or where after a brief discussion 
consensus about the rationale was reached. If there was no consensus, the majority vote was 
recorded.  
The order of the hazards was randomized. This included randomizing the order in which 
specific conceptual mitigation were shown and whether they would be presented as a Hazard 
Relation Diagram (treatment condition) or as an activity diagram with corresponding hazard 
analysis results (control condition). Randomization was done such that in both sessions, an 
equal number of adequate and inadequate as well as treatment stimuli and control stimuli were 
inspected. In both sessions, Step 4 continued until all conceptual mitigations were inspected or 
the allotted class time was up (55 minutes for Session 1 and 70 minutes for Session 2). Due to 
the participants’ other class obligations, this was a hard time limit.  
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Like in Experiment 2, experimenter bias was a considerable threat to validity, because the au-
thor of this dissertation acted as the moderator in both sessions. The same measures to mitigate 
this threat was applied as in Experiment 2. 
Step 5: Answer Post-Hoc Questionnaire & Demographics. Participants were given a paper-
based version of the demographic and post-hoc questionnaires that were used in Experiment 3. 
The questionnaires were answered by each participant individually. 
10.9. Data Preparation  
After the review experiments (i.e. Experiment 1 and Experiment 3) concluded, the data of all 
fully completed data sets were downloaded from the survey website, thereby discarding incom-
plete data sets (e.g., due to participants who discontinued participation). All data was transcoded 
into a data file for the statistical analysis tool SPSS and prepared for statistical analysis. Simi-
larly, the inspection protocol for all inspection sessions from Experiment 2 and Experiment 4 
was transferred into the SPSS data file as well. Since the order in which diagrams was random-
ized in the experiments, a common order of diagrams was established using a unique ID.  
For each adequacy judgment (i.e. yes/no indication concerning the adequacy of the concep-
tual mitigation in each diagram), it was recorded whether this was a correct or incorrect re-
sponses, thereby determining true positive, false positive, true negative, and false negative an-
swers for Experiment 1 and 3. 
Rationales were qualitatively analyzed and prepared for statistical analysis by means of 
constant comparison [Corbin and Strauss 2008]. The constant comparison technique entails 
reading every statement and categorizing the statements according to constant concepts men-
tioned in the statement. This was done by counting the number of statements in each rationale 
(i.e. when a participant in Experiments 1 and 3 used conjunctions such as “and” or “further-
more” or when multiple rationales were given by the inspectors in Experiments 2 and 4). If in 
Experiments 1 and 3, a rationale included phrases such as “don’t know,” “just guessed,” or 
other indications that the participant did not provide a proper reason (e.g., placeholders such as 
“…,” “bla,” or if the text field was simply left empty), this was seen as an invalid rationale and 
not counted. For all valid rationales, the rationales were categorized into exactly one of the 
categories, as outlined in Section 10.4: 
 Semantics: The rationale was based on the individuals’ understanding of the semantics of 
the subject matter, e.g., functionality of the system, etc. 
 Syntax: The rationale was based on the individuals’ understanding of the diagram notation, 
the diagram’s layout, etc. 
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 Trigger Condition: The rationale indicated that one or more trigger conditions are or are 
not rendered sufficiently unlikely to occur during operation in order to mitigate the hazard. 
 Safety Goal: The rationale indicated that the safety goal was or was not fulfilled or is 
semantically wrong. 
 Conceptual Mitigation: The rationale explained how and why the hazard-mitigating re-
quirements do or do not lead to resolution of the hazard.  
Rationales that could not be coded into either category were counted as invalid and discarded. 
Initial qualitative analysis and categorization was done by the author, where each rationale was 
categorized independently from all other rationales. Moreover, in order to reduce researcher 
bias, each rationale was categorized without knowledge about what condition (i.e. treatment or 
control) the rational in question belonged to (i.e. which group the participant was in Experiment 
1, by which inspection team the rational was given in Experiment 2, or whether the associated 
diagram was a Hazard Relation Diagram or an activity diagram in Experiments 3 and 4). This 
was done by temporarily removing the information pertaining to group membership and exper-
imental condition from the data file during rationale categorization and re-introducing it based 
on participant IDs and inspection protocols after qualitative analysis was complete. In addition, 
rationale categorization and transcoding was verified by a total of three independent researchers 
(two researchers at the University of Duisburg-Essen and one additional researcher at the State 
University of New York at Oswego) in order to identify erroneously coded data. Each deriva-
tion between the authors’ and the verifiers’ categorization was individually reviewed, bilater-
ally discussed, and rectified. In case of unresolvable conflicts, the rationale was discarded. This 
was the case only in very few rationales. In only five cases, there was conflicting categorizations 
were identified, all of which were easily resolved. Hence, due to the low number of conflicts, 
we refrained from computing interrater reliability. 
After data preparation was concluded, descriptive statistics and frequencies were computed 
using SPSS Version 22.0 [IBM SPSS 22] and the data file was manually reviewed in order to 
identify outliers and irregular responses. Irregular responses entailed all participant data sets 
which contained three or fewer valid rationales in total for all hazards, where participants an-
swered in patterns (e.g., alternating yes/no answers for each adequacy judgment or using always 
the same answer on the post-hoc questionnaire). Such irregular responses were discarded. In 
addition, since in Experiment 1, participants were able to run the experiment at home, control-
ling for participants “pausing” participation (e.g., by leaving the survey open in the browser 
and leaving the computer) or not fully concentrating on the experiment and doing other things 
while participating (see Section 10.5.3) was not possible. This behavior likely resulted in largely 
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skewed reaction times. Therefore, data sets from Experiment 1 and 3 were counted as irregular 
responses, if participants took less time than 5.5 minutes (since this was the minimal time 
needed to view each stimulus and questionnaire page once) or more than 40 minutes (about 
twice the mean of total response times, which is a standard exclusion criterion for multivariate 
statistics [Tabachnik and Fidell 2010]). These cases were excluded from all analyses as well. 
In total, thirteen participant data sets from both groups were excluded from Experiment 1, yield-
ing a total of 120 valid cases, with 59 participants in the treatment group and 61 participants in 
the control group. For Experiments 2, 3, and 4, the same criteria (which the exception of time 
limits) was used to review and clean the data file from outliers and irregular responses. No 
participant data set nor the inspection results met any of these criteria, so no data set was dis-
carded from the batch collected during these experiments.  
Since the original TAM3 and TTF items and questionnaire questions were adapted to suit 
the needs of these experiments, it was necessary to validate questionnaire cohesion. For this 
purpose, Cronbach’s α [Cronbach 1951] was computed on the post-hoc questionnaire items for 
the quality foci from Table 10-2. For further analysis, only those quality foci where cohesion 
was at least high (i.e., α > 0.7, which is the standard criterion, cf. [Cronbach 1951]) were re-
tained. The results are shown for each experiment in Table 10-10 with retained quality foci 
printed in bold. 
Table 10-10 Cronbach’s α for all quality foci from Table 10-2 and all experiments. 
TAM3 / TTF item Cronbach’s α 
DV ID Quality Focus Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
DV14.x Perceived Usefulness 0.906 0.819 0.930 0.927 
DV15.x Self-Efficacy 0.796 0.770 0.405 0.416 
DV16.x Result Demonstrability 0.793 0.783 0.774 0.809 
DV17.x The Right Data 0.629 0.516 0.439 0.311 
DV18.x Meaning 0.747 0.737 0.740 0.527 
DV19.x Presentation 0.502 0.515 0.928 0.840 
DV20.x Training 0.641 0.348 < 0.01 0.333 
DV21.x Confusion 0.736 0.784 0.786 0.547 
Overall α of retained quality foci 0.914 0.785 0.869 0.949 
10.10. Participant Experience Levels across Experiments 
The post-hoc questionnaire administered in all experiments pertained, among other things, to 
the participants’ levels of experience with automotive software engineering (since the case ex-
ample was from the automotive domain), requirements engineering in general, modeling using 
activity diagrams (since this is the foundation of Hazard Relation Diagrams), static require-
ments quality assurance using reviews or inspections (since this was the experimental task), 
dynamic quality assurance (i.e., testing and verification), and functional design and system ar-
chitecture (since experience in this area may increase participants ability to think abstractly 
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about diagrams in general). Like the questions pertaining to participant confidence (see Section 
10.4), each experience level question was measured on a 5-point-Likert scale [1: “no experi-
ence”; 2: “experience from academic homework”; 3: “experience from one or more academic 
projects”; 4: “experience from one industry project”; 5: “experience from multiple industry 
projects”]. We have deliberately chosen this scale, as these ordinates yield more objective cat-
egorizations than ordinates that, for instance, ask for “very little experience” to “very much 
experience.” Table 10-11 shows the levels of experience of participants in all four experiments. 
For each ordinate, Table 10-11 shows the total number as well as the relative amount of partic-
ipants. It is to note that there were participants who agreed to participate in the experiments, yet 
declined to provide demographic information. The total n for demographics in Experiment 1 is 
= 130, in Experiment 2, n = 40, in Experiment 3, n = 30, and in Experiment 4, n=25. 
Table 10-11 Relative Levels of Experience in Participants for all Experiments. 
Experience Level in… Exp. no experience academic 
homework 
academic 
projects 
industry 
project 
mult. industry 
projects 
Automotive Software En-
gineering 
1 62 47.3% 54 41.2% 11 8.4% 2 1.5% 2 1.5% 
2 23 57.5% 7 17.5% 4 10.0% 1 2.5% 3 7.5% 
3 23 76.7% 2 6.7% 3 10.0% 0 0.0% 2 6.7% 
4 20 80.0% 5 20.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Requirements Engineering 1 12 9.2% 69 52.7% 39 29.8% 8 6.1% 3 2.3% 
2 4 10.0% 17 42.5% 10 25.0% 3 7.5% 4 10.0% 
3 4 13.3% 11 36.7% 8 26.7% 3 10.0% 4 13.3% 
4 7 28.0% 9 36.0% 6 24.0% 1 4.0% 2 8.0% 
Modeling using Activity 
Diagrams 
1 20 15.3% 61 46.6% 39 29.8% 10 7.3% 1 0.8% 
2 1 2.5% 16 40.0% 13 32.5% 5 12.5% 3 7.5% 
3 4 13.3% 12 40.0% 10 33.3% 2 6.7% 2 6.7% 
4 4 16.0% 10 40.0% 9 36.0% 0 0.0% 2 8.0% 
Reviews and Inspections 1 45 34.4% 68 51.9% 14 10.7% 4 3.1% 0 0.0% 
2 17 42.5% 11 27.5% 6 15.0% 3 7.5% 1 2.5% 
3 8 26.7% 8 26.7% 7 23.3% 4 13.3% 3 10.0% 
4 6 24.0% 12 48.0% 5 20.0% 0 0.0% 2 8.0% 
Req. Test and Software 
Test 
1 38 29.0% 62 47.3% 25 19.1% 6 4.3% 0 0.0% 
2 8 20.0% 16 40.0% 9 22.5% 3 7.5% 2 5.0% 
3 8 26.7% 10 33.3% 5 16.7% 4 13.3% 3 10.0% 
4 10 40.0% 8 32.0% 4 16.0% 1 4.0% 2 8.0% 
Design and System Archi-
tecture 
1 46 35.1% 52 36.7% 27 20.6% 6 4.3% 0 0.0% 
2 5 12.5% 12 30.0% 11 27.5% 6 15.0% 4 10.0% 
3 6 20.0% 10 33.3% 8 26.7% 3 10.0% 3 10.0% 
4 9 36.0% 9 36.0% 4 16.0% 2 8.8% 1 4.0% 
 
In order increase comparability between the experimental results, the experience levels of the 
experimental populations ought to be homogenous. To investigate differences in experimental 
populations, we computed the mean experience level (μ) and standard deviations (σ) by sum-
ming up the numeric value of the ordinates. To test the significance of differences in means 
between groups we used independent group T-Tests [Corbin and Strauss 2008] for all experi-
ments. We deliberately computed two independent group T-Tests as opposed to one One-way 
ANOVA [Fisher 1918] in order to highlight the comparison between experiments using the 
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same validation technique. For each T-Test result, we calculated Cohen’s d [Cohen 1992] for 
statistical power and effect size.  
Table 10-12 summarizes the means (μ), standard deviations (σ), T-Test results (t, dF), sig-
nificance (p), effect size (d), and statistical power (η2) of participants’ levels of experience 
between Experiment 1 and 3. Significant T-Test results for higher means in Table 10-12 are 
printed in bold.  
Table 10-12 Means, Std. Dev., T-Test, and Power for Participants’ Levels of Experience in Exp. 1 & 3. 
Experience Level in… Exp. 𝝁 𝝈 t dF p d 𝜼𝟐 
Automotive Software En-
gineering 
1 1.69 0.814 
-0.701 31.104 0.488 0.162 0.609 
3 1.53 1.137 
Requirements Engineering 
1 2.40 0.829 
1.426 32.265 0.163 0.315 0.563 
3 2.73 1.230 
Modeling using Activity 
Diagrams 
1 2.32 0.853 
1.041 38.838 0.304 0.221 0.541 
3 2.53 1.042 
Reviews and Inspections 
1 1.82 0.739 
2.870 33.366 0.007 0.669 0.716 
3 2.53 1.306 
Req. Test and Software 
Test 
1 1.99 0.818 
1.905 34.383 0.065 0.441 0.625 
3 2.47 1.306 
Design and System Archi-
tecture 
1 1.95 0.862 
2.632 35.874 0.012 0.586 0.638 
3 2.57 1.223 
 
The results depicted in Table 10-11 and Table 10-12 show that the participant populations in 
Experiment 1 and 3 are largely homogeneous. This is indicated by the fact that the majority of 
participants in both experiments claimed either no experience from the respective areas or ex-
perience from academic work (see Table 10-12). A notable exception is the claimed industrial 
experience (zero participants in Experiment 1; three participants in Experiment 3). These three 
individuals in Experiment 3 who claimed industrial experience were students, who had a side-
job in local software development companies. Overall, the only experience areas with signifi-
cant differences between experimental populations are “reviews and inspections” and “design 
and system architecture” (see Table 10-12). The assumption that this difference had little impact 
on the experimental results is supported by the fact that effect size and statistical power was 
medium (0.3 < d, η2 < 0.8) for both significant T-Test results in Table 10-12. In principle, 
independent samples T-Tests are sensitive to largely unequal n. The difference in population 
(nExperiment 1 = 130, nExperiment 2 = 30) size has thus likely exaggerated significance. 
Table 10-13 summarizes the means (μ), standard deviations (σ), T-Test results (t, dF), sig-
nificance (p), effect size (d), and statistical power (η2) of participants’ levels of experience be-
tween Experiment 2 and 4.  
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Table 10-13 Means, Std. Dev., T-Test, and Power for Participants’ Levels of Experience in Exp. 2 & 4. 
Experience Level in… Exp. 𝝁 𝝈 t dF p d 𝜼𝟐 
Automotive Software En-
gineering 
2 1.25 2.667 
0.116 41.882 0.908 0.026 0.052 
4 1.20 0.408 
Requirements Engineering 
2 2.05 2.791 
-0.460 56.791 0.647 0.107 0.069 
4 2.28 1.173 
Modeling using Activity 
Diagrams 
2 2.23 2.778 
-0.442 54.127 0.660 0.100 0.067 
4 2.44 1.044 
Reviews and Inspections 
2 1.40 2.639 
-1.703 56.153 0.094 0.397 0.335 
4 2.20 1.080 
Req. Test and Software 
Test 
2 1.78 2.713 
-0.618 58.429 0.539 0.143 0.085 
4 2.08 1.222 
Design and System Archi-
tecture 
2 2.20 2.848 
0.239 55.089 0.812 0.055 0.055 
4 2.08 1.115 
 
Table 10-11 and Table 10-13 show that the experimental populations in Experiment 2 and 4 
were homogenous. Like in Experiments 1 and 3, the majority of participants indicated no ex-
perience or experience from academic homework in the respective areas shown in Table 10-11. 
Independent group T-Test confirm homogeneity in experimental populations, as none of the 
by-group comparisons shown in Table 10-13 revealed significant results. Moreover, for all T-
Test results effect size and statistical power was small (0.3 < d, η2) or, in case of “reviews and 
inspections” approaching small (d = 0.397, η2 = 0.335, see Table 10-13).  
Overall, there is no statistically significant difference in experience levels between groups 
and experimental populations. The groups are therefore comparable.  
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11. Experimental Results 
In this chapter, the results of all four experiments are presented9. In order to improve compara-
bility of results for each hypotheses, we present the results ordered by hypotheses, rather than 
ordered by experiments. Using the data prepared according to Section 10.9 we  
1. tested for normal distribution of measurements; 
2. determined the mean difference between treatment and control groups using independent 
group T-Tests [Student 1908] for all dependent variables (in the following: DVs) from 
Table 10-3; and  
3. computed Cohen’s d [Cohen 1992] to calculate effect size and the achieved statistical 
power in the T-Tests 
for all hypothesis in which statistical hypothesis testing was possible. Since all hypotheses in 
Section 10.4 are two-tailed, the aim of T-Tests was to accept or reject the corresponding alter-
native hypotheses (i.e. there is no difference between groups). In accordance with common 
statistical practice [Tabachnik and Fidell 2010], this chapter we use the following symbols 
whenever referring to statistical tests: “μ” is used to refer to a variable’s mean, “σ” to refer to 
standard deviations, “t” and “dF” to refer to the results and degrees of freedom of a statistical 
test, “p” to denote the significance level, as well as “d” and “η2” to refer to effect size and 
statistical power, respectively. Moreover, we assume a strict p-level of 0.05 to consider a result 
significant and assume small (0.3 < d, η2), medium (0.3 ≤ d, η2 < 0.8), and large (0.8 ≤ d, η2) 
effect sizes and statistical power [Cohen 1992]. 
In Experiment 2 and 4, for some hypotheses, statistical hypothesis testing was not possible. 
This is due to the fact that in inspections, group responses were recorded, which do not produce 
a mean and no standard deviation. In these cases, comparative analyses were conducted on the 
group scores. 
In the following subsections 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and 11.4, we first state under which circum-
stance we accept results for each hypothesis as evidence in favor of Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
We then present the results from each experiment and, for each experiment, state if the hypoth-
esis was accepted.  
                                                 
9 The results of Experiments 1 and 3 have been previously reported in [Tenbergen et al. 2017]. 
11 – Experimental Results 
160 
11.1. Hypothesis H1: Rationale Objectivity 
We accept hypothesis H1 if participants more often mention contextual hazard information (i.e. 
“mitigation,“ DV3.x, “trigger conditions,” DV4.x, or “safety goal,” DV5.x) in their rationales 
than diagram properties (i.e. “semantics,” DV1.x or “syntax,” DV2.x) in the treatment condition 
and vice versa in the control condition. There must be a significant difference between treatment 
and control conditions in the combination of DV1.x and DV2.x (in the following H1.xa) and 
the treatment group has a lower mean for H1.xa. At the same time, there must be a significant 
difference between in the combination of DV3.x, DV4.x, and DV5.x (in the following H1.xb) 
and the treatment condition has a higher mean for H1.xb. 
 Experiment 1 
Table 11-1 summarizes means, standard deviations, T-Test, and power analysis results for all 
dependent variables pertaining to H1.1. Better performing groups with regard to the means in 
the dependent variables as well as significant T-Test results are printed in bold.  
Table 11-1 Means, Std. Deviations, T-Test, and Power for H1.1. 
Variable Group 𝝁 𝝈 t dF p d 𝜼𝟐 
DV1.1 
treatment 1.44 1.393 
-8.36 118 < 0.001 1.536 1.000 
control 4.79 2.751 
DV2.1 
treatment 0.29 0.720 
-0.71 118 0.481 0.123 0.172 
control 0.39 0.900 
DV3.1 
treatment 1.10 1.410 
2.614 118 0.10 0.477 0.860 
control 0.57 0.694 
DV4.1 
treatment 1.44 1.755 
1.239 118 0.218 0.223 0.355 
Control 1.07 1.559 
DV5.1 
treatment 5.37 2.304 
7.024 118 < 0.001 1.278 1.000 
Control 2.69 1.867 
H1.1a` 
treatment 1.73 1.799 
-8.13 118 < 0.001 1.488 1.000 
control 5.18 2.742 
H1.1b 
treatment 7.92 2.967 
7,059 118 < 0.001 1.288 1.000 
control 4.33 2.593 
 
The significant differences between treatment and control group for rationales pertaining to 
diagram properties (H1.1a) and contextual hazard information (H1.1b) show that the alternative 
hypothesis must be rejected and hypothesis H1.1 can be accepted.  
It is established that when using Hazard Relation Diagrams, adequacy judgments are more 
often based on contextual information about hazard. This is due to the fact that the mean for 
H1.1a was lower and the mean for H1.1b was higher in the treatment group than in the control 
group. In other words, whether or not the hazard was adequately mitigated is more likely to be 
judged based on objective information made available during hazard analyses, and less likely 
to be judged based on the subjective understanding of the diagram. Specifically, considering 
the effect sizes, Hazard Relation Diagram have a definitive positive impact mostly with regard 
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of conceptual mitigation (DV5.1) and completeness of trigger conditions (DV3.1). The effect 
of Hazard Relation Diagrams regarding the fulfillment of safety goals (DV4.1) is also positive, 
yet the effect is smaller. This indicates that from the concepts by which Hazard Relation Dia-
grams extend activity diagrams (see Section 5.1), the mitigation partition and trigger conditions 
are most effective to increase rationale objectivity. Since the purpose of the mitigation partitions 
is to highlight the affected hazard-mitigating requirements and since the purpose of trigger con-
ditions is to act as a validation reference for operational conditions to be rendered sufficiently 
unlikely such that the hazard is less likely to be triggered during operation, we conclude that 
Hazard Relation Diagrams successfully highlight dependencies between hazard-mitigating re-
quirements, hazards, their trigger conditions, and their safety goals and improve review results.  
 Experiment 2 
A summary of the total scores in rationales provided by the treatment group and the control 
group is given in Table 11-2. Better performing groups with regard to hypothesis H1.2 are 
printed in bold and percentages from the total rationales given by each group are provided for 
the combined variables H1.2a and H1.2b.  
Table 11-2 Rationales Categorization for each Inspected Conceptual Mitigation for H1.2. 
Variable Group 
Adequately Mitigated Inadequately Mitigated 
∑  Hazard 1 Hazard 2 Hazard 3 Hazard 4 Hazard 5 
DV1.2 
treatment 1 1 1 2 3 8 
control 2 0 3 4 4 13 
DV2.2 
treatment 1 0 0 0 1 2 
control 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DV3.2 
treatment 4 1 2 0 0 7 
control 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DV4.2 
treatment 1 2 2 2 1 8 
control 0 2 1 1 1 5 
DV5.2 
treatment 1 1 3 1 1 7 
control 1 1 1 0 0 3 
H1.2a 
treatment 2 1 1 2 4 10 31.25% 
control 2 0 3 4 4 13 61.9% 
H1.2b 
treatment 6 4 7 3 2 22 68.75% 
control 1 3 2 1 1 8 38.1% 
 
As can be seen, with the exception of Hazard 3, the treatment group provided less rationales 
mentioning diagram semantics for all conceptual mitigations. Furthermore, while the control 
group provided no rationales mentioning diagram syntax (DV2.2), the treatment group scored 
two such rationales. In total, the treatment group provided less rationales mentioning non-con-
textual information about the hazard than the control group (H1.2atreatment = 10, H1.2acontrol = 
13), which can be seen as evidence in favor of hypothesis H1.2. Similarly, while no rationale 
was provided by the control group mentioning trigger conditions (DV4.2), the treatment group 
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provided seven such rationales. Yet, none of these rationales were given for inadequate con-
ceptual mitigations (i.e. Hazard 4 and Hazard 5). For DV4.2, the treatment group uniformly 
provided more rationales mentioning the safety goal than controls did, scoring eight such ra-
tionales as opposed to five in the control group. Together with the larger number of rationales 
mentioning the conceptual mitigation in the treatment condition (DV5.2treatment = 8, DV5.2control 
= 5), this yielded a total number of 22 rationales mentioning contextual hazard information 
(H1.2b) for the treatment group and eight such rationales provided by the control group.  
Despite the lack of statistical hypothesis testing like in Experiment 1, the results concerning 
hypothesis H1.2 can be seen as indications in favor of the ability of Hazard Relation Diagrams 
to increase validation objectivity in Fagan inspections. Since the treatment group collectively 
based their judgment more often on contextual information about the hazard and the control 
group inversely based their collective judgment more often on diagram semantics and diagram 
syntax. This effect becomes even more apparent when considering the percentages: The treat-
ment group based 31.25% of their rationales on diagram semantics or diagram syntax and the 
majority of 68.75% on contextual information about the hazard. For the control condition, this 
relationship is approximately reversed. In conclusion, these results provide evidence that Haz-
ard Relation Diagrams succeed in focusing the inspectors’ rationales on the information uncov-
ered during hazard analyses, thereby increasing objectivity when inspecting hazard-mitigating 
requirements. 
 Experiment 3 
Table 11-3 summarizes means, standard deviations, T-Test, and power analysis results for all 
dependent variables pertaining to H1.3, with better performing conditions (with regard to the 
hypothesis) and significant T-Test results are printed in bold.  
Table 11-3 Means, Std. Deviations, T-Test, and Power for H1.3. 
Variable Condition 𝝁 𝝈 t dF p d 𝜼𝟐 
DV1.3 
treatment 1.52 1.087 
-5.151 29 < 0.001 1.010 0.978 
control 2.74 1.318 
DV2.3 
treatment 0.00 0.000 
-1.795 29 0.161 n/a n/a 
control 0.07 .267 
DV3.3 
treatment 0.74 0.944 
-2.359 29 0.009 0.660 0.761 
control 0.26 0.447 
DV4.3 
treatment 1.04 1.160 
3.275 29 0.005 0.580 0.677 
control 0.44 0.892 
DV5.3 
treatment 1.96 1.285 
2.249 29 0.063 0.386 0.403 
control 1.52 0.975 
H1.3a 
treatment 1.52 1.087 
-5.677 29 < 0.001 1.076 0.988 
control 2.81 1.302 
H1.3b 
treatment 3.74 1.723 
5.673 29 < 0.001 0.940 0.961 
control 2.22 1.502 
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Results show that the means in the treatment condition for DV1.3, DV2.3, and the combined 
variable H1.3a are lower than in the control condition, indicating that review rationales were 
less often based on diagram semantics and diagram syntax whenever participants used Hazard 
Relation Diagrams to review conceptual mitigations as opposed to activity diagrams and hazard 
analysis worksheets. A pairwise T-Test shows that these differences between treatment condi-
tion and control condition was significant for DV1.3, DV3.3, DV4.3, H1.3a, and H1.3b. For 
DV5.3, the differences in means approaches significance.  
The significant differences require hypothesis H1.3 to be accepted: there is a difference in 
rationales within participants when reviewing conceptual mitigations. Specifically, since in the 
treatment condition, more rationales were based on objective contextual information about the 
hazard, it is established that Hazard Relation Diagrams lead to adequacy judgements being 
based on contextual information about the hazard. This effect was large of very large especially 
with respect to diagram semantics and diagram syntax, where the treatment condition produced 
fewer such rationales, as well as trigger condition completeness and safety goal appropriateness. 
With regard to conceptual mitigation adequacy, the effect was less pronounced, but measurable. 
It can hence be concluded that integrating the contextual information about the hazard from the 
hazard analysis worksheets into activity diagrams, thereby creating Hazard Relation Diagrams 
is quite effective in focusing the reviewers’ judgements on hazard analyses results as opposed 
to non-safety related information.  
 Experiment 4 
Table 11-4 summarizes the total amount of rationales provided in the treatment condition and 
the control condition in both inspection sessions for each respective hazard. In contrast to Ex-
periment 2, the order of presented stimuli was randomized for each session. Table 11-4 there-
fore shows the number of rationales provided for each hazard stimulus, referred to by its unique 
ID that was assigned prior to experimental onset (see Section 10.1). Hazard 1, 2, and 8 were 
stimuli containing adequate conceptual mitigations, and Hazard 4 through 6 containing inade-
quate conceptual mitigations. Furthermore, Table 11-4 sums up the rationales given for each 
stimulus and provides the percentages from the total rationales given in each condition in both 
sessions for the combined variables H1.4a and H1.4b. Better performing conditions with regard 
to the hypothesis are printed in bold.  
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Table 11-4 Rationales Categorization for each Inspected Conceptual Mitigation for H1.4. 
Variable Session Condition 
Adequately Mitigated Inadequately Mitigated 
∑  Hazard 1 Hazard 2 Hazard 8 Hazard 4 Hazard 5 Hazard 6 
D1.4 
1 
treatment 0      0 
control  4   1  5 
2 
treatment 1     1 2 
control  2  4 4  10 
DV2.4 
1 
treatment 0      0 
control  0   0  0 
2 
treatment 0  0   0 0 
control  0  0 0  0 
DV3.4 
1 
treatment 0      0 
control  1   1  2 
2 
treatment 0  1   1 2 
control  0  0 0  0 
DV4.4 
1 
treatment 0      0 
control  0   0  0 
2 
treatment 1  1   0 2 
control  0  0 0  0 
DV5.4 
1 
treatment 2      2 
control  1   0  1 
2 
treatment 3  1   2 6 
control  0  1 1  2 
H1.4a 
treatment 1  0   1 2 14.28% 
control  6  4 5  15 78.95% 
H1.4b 
treatment 6  3   3 12 85.71% 
control  2  1 1  4 21.05% 
 
As can be seen, neither inspection session provided any rationales mentioning diagram syntax. 
Moreover, the total number of rationales mentioning diagram semantics was lower in the treat-
ment condition than it was in the control condition for both inspection sessions (DV1.4). In 
consequence, the number of rationales mentioning diagram properties (H1.4a) is lower in the 
treatment condition than in the control condition. Regarding rationales mentioning trigger con-
ditions (DV3.4), there is no clear superiority between conditions. While in Session 1, inspectors 
mentioned trigger conditions in two rationales in the control condition and zero in the treatment 
condition, the opposite was the case in Session 2. In Session 1, no rationale was provided men-
tioning safety goals in either condition (DV4.4), yet two such rationales were provided in the 
treatment condition in Session 2. For DV5.4, it can be seen from Table 11-4 that in both ses-
sions, there were more rationales provided mentioning the conceptual mitigation in the treat-
ment condition. Although in Session 1, there was only one more such rationale, there are three 
times as many rationales mentioning the conceptual mitigation in Session 2 in the treatment 
condition. In summary, the total number of rationales mentioning contextual information about 
the hazard (H1.4b) is considerably higher in the treatment condition with over 85% of all ra-
tionales provided belonging to that category. 
Even though the absence of a standard deviation rendered hypothesis testing impossible, 
the result discussed above can be seen in favor of Hazard Relation Diagrams for hypothesis 
H1.4: Hazard Relation Diagrams appear to increase validation objectivity in Fagan inspections. 
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In the treatment condition, considerably more rationales mentioned contextual information 
about the hazard, indicating a higher degree of objectivity when judging the adequacy of con-
ceptual mitigations. This effect was particularly pronounced with the conceptual mitigation: the 
majority of rationales in the treatment condition were provided for the conceptual mitigation, 
as opposed to trigger conditions or the safety goal. In summary, these results provide strong 
indications that Hazard Relation Diagrams foster adequacy judgements to be based on contex-
tual information about the hazard as opposed to diagram properties. 
11.2. Hypothesis H2: Effectiveness 
In order for Hazard Relation Diagrams to have a positive influence on reviews, the treatment 
condition should score more correct answers (DV6.x and DV7.x) and fewer incorrect answers 
(DV8.x and DV9.x). Therefore, we accept hypothesis H2, if there is a significant difference 
between DV6.x through DV9.x, the mean in the treatment condition is higher for DV6.x and 
DV7.x than in the control condition (i.e. treatment condition scored more correct answers), and 
the mean in the treatment condition is lower in DV8.x and DV9.x than in the control condition 
(i.e. treatment condition scored fewer wrong answers). 
 Experiment 1 
Table 11-5 summarizes means, standard deviations, T-Test, and power analysis results. Better 
performing groups are printed in bold. 
Table 11-5 Means, Std. Deviations, T-Test, and Power for H2.1. 
Variable Group 𝝁 𝝈 t dF p d 𝜼𝟐 
DV6.1 
treatment 3.03 1.299 
-1.23 118 0.222 0.226 0.362 
control 3.31 1.177 
DV7.1 
treatment 3.17 1.289 
-0.19 118 0.850 0.032 0.071 
control 3.21 1.226 
DV8.1 
treatment 1.93 1.298 
1.214 118 0.227 0.216 0.341 
control 1.66 1.196 
DV9.1 
treatment 1.78 1.260 
0.187 118 0.852 0.033 0.072 
control 1.74 1.196 
 
The control group scored more correct answers (DV6.1, DV7.1) and fewer wrong answers 
(DV8.1, DV9.1) than the treatment group. However, results from the T-Test indicate that none 
of the means in DV6.1 through DV9.1 were significant and effect sizes as well as statistical 
power was small for all tests except DV8.1. 
The lack of significance for all dependent variable pertaining to hypothesis H2 in Experi-
ment 1 shows that the alternative hypothesis must be accepted: There is no difference between 
groups with regard to the number of correctly or incorrectly identified adequate or inadequate 
11 – Experimental Results 
166 
conceptual mitigations between both groups. On the one hand, this means that using Hazard 
Relation Diagrams for reviews does not improve effectiveness. On the other hand, this also 
means that that the positive effect of Hazard Relation Diagrams on rationales is not achieved at 
the expense of reduced effectiveness, either.  
 Experiment 2 
Table 11-6 shows the adequacy judgments for each conceptual mitigation for both inspection 
groups. Each conceptual mitigation was either judged as adequately or as inadequately miti-
gated. Depending on whether this judgment was correct for the specific conceptual mitigation 
(Hazards 1, 2, and 3 were in fact adequately mitigated, whereas Hazards 4 and 5 were in fact 
inadequately mitigated), a mark was placed into the appropriate cells for DV6.2 through DV9.2. 
For example, the “X” for the treatment group in DV6.2 for Hazard 2 means that this was an 
adequate conceptual mitigation and it was correctly assessed as such by the treatment group, 
hence rendering a true positive response. For another example, the “X” for the control group in 
DV9.2 for Hazard 4 means that this was an in inadequate conceptual mitigation, which was 
incorrectly judged as adequate by the control group, hence rendering a false negative response. 
The rightmost column sums the number of marks per variable, better performing groups indi-
cated in bold. 
Table 11-6 Judgement Effectiveness for H2.2. 
Variable Group 
Adequately Mitigated Inadequately Mitigated 
∑  Hazard 1 Hazard 2 Hazard 3 Hazard 4 Hazard 5 
DV6.2 
treatment  X X   2 
control X X X   3 
DV7.2 
treatment     X 1 
control     X 1 
DV8.2 
treatment X     1 
control      0 
DV9.2 
treatment    X  1 
control    X  1 
 
Results show that both groups performed about equally, with a slight advantage for the control 
group: The control group managed to correctly assess all adequate conceptual mitigations, 
whereas the treatment group incorrectly judged Hazard 1 as inadequately mitigated, yielding 
one more false positive answer (and therefore, inversely, one less true positive answer). How-
ever, both treatment group and control group correctly judged one inadequate conceptual miti-
gation (Hazard 5) and missed the other (Hazard 4). Unfavorable for hypothesis H2.2, the control 
group performed better than the treatment group. This might be explained by diagram seman-
tics: The functional requirements for Hazard 1 contained a deliberate semantic mistake in the 
decision node (see Figure 2-1), which was noticed by both the treatment group and the control 
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group. However, the treatment group decided that this semantic mistake would render the entire 
ACC unfit for operation, regardless if it is safe or not. While the control group ascertained the 
same semantic mistake, they decided to continue under the assumption that this was an over-
sight during modeling and judged that it had no impact on safety. Similarly, both treatment and 
control group noticed a nonsense safety goal in Hazard 4 and decided that albeit the safety goal 
was semantically wrong, the conceptual mitigation is adequate (with regard to the safety goal), 
hence incorrectly arriving at the conclusion that the hazard was adequately mitigated. In con-
sequence, it can be concluded that using Hazard Relation Diagrams for inspections only mini-
mally impacts effectiveness.  
 Experiment 3 
Table 11-7 summarizes means, standard deviations, T-Test results, and power analysis results 
and depicts better performing conditions with respect to H2.3 and significant results in bold. 
Table 11-7 Means, Std. Deviations, T-Test, and Power for H2.3. 
Variable Condition 𝝁 𝝈 t dF p d 𝜼𝟐 
DV6.3 
treatment 0.70 0.318 
3.077 56 0.011 0.614 0.720 
control 0.51 0.325 
DV7.3 
treatment 0.70 0.282 
2.718 56 < 0.001 0.860 0.929 
control 0.43 0.359 
DV8.3 
treatment 0.30 0.318 
-3.112 56 0.011 1.547 0.999 
control 0.49 0.325 
DV9.3 
treatment 0.30 0.282 
-3.225 56 < 0.001 0.860 0.929 
control 0.57 0.359 
 
Results show that for adequately mitigated hazards (i.e. DV6.3 and DV8.3), participants cor-
rectly judged conceptual mitigations more often when using Hazard Relation Diagrams, while 
making incorrect judgments less often. This performance is superior to the control condition. 
The same relationship holds for inadequately mitigated hazards. Interestingly, participants av-
eraged at the same success and failure rate in the treatment condition, but were slightly more 
likely to make incorrect judgment in the control condition. T-Tests show significance for all 
these differences. Moreover, Cohen’s d shows large and very large effect size and power. 
These results provide compelling evidence for accepting hypothesis H2 in Experiment 3: 
there is a significant difference in effectiveness within participants between the treatment con-
dition and the control condition when reviewing conceptual mitigations and using Hazard Re-
lation Diagrams for review results in higher effectiveness. 
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 Experiment 4 
Table 11-8 summarizes the adequacy judgments for each unique conceptual mitigation for both 
conditions and both sessions. Like in Experiment 2 (see Section 11.2.2), an “X” in a respective 
field indicates an answer. For example, the “X” for Hazard 2 in the control condition for Session 
2 in DV9.4 means that Hazard 2 was adequately mitigated, but the inspectors in Session 2 con-
sidered it to be an inadequate conceptual mitigation, thereby rendering a false negative answer. 
The rightmost column sums up the total amount of answers per variable, condition, and session; 
better performing conditions are printed in bold.  
Table 11-8 Judgement Effectiveness for H2.4. 
Variable Session Condition 
Adequately Mitigated Inadequately Mitigated 
∑  Hazard 1 Hazard 2 Hazard 8 Hazard 4 Hazard 5 Hazard 6 
DV6.4 
1 
treatment X      1 
control       0 
2 
treatment X  X   X 3 
control       0 
DV7.4 
1 
treatment       0 
control     X  1 
2 
treatment       0 
control       0 
DV8.4 
1 
treatment       0 
control       0 
2 
treatment       0 
control     X  1 
DV9.4 
1 
treatment       0 
control  X     1 
2 
treatment       0 
control  X  X   2 
 
As can be seen, inspectors performed better across the board in the treatment condition: In both 
sessions, using Hazard Relation Diagrams to inspect conceptual mitigation adequacy lead to 
more correct answers (DV6.4 and DV7.4) than when using conventional activity diagrams and 
hazard analysis worksheets. Moreover, it is noteworthy, that the treatment condition, neither 
inspection session made a single mistake, leading to a total score of zero for both sessions in 
(DV8.4 and DV9.4). On the other hand, in the control condition, participants in Session 1 in-
correctly judged one hazard, while in Session 2, half the conceptual mitigations were misjudged 
in the control condition (i.e. three out of six inspected conceptual mitigations).  
Results show that both sessions performed about equally. However, due to the fact that in 
the treatment condition, neither inspection group made a single mistake, these results indicate 
that using Hazard Relation Diagrams to inspect conceptual mitigations leads to higher effec-
tiveness, which is evidence in support for hypothesis H2.4. These results are supported by the 
fact that in Session 2, half of the judgements were incorrect (i.e. false positives or false nega-
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tives). Albeit in Session 1, there was a higher amount of overall correct answers, it is conceiv-
able that using conventional activity diagrams and hazard analysis worksheets for untrained 
participants (considering that participants in Session 2 were recruited from a human factors 
class as opposed to a software quality class, see Section 10.8.2) results in adequacy judgment 
correctness to be determined by random chance. Based on these results, Hazard Relation Dia-
grams seem to have to have a positive impact on inspection effectiveness for untrained partici-
pants. 
11.3. Hypothesis H3: Efficiency 
We accept hypothesis H3, if the means of treatment condition are significantly lower than the 
means of the control condition in the response times (for Experiment 1 and 3) or the group 
effort (Experiment 2 and 4) for true positive answers (DV10.x), true negative answers 
(DV11.x), false positive answers (DV12.x), and false negative answers (DV13.x) as well as the 
overall efficiency (in the following H3.xtotal). 
 Experiment 1 
Table 11-9 summarizes the results pertaining to hypothesis H3.1. Superior group performance 
and significant T-Test results depicted using bold font. 
Table 11-9 Means, Std. Deviations, T-Test, and Power for H3.1. 
Variable Group 𝝁 𝝈 T dF p d 𝜼𝟐 
DV10.1 
treatment 248.17 157.124 
-1.92 116 0.05 0.353 0.646 
control 305.65 168.001 
DV11.1 
treatment 326.38 224.416 
-0.97 116 0.336 0.178 0.266 
control 373.48 298.171 
DV12.1 
treatment 176.36 163.282 
-0.66 116 0.508 0.123 0.172 
control 199.20 206.925 
DV13.1 
treatment 187.24 212.735 
-0.72 116 0.641 0.133 0.118 
control 214.93 203.705 
H3.1total 
treatment 938.16 418.790 
-1.89 116 0.281 0.348 0.635 
control 1093.27 470.493 
 
The mean response time for all dependent variables DV10.1 through DV11.3 was lower in the 
treatment group than in controls. This means the treatment group was able to correctly detect 
adequate (true positive answers, DV10.1) and inadequate (true negative answers, DV11.1) con-
ceptual mitigations more quickly than the control group. Furthermore, the treatment group had 
a lower response time for incorrect answers (DV12.1 and DV13.1). T-Tests only revealed dif-
ference in means for true positive answers (DV10.1). Post-hoc power analyses on the T-Test 
results revealed a medium effect size and statistical power for DV10.1 and H3.1total as well as 
a small effect size and low statistical power for all other variables.  
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In light of the absence of significance in the differences between the treatment and control 
groups for variable H3.1total, the hypothesis for H3 must be rejected for Experiment 1. In other 
words, there is no significant difference between the two groups with regard to the time needed 
to review hazard-mitigating requirements using Hazard Relation Diagrams. Nevertheless, there 
is a clear trend for Hazard Relation Diagrams to positively influence efficiency, given that the 
response times were consistently faster in the treatment group for all dependent variables. 
 Experiment 2 
Table 11-10 compares the efficiency of both groups for DV10.2, DV11.2, DV12.2, and 
DV13.2, with more efficient groups depicted in bold.  
Table 11-10. Judgement Efficiency for H3.2. 
Variable Group No. of participants Time No. of Answers Efficiency  
DV10.2 
treatment 15 
90 
2 1.481 
control 25 3 1.333 
DV11.2 
treatment 15 
90 
1 0.741 
control 25 1 0.444 
DV12.2 
treatment 15 
90 
1 0.741 
control 25 0 - 
DV13.2 
treatment 15 
90 
1 0.741 
control 25 1 0.444 
H3.2otal 
treatment 15 
90 
5 3.704 
control 25 5 2.222 
 
As can be seen, despite the treatment group having identified one true positive conceptual mit-
igation less than the control group (DV10.2), their efficiency remained superior due to the fact 
that the treatment group consisted of fifteen participants as compared to the 25 controls. In 
consequence, the efficiency for true negative and false negative answers (DV11.2 and DV13.2, 
respectively) is higher in the treatment condition than in the control condition as well. For false 
positive answers in DV12.2, no comparison can be made since control group gave no such 
response.  
Albeit these results are in favor of hypothesis H3.2 and thereby in favor of Hazard Relation 
Diagrams, it must be noted that these results are impacted the unequal group sizes: Since the 
group size could not be controlled for due to the self-selection process into treatment and control 
conditions, which was administratively necessary in order to avoid scheduling conflicts, the 
treatment group had less participants than in the control condition, thereby increasing efficiency 
in favor of Hazard Relation Diagrams. In a within-subjects design, such an issue would not 
have impacted the results, as the same number of participants would inspect treatment stimuli 
as well as control stimuli. Nevertheless, inspection efficiency using Hazard Relation Diagrams 
did not decrease as compared to activity diagrams.  
Hypothesis H3: Efficiency – 11.3 
171 
 Experiment 3 
Table 11-11 summarizes the results pertaining to hypothesis H3.3. Superior group performance 
is depicted using bold font.  
Table 11-11 Means, Std. Deviations, T-Test, and Power for H3.3. 
Variable Condition 𝝁 𝝈 t dF p d 𝜼𝟐 
DV10.3 
treatment 68.95 60.171 
-1.349 22 0.366 0.020 0.158 
control 78.56 30.871 
DV11.3 
treatment 89.55 54.360 
-0.870 18 0.349 0.277 0.203 
control 103.67 47.518 
DV12.3 
treatment 76.50 60.078 
1.043 13 0.406 0.242 0.148 
control 63.87 42.804 
DV13.3 
treatment 85.31 66.861 
0.188 15 0.781 0.103 0.085 
control 79.63 40.052 
H3.3total 
treatment 86.34 38.485 
0.497 28 0.374 0.156 0.140 
control 81.11 27.639 
 
As can be seen in Table 11-11, response times for correctly judged adequate (DV10.3) and 
inadequate (DV11.3) conceptual mitigations was faster in the treatment condition than in the 
control condition. However, response times in the control condition were faster than in the 
treatment condition for incorrectly judged conceptual mitigations, both adequate and inade-
quate (DV12.3 and DV13.3, respectively). Furthermore, the overall response time (H3.3total) 
was on average faster in the control condition as well. However, it can be seen, that response 
times only differed by five to fourteen seconds for all variables, indicating that the average time 
to review any stimulus was only marginally impacted by experimental condition or conceptual 
mitigation adequacy. This is supported by the relatively high standard deviations for all varia-
bles. In consequence, none of the pairwise T-Tests indicated any significance of the mean re-
sponse times for the variables. Furthermore, effect size and statistical power was low for all 
variables as well.  
Due the lack of significance in the difference of response times in both conditions for vari-
able H3.3total, we must reject hypothesis H3.3. In other words, there is no significant difference 
with regard to the time needed to review hazard-mitigating requirements using Hazard Relation 
Diagrams as opposed to conventional activity diagrams and hazard analysis worksheets. How-
ever, it is noteworthy that when using Hazard Relation Diagrams for review, participants were 
faster for all correct judgements (i.e. DV10.3 and DV11.3), but slower when they incorrectly 
judged a conceptual mitigation (i.e. DV12.3 and DV13.3).  
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 Experiment 4 
Table 11-12 compares the efficiency of both inspection sessions for both the treatment condi-
tion and the control condition for true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative 
adequacy judgments. More efficient conditions are depicted in bold.  
Table 11-12 Judgement Efficiency for H3.4. 
Variable Session Condition No. of participants Time No. of Answers Efficiency  
DV10.4 
1 
treatment 
24 50 
1 0.833 
control 0 - 
2 
treatment 
27 75 
3 1.481 
control 0 - 
DV11.4 
1 
treatment 
24 50 
0 - 
control 1 0.833 
2 
treatment 
27 75 
0 - 
control 0 - 
DV12.4 
1 
treatment 
24 50 
0 - 
control 0 - 
2 
treatment 
27 75 
0 - 
control 1 0.494 
DV13.4 
1 
treatment 
24 50 
0 - 
control 1 0.833 
2 
treatment 
27 75 
0 - 
control 2 0.988 
H3.4correct 
treatment 
25.5 62.5 
4 2.510 
control 1 0.627 
H3.4incorrect 
treatment 0 - 
control 4 2.510 
 
Due to the fact that the order of inspected conceptual mitigations was randomized, there was an 
unequal amount of control and treatment stimuli, and, for inspection Session 1, also an unequal 
amount of adequate and inadequate stimuli. Therefore, efficiency measurements did not yield 
a result for all combinations of sessions, condition, and conceptual mitigation adequacy. Nev-
ertheless, it can be seen that efficiency in the treatment condition ranges between 0.833 and 
1.481, while efficiency in the control condition has a lower range between 0.494 and 0.988 over 
all variables and inspection sessions. This observation especially holds for correct judgments 
(i.e., true positive and true negative answers, see DV10.4and DV11.4, respectively). As we 
have outlined in Section 11.2.4, neither inspection session has a false positive or false negative 
answer in the treatment condition. It was therefore not possible to compute the efficiency for 
DV12.4 and DV13.4 in the treatment condition, such that a comparison of efficiency between 
for incorrect judgements cannot be made. In consequence, a comparison of the efficiency for 
the combined variable H3.4incorrect can also not be made. However, it can be seen that with 
regard to correct judgements, higher efficiency was achieved in the treatment condition 
(H3.4correcttreatment = 2.510 and H3.4correctcontrol = 0.627).  
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Albeit efficiency for the combined variable H3.4correct is higher in the treatment condition 
than in the control condition, we hesitate to consider this evidence in favor of Hazard Relation 
Diagrams positively impacting inspection efficiency. Due to the within-subjects nature of Ex-
periment 4, group size and available time for the inspection sessions were not a factor that 
impacted different results. Nevertheless, we believe that the one sided effectiveness measure in 
hypothesis H2.4 (see Section 11.2.4) may have caused a ceiling effect [Wohlin et al. 2012] that 
skewed results such that a more detailed analysis of differences in efficiency became moot. 
Instead, these results can at best be seen as indications, not as evidence in favor of H3.4, but we 
cannot definitively accept nor reject this hypothesis.  
11.4. Hypothesis H4: Self-Reported Confidence 
In Experiment 1 and 2, we expected a difference between treatment condition and control con-
dition regarding the participant’s self-reported confidence in their own adequacy judgment 
when validating conceptual mitigations using Hazard Relation Diagrams for hypothesis H4. We 
assumed that Hazard Relation Diagrams increase review confidence and lead to a higher mean 
for the treatment condition in the quality foci with high post-Cronbach cohesion, i.e. DV14.x, 
DV15.x, DV16.x, DV18.x, and DV21.x. Moreover, we assumed the overall degree of confi-
dence (in the following H4.xtotal) is also higher in the treatment condition than in the control 
condition. 
In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, we measured self-reported confidence in Experiment 3 
and 4 by means of a semantic differential (see Section 10.7.1). Since every participant answered 
based on their personal preference, answers cannot be differentiated by means of groups or 
conditions, like in Experiments 1 and 2. Therefore, it was neither possible to run T-Tests nor 
power analyses on the results pertaining to hypothesis H4.x. Instead, we accept results as indi-
cations in favor of Hazard Relation Diagrams, if the retained quality foci 3 (see Table 10-10) 
as well as the overall variable H4.xtotal indicate tendencies towards the ordinate “5: true for 
Hazard Relation Diagrams.” We accept evidence in favor of activity diagrams and hazard anal-
ysis worksheets if these dependent variables indicate tendencies towards the ordinate “1: true 
for activity diagrams.“ 
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 Experiment 1 
Table 11-13 summarizes the results with higher rating groups and significant results printed in 
bold. 
Table 11-13 Means, Std. Deviations, T-Test, and Power for H4.1. 
Variable Group 𝝁 𝝈 t dF p d 𝜼𝟐 
DV14.1 
treatment 3.60 0.786 
0.944 130 0.347 0.151 0.217 
control 3.48 0.880 
DV15.1 
treatment 3.76 0.629 
2.001 130 0.047 0.323 0.580 
control 3.52 0.824 
DV16.1 
treatment 2.82 0.472 
2.001 130 0.552 0.322 0.577 
control 2.64 0.618 
DV18.1 
treatment 3.50 0.878 
2.228 130 0.027 0.356 0.651 
control 3.19 0.876 
DV21.1 
treatment 2.90 0.840 
-3.881 130 < 0.001 0.625 0.973 
control 3.49 1.039 
H4.1total 
treatment 3.41 0.491 
1.900 130 0.05 0.301 0.538 
control 3.25 0.588 
 
Results indicate that the means was higher in the treatment group for the quality foci “Perceived 
Usefulness,” (DV14.1) “Computer Self-Efficacy,” (DV15.1) “Results Demonstrability,” 
(DV16.1) and “Meaning” (DV18.1) while at the same time reporting less confusion (DV21.1). 
Moreover, the independent samples T-Test reveals that the differences in between-group means 
were significant for DV15.1, DV18.1, DV21.1, and the combined variable H4.1total, yet not 
significant for any other variable. The post-test power analysis revealed a medium effect size 
and very high statistical power for the significant difference in DV21.1. Medium effect size and 
statistical power became apparent for the other significant variables DV15.1, DV18.1, and 
H4.1total as well as for the non-significant variable DV16.1. A small effect size and low statis-
tical power was revealed for DV14.1.  
In light of these results, we can accept hypothesis H4 in Experiment 1: participants using 
Hazard Relation Diagrams to review hazard-mitigating requirements report higher subjective 
confidence compared with participants using conventional activity diagrams and hazard analy-
sis worksheets. 
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Table 11-14 summarizes means, standard deviations, T-Test, and power analysis results for 
hypotheses H4.2 with higher rating groups printed in bold. 
Table 11-14 Means, Std. Deviations, T-Test, and Power for H4.2. 
Variable Group 𝝁 𝝈 T dF p d 𝜼𝟐 
DV14.2 
treatment 3.83 0.595 
1.313 38 0.197 0.437 0.371 
control 3.55 0.696 
DV15.2 
treatment 3.97 0.452 
0.696 38 0.491 0.239 0.177 
control 3.81 0.708 
DV16.2 
treatment 2.97 0.339 
0.696 38 0.491 0.240 0.178 
control 2.86 0.531 
DV18.2 
treatment 3.63 0.694 
0.309 38 0.273 0.369 0.296 
control 3.36 0.784 
DV21.2 
treatment 3.23 0.753 
-0.985 38 0.331 0.332 0.259 
control 3.52 0.963 
H4.2total 
treatment 3.64 0.406 
1.212 38 0.233 0.400 0.330 
control 3.47 0.428 
 
A comparison of the means for these variables shows a higher mean in the treatment group than 
in the control group for DV14.2, DV15.2, DV16.2, DV18.2, and H4.2total and a lower mean 
DV21.2. Independent groups T-Tests did not indicate significance for these differences in either 
variable. The post-test power analysis revealed a medium effect size and medium statistical 
power for the differences in DV14.2 and H4.2total, and a medium effect size with low statistical 
power for DV21.2. The power analysis also indicated low effect sizes and statistical power for 
the remaining variables.  
Given the T-Test results, we must reject hypothesis H4.2 in favor of the alternative hypoth-
esis: There is no significant difference in self-reported confidence between participants using 
Hazard Relation Diagrams and participants using conventional activity diagrams and hazard 
analysis worksheets to inspect hazard-mitigating requirements. A possible explanation of the 
lack of significance may lie in the overall small number of participants for both groups and in 
the high sensitivity of Student’s T to unequal group sizes [Tabachnik and Fidell 2010]: Due to 
the fact that participants were sampled at convenience from a graduate class, the voluntary na-
ture of participation, and self-selection into treatment and control condition, equality of group 
sizes could not be controlled for, resulting in ntreatment = 15 and ncontrol = 25. Nevertheless, clear 
positive trend can be observed: Just like in Experiment 1, the participants in the treatment group 
reported higher perceived usefulness, self-efficacy, and result demonstrability, less confusion, 
and higher understandability of the information depicted in Hazard Relation Diagrams then 
control participants did for conventional activity diagrams and hazard analysis worksheets.  
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 Experiment 3 
Table 11-15 summarizes the means for each variable. In Figure 11-1, the frequencies of re-
sponses for each ordinate and each retained quality focus is shown. Darker bars indicate 
stronger preference for Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
Table 11-15 Means and Std. Deviations H4.3 
Variable 𝝁 𝝈 
DV14.3 2.79 1.11 
DV16.3 2.93 0.92 
DV18.3 2.54 1.11 
DV19.3 2.44 1.24 
DV21.3 3.41 0.89 
H4.3total 2.83 0.78 
 
 
Figure 11-1 Distributions over all Ordinates of the Retained Quality Foci for H4.3. 
As can be seen in Table 11-15, the means for “Perceived Usefulness,” “Result Demonstrabil-
ity,” “Meaning,” “Presentation,” and “Confusion“ (DV14.3, DV16.3, DV18.3, DV19.3, and 
DV21.3, respectively) are around the neutral ordinate of “3: indifference.“ It can also be seen 
that the standard deviation was for all variables around one full ordinate, indicating that the 
mean difference between participants was between the ordinate “4: tendentially true for Hazard 
Relation Diagrams” and the ordinate “2: tendentially true for activity diagrams”. Results also 
show that participants report a slight preference for activity diagrams with regard to the varia-
bles “Perceived Usefulness” (DV14.3), “Result Demonstrability” (DV16.3), “Meaning” 
(DV18.3), and “Presentation” (DV19.3), and reported slightly more confusion with Hazard Re-
lation Diagrams (DV21.3). With regard to the overall variable for self-reported subjective con-
fidence H4.3total, participants indicate a preference for activity diagrams and hazard analysis 
worksheets.  
The fact that the means for each variable were consistently around the neutral ordinate with 
a fairly large standard deviation suggest that we must reject hypothesis H4.3: there is no differ-
ence in subjective confidence within participants when using Hazard Relation Diagrams or 
when using conventional activity diagrams with hazard analysis worksheets to review concep-
tual mitigations. 
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Table 11-16 summarizes the means for each retained quality focus. For each ordinate, the re-
sponse frequency over both inspection sessions are shown in Figure 11-2, where darker bars 
indicate stronger preference for Hazard Relation Diagrams. 
Table 11-16 Means and Std. Deviations H4.4. 
Variable 𝝁 𝝈 
DV14.4 3.75 1.23 
DV16.4 3.54 1.08 
DV19.4 3.76 1.35 
H4.4total 3.65 1.13 
 
 
Figure 11-2 Distributions over all Ordinates of the Retained Quality Foci for H4.4. 
For this hypothesis, answers from the post-hoc questionnaire from both inspection sessions 
have been combined. After excluding invalid questionnaire responses (i.e. pattern-like answers, 
only single-ordinate answers, or blank answers, see Section 10.9), this yielded a total of 25 
completed questionnaires. Cronbach’s α was computed for all quality foci over the responses 
from valid questionnaires. Only three quality foci from Table 10-10 were retained for Experi-
ment 4. This was due to the fact that “Perceived Usefulness,” “Result Demonstrability,” and 
“Presentation” were the only three TAM3 and TTF items that had a high questionnaire cohe-
sion. From the means for the variables representing these quality foci, i.e. DV14.4, DV16.4, 
and DV19.4, respectively, are approaching, but do not reach the ordinate “4: tendentially true 
for Hazard Relation Diagrams.“ However, it can also be seen that the standard deviation for all 
variables was at least one full ordinate, indicating that the mean difference between participants 
was between the ordinates 2/3 and 4/5. These results show participants’ tendential preference 
for Hazard Relation Diagrams over conventional activity diagrams with hazard analysis work-
sheets when inspecting conceptual mitigations.  
Considering the fact that questionnaire responses are strongly approaching ordinate “4: ten-
dentially true for Hazard Relation Diagrams,” the results suggest that participants tendentially 
consider Hazard Relation Diagrams more useful during inspections than activity diagrams and 
hazard analysis worksheets and that participants’ inspection judgments were easier to demon-
strate and present using Hazard Relation Diagrams as well. This is also reflected in the com-
bined variable H4.4total, suggesting that participants felt subjectively more confident with their 
inspections when judging the adequacy of conceptual mitigations using Hazard Relation Dia-
grams. Yet, this is at best a tendential indication in favor of accepting hypothesis H4.4.  
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12. Discussion of the Results of the Empirical Evaluation  
In this chapter, we critically discuss the results of the empirical evaluation. In Section 10.1, 
several research questions were defined and in Section 10.4, hypotheses were defined to inves-
tigate these research questions. These hypotheses are summarized in Table 12-1. In the follow-
ing, the results with regard to these hypotheses are summarized. 
Table 12-1 Summary of Experimental Results, Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Hypothesis 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
Hypothesis Accepted 
Superior Performance of HRD/AD 
H1 
There is a difference in rationales between treatment con-
dition and control condition regarding adequacy judg-
ments when validating hazard-mitigating requirements. 
yes yes yes yes 
HRD HRD HRD HRD 
H2 
There is a difference in effectiveness between treatment 
condition and control condition when validating hazard-
mitigating requirements. 
no 
(no hypothesis 
testing) 
yes 
(no hypothesis 
testing) 
AD AD HRD HRD 
H3 
There is a difference in efficiency between treatment con-
dition and control condition when validating hazard-miti-
gating requirements. 
no 
(no hypothesis 
testing) 
no 
(no hypothesis 
testing) 
HRD HRD HRD HRD 
H4 
There is a difference in self-reported confidence between 
treatment condition and control condition when validating 
hazard-mitigating requirements. 
yes no 
(no hypothesis 
testing) 
(no hypothesis 
testing) 
HRD HRD AD HRD 
12.1. Hypothesis H1: Rationales Objectivity 
Hypothesis H1 aimed at investigating the impact on validation judgments by measuring differ-
ences in rationale. In all experiments, the treatment condition provided considerably more ra-
tionales mentioning contextual information about the hazard as opposed to diagram properties. 
In Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, these results are significant for all combined variables (see 
Sections 11.1.1 and 11.1.3, respectively). In particular, the modeling concepts “mitigation par-
tition” and “trigger condition” are the most pertinent to this effect, while there does not seem 
to be a significant effect on “safety goal” or “diagram syntax.” Yet, these results do not indicate 
whether or not this effect is due to the combination of modeling elements in Hazard Relation 
Diagrams or due to the mitigation partitions and trigger conditions alone. Further investigation 
is needed to ascertain whether this effect also holds when safety goals are not present in the 
diagram, i.e. whether or not surrounding the changed portions of the diagram with a dashed line 
is sufficient as long as trigger conditions are present. Nevertheless, these results suggest that 
the positive impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams on the rationales seems to be unaffected by 
the experience level of validators. Albeit experimental populations were roughly equivalent 
with regard to their levels of experience (see Section 10.10), repetition is necessary with, for 
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example, industry representatives. Nevertheless, it can be confidently concluded that Hazard 
Relation Diagrams improve the stakeholders’ ability to judge the adequacy of hazard-mitigating 
requirements based on the information from hazard analysis worksheets when validating haz-
ard-mitigating requirements.  
12.2. Hypothesis H2: Effectiveness 
Experiment 1 revealed negligibly better effectiveness in control participants during reviews, as 
they scored more correct answers while making fewer mistakes than the treatment group. How-
ever, these differences were insignificant and the measured effect was small in all instances 
(see Section 11.2.1). In Experiment 3, these results were reversed: when using Hazard Relation 
Diagrams for reviews, participants scored significantly more correct answers than in the control 
condition (see Section 11.2.3). These results can be explained by the experimental design: while 
in Experiment 1, participants were allowed to complete the experiment at home in an uncon-
trolled environment, we controlled the experimental conditions more strictly in Experiment 3 
by inviting participants to complete the experiment in a controlled environment during a class 
meeting. Considering the lack of significance in all variables, we can assume that the mode of 
experimentation between Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 caused participants in Experiment 1 
to be distracted, impacting their focus and motivation, and lead to equal effectiveness in be-
tween Hazard Relation Diagrams and activity diagrams Experiment 1. In light of this possibil-
ity, the significant results in Experiment 3 represent more compelling evidence in favor of Haz-
ard Relation Diagrams. Moreover, effect sizes were high or very high for all variables, which 
increases confidence in these results.  
In Experiment 2, effectiveness in both inspection sessions was about equal, however with a 
negligible advantage for the control groups due to the fact that the treatment groups in total had 
one more incorrect answer (see Section 11.2.2). Again, in Experiment 4, this effect was reversed 
and participants performed better in the treatment condition than in the control condition (see 
Section 11.2.4). In consequence, with regard to validation mode, we have evidence in favor and 
against Hazard Relation Diagrams to improve effectiveness in inspection sessions, albeit it is 
to note that evidence against Hazard Relation Diagrams lack significance in Experiment 1. 
12.3. Hypothesis H3: Efficiency  
Results regarding efficiency in Experiment 1 indicate that there is no significant difference be-
tween groups, albeit all response times were faster in the treatment group (see Section 11.3.1). 
Similar results were found in Experiment 3, where participants were faster when answering 
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correctly, but slower when answering incorrectly (see Section 11.3.3). These findings are in 
line with the results from Experiment 2 and 4, where the treatment condition outperformed the 
control condition in terms of efficiency in all cases (see Section 11.3.2 and Section 11.3.4, 
respectively). However, it must be noted that the efficiency in Experiment 2 was impacted by 
differences in group size between treatment group and control group, which may have resulted 
in better performance of the treatment group to a higher degree than the higher effectiveness in 
the control group could alleviate. Albeit in Experiment 4, differences in group size did not 
impact efficiency measures, the fact that in the treatment condition, not a single incorrect an-
swer was given may have resulted in a ceiling effect. Considering the lack of significance for 
Experiment 1 and 3 and due to the impact on group size and effectiveness metrics in Experi-
ments 2 and 4, we must to conclude that there is no significant difference when validating haz-
ard mitigating using Hazard Relation Diagrams. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that in all 
experiments, albeit not statistically significant, an improvement in efficiency using Hazard Re-
lation Diagrams became apparent. 
12.4. Hypothesis H4: Self-Reported Confidence  
The results of the post-hoc questionnaire from Experiment 1 show that the treatment group 
rated their confidence during reviews consistently higher than the control group, revealing an 
overall significant effect. In particular, participants in the treatment condition rated their ability 
to justify adequacy judgements and understand the modeling concepts contained in the dia-
grammatic representation significantly higher than controls and self-reported significantly less 
confusion about the review task than control participants (see Section 11.4.1). Results from 
individual participant answers on the same questionnaire in Experiment 2 indicate similar re-
sults, with treatment participants self-reporting consistently higher confidence for all quality 
foci than control participants (see Section 11.4.2). Results from Experiment 4 are in line with 
these findings: participants reported a preference towards Hazard Relation Diagrams when in-
specting conceptual mitigations and perceived Hazard Relation Diagrams to be more useful and 
presentable and preferred demonstrability of inspection results using Hazard Relation Diagrams 
over conventional activity diagrams (see Section 11.4.4). Contrastingly, however, questionnaire 
results from Experiment 3 did not reveal such a strong effect. Instead, participants reported a 
slight preference for conventional activity diagrams (see Section 11.4.3). These results are sur-
prising, as participants’ self-reported lower confidence using Hazard Relation Diagrams for 
reviews contrasts with the results pertaining to rationales, effectiveness, and efficiency in Ex-
periment 3 (see Sections 11.1.3, 11.2.3, and 11.3.3). This could be explained with the fact that 
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activity diagrams were a more recent topic in the course from which participants were recruited. 
The topic of activity diagrams was recently completed in the course just before Experiment 3 
was conducted, such that participants preferred more familiar diagrammatic representations. In 
Experiment 1, activity diagrams were a topic earlier in the semester, and in Experiment 2 and 
4, activity diagrams were introduced for the purpose of the experiment. Yet, the current exper-
imental investigation nor the participants’ self-reported levels of experience (which were com-
parable between all experiments, see Section 10.10) do not conclusively support such conjec-
ture. The results from Experiment 3 notwithstanding, Experiment 1, 2, and 4 show a positive 
influence on participants’ self-reported subjective confidence for validation at large when Haz-
ard Relation Diagrams to validate the adequacy of conceptual mitigations, regardless of partic-
ipant demographics. 
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13. Threats to Validity 
Albeit utmost care was taken to design the experiments, several threats to validity remain. These 
are discussed in the order suggested by [Wohlin et al. 2012] in the following. 
Internal Validity 
One issue for the study at hand is the suitability of the between-subjects design and the experi-
mental procedure. To gain confidence in the design and experimental set-up in general, we 
conducted a pilot test (reported in [Tenbergen et al. 2015]) that lead to several improvements 
of the study. Another issue which may impair the internal validity is that participants were 
conveniently sampled from undergraduate and graduate university courses and had limited ex-
perience in the subject matter. “Conveniently sampled” in this sense means that students were 
recruited from courses where the authors had easiest access to and where students could be 
motivated to participate the easiest. Albeit the use of undergraduate students in Experiment 1 
in this sense is somewhat controversial [Carver et al. 2003], we adhered to the best practices in 
this matter [Hart et al. 2000; Carver et al. 2008] to reduce this threat, while at the same time 
served to motivate students. This included integrating the experiments as a learning opportunity 
into the courses from which were sampled, allowing for student feedback on the effectiveness 
of experiments to facilitate learning, allowing for student introspection about the post-experi-
mental learning progress post, and providing a detailed debriefing concerning the purpose of 
the study, including sharing preliminary data with participants to foster learning. Moreover, 
Experiments 2 and 4 were conducted using graduate student participants, which have previously 
been reported to be comparable to practitioners in regard to introspective measures (such as 
statement objectivity, response time, or self-reported metrics, see [Sjøberg et al. 2005] for an 
overview).  
Another issue that impacts the internal validity of the empirical evaluation is the difference 
in the mode of experimentation between Experiment 1 and Experiment 3. In Experiment 1, 
students completed the experiment at home, in an uncontrolled setting, while in Experiment 3, 
students participated in the experiment in a class meeting. In consequence, there is the possibil-
ity that participants in Experiment 1 were distracted, did not entirely focus on participation, and 
may have had a lower level of motivation than in Experiment 3. This may have impacted their 
performance and skewed results. We accounted for this possibility during data preparation (see 
Section 10.9) and strictly excluded potentially skewed results. Furthermore, we took a very 
conservative approach to present and discuss the results in Chapter 11 in light of differences in 
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mean, significance, and statistical power. Nevertheless, a remaining influence of the uncon-
trolled factors in Experiment 1 as a threat to internal validity must be acknowledged. In fact, 
this issue was one of the key motivators for us to conduct Experiments 3. 
Language ability may also have had a small influence on the results of Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2, as the experimental stimuli were in English, but participants were mainly Ger-
man speaking. However, we are confident that this impact is negligible due to the generally 
high proficiency of German university students in written and spoken English. Nevertheless, 
we combatted this threat by allowing for questions pertaining to technical terminology used in 
the experimental stimuli during the briefing session. 
Construct Validity 
The experimental material must be suitable to measure the desired effect. Errors or bias within 
the material must not influence the experimental results. In our experiments, we placed partic-
ular emphasis on the development of the experimental stimuli. To avoid bias, we specifically 
used a case example which is intuitively understandable whilst maintaining some degree of 
realism. We used the findings from the pilot test to improve the experimental material and the 
pre-experimental briefing. Participants were trained not only in the case example and in the 
intended review procedure, but also in safety engineering and in the syntax and semantics of 
Hazard Relation Diagrams, activity diagrams, and Functional Hazard Analysis. The same train-
ing material was used in both experiments. Moreover, through industry cooperation and pilot 
testing, we iteratively improved the experimental material, metrics, and questionnaires until 
they fit for experimentation in both conditions. 
In addition, the mode of testing may have impaired the experimental results. While in Ex-
periment 2, participation took place during a class meeting, scheduling conflicts prevented con-
trolled participation conditions in Experiment 1. To combat this issue, we took great care in 
identifying irregular responses, by rigorously excluding incomplete participant datasets, data 
sets with pattern answers, or data sets showing skewed response times, etc. This resulted in the 
exclusion of several data sets as outlined in Section 10.9. 
Conclusion Validity 
Confirmation bias and low statistical power may impair conclusions drawn from results. To 
avoid confirmation bias, we have only accepted hypotheses based on a strict significance level 
of 0.05. We have taken a conservative approach in discussing results and aimed to illustrate 
tendencies that are in favor of and against Hazard Relation Diagrams. We have conducted post-
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hoc power analyses on all T-Test results and have reported on effect sizes and power in order 
to increase credibility in analysis results. Due to the possible impact on internal and construct 
validity of Experiment 1 (see above), we furthermore conducted Experiment 2, 3, and 4 in order 
to minimize the impact on the “take-home” nature of Experiment 1 on the experimental results 
and in order to investigate the impact on reviews rigorously in thorough detail. We furthermore 
designed two empirical experiments investigating the impact on validation at large by means of 
two different validation techniques (i.e. reviews and inspections) and have conservatively ana-
lyzed the impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams on both techniques and have carefully drawn 
conclusions for validation at large. Findings from Experiment 2 in part confirm findings from 
Experiment 1, thereby increasing confidence in experimental results. In general, confirmatory, 
but also contrasting results were highlighted, thereby increasing confidence in the findings.  
In addition, the results in both experiments may have been impacted by the participants’ 
levels of experience. We have reported on a detailed comparison of the differences in experi-
ence (Section 10.10) and have discussed the possible impact of experience on the findings 
(Chapter 12). We have found little differences between the experimental populations, which 
presumably had little impact on the results.  
Considering the conservative approach and strict criteria in accepting evidence in favor of 
Hazard Relation Diagrams, and considering rigorous experimental design and discussion of 
findings, we have confidence in our results. Nevertheless, the results from both experiments 
warrant further investigation into the impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams, particularly with 
regard to effectiveness, subjective confidence, and more experienced participants (e.g., industry 
practitioners).  
External Validity 
Another relevant concern is how the results generalize to circumstances beyond the scope of 
the study at hand, i.e. if the effects found in this study hold for reviews of any hazards in any 
project. To ensure external validity, we used an industrial case example developed by industry 
partners as the basis for the experimental material. The experimental material was rigorously 
reviewed and quality assured. In addition, already during the development of Hazard Relation 
Diagrams, industrial practice of validating requirements by means of reviews and inspections 
was discussed intensively with industrial partners. The experimental procedures were hence 
developed to reflect industrial practice. Yet, since the industrial case example was reduced in 
complexity to fit this study’s scope, generalizability with real-world examples may have been 
lost. It must hence be noted that the experimental material reflects a realistic example, not a real 
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example. This means that the example used in the empirical evaluation is realistic in the sense 
that it meets industrial challenges and reflects industrial practice, however is not a real example 
taken directly from industrial practice.  
Student Participant Representativity 
The typical arguments regarding the employment of students in experimental evaluations can 
be brought forward [Carver et al. 2003], i.e. mainly hat students may not be representative for 
industry experts and that the low experience level for undergraduate students from Experiment 
1 and 3 may have impacted the results. Since the experimental design in all experiments bal-
anced participants across groups and conditions to similar experience levels (see Section 10.10) 
and did not draw upon experience (with the exception of the material covered during pre-ex-
perimental training), we believe that the experimental designs in general alleviates this issue to 
some degree. Nevertheless, a repetition of these experiments with practitioners is desirable. 
Researcher Bias 
The qualitative analysis regarding the rationale categorization gives rise to the possibility of 
researcher bias during coding of the rationale statements. This is a serious issue that we took 
great care to avoid. For this purpose, the qualitative analysis was conducted as objectively as 
possible: We have removed group membership information from the data set while coding ra-
tionale statements in order to remove any possibility to influence categorization and categori-
zation was verified by a total of three researchers from two different institutions. This should 
reduce the influence of researcher bias on categorization. In addition, categorization was veri-
fied by three independent researchers. Yet, due to the nature of the quality assurance process of 
the qualitative data categorizations (see Section 10.9), we were unable to compute interrater 
reliability, which is an acknowledgeable threat to validity. Furthermore, the fact that one of the 
experimenters also took on the role of moderator and reader in the inspection sessions, might 
have introduced some bias during execution of Experiments 2 and 4. Again, we took special 
care to avoid bias by asking an individual with no interest in the outcome of the study to act as 
the scribe as well as a control instance against bias during the inspection sessions. Because of 
this, we have taken a very conservative approach to data preparation and analysis, adhered to a 
strict protocol, which was reviewed by academic partners. Potentially biased results in both 
experiments have been rigorously reviewed, rectified, or discarded, where necessary. We are 
therefore confident that we took sufficient measures to minimize bias. 
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14. Contribution, Limitations, and Future Work 
In this chapter, we discuss the work undertaken in this dissertation. Section 14.1 summarizes 
the contributions this work presents. Section 14.2 discusses the limitations of the solution ap-
proach. Finally, Section 14.3 gives an outlook onto future work. 
14.1. Contribution of this Dissertation 
In Section 1.4, we have outlined the goal of this dissertation to support stakeholders in the 
validation of hazard-mitigating requirements through an integrated diagrammatic representa-
tion which visualizes the dependencies between hazard-mitigating requirements, hazards, the 
hazard’s trigger conditions, and the hazard’s safety goal. Throughout this dissertation, we have 
discussed Hazard Relation Diagrams as a fulfillment of this goal. In order to realize Hazard 
Relation Diagrams as a solution approach to the goal of this dissertation from Section 1.4, we 
have proposed a number solution components in Section 1.5 These are summarized in the fol-
lowing. 
Modeling Concepts of Hazard Relation Diagrams 
In this dissertation, we have proposed the modeling concepts of Hazard Relation Diagrams 
(Chapter 5), which visualize the dependencies between hazard-mitigating requirements and 
hazard analysis results (Section 5.1). These modeling concepts have been ontologically inte-
grated with UML activity diagrams (Section 5.2). Moreover, a visual notation in accordance 
with [Moody 2009] has been defined (Section 5.3). We presented a detailed discussion of non-
trivial n:m relationships between hazards, conceptual mitigations, and hazard-mitigating re-
quirements distributed across several UML activity diagrams. The discussion showed how Haz-
ard Relation Diagrams can be used to visualize such relationships (see Section 5.4). Based on 
the ontological foundations, well-formedness rules were defined to support the creation of Haz-
ard Relation Diagrams (Section 5.5). 
Formal Approach to Create Hazard Relation Diagrams 
We presented an approach to create Hazard Relation Diagrams in Chapter 6. We proposed for-
malizations of Hazard Relation Diagrams, functional requirements, hazard analysis worksheets, 
and mitigation templates (Section 6.2). We presented OMG Query/View/Transformation 
scripts based on the formalized artifacts, which create Hazard Relation Diagrams in two steps: 
first, UML activity diagrams containing hazard-mitigating requirements are created based on 
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activity diagrams containing functional requirements and based on transformation steps speci-
fied in mitigation templates. Second, Hazard Relation Diagrams are created by appending haz-
ard analysis results to the activity diagrams containing hazard-mitigating requirements from the 
previous step (Section 6.3). We have illustrated how the well-formedness rules for Hazard Re-
lation Diagram are be enforced by the scripts (Section 6.4). 
Tool Support for Hazard Relation Diagrams 
This dissertation furthermore demonstrated and discussed tool support for Hazard Relation Di-
agrams (Chapter 7). Tool support for Hazard Relation Diagrams consists of two components: a 
profile for the UML modeling tool Enterprise Architect (Section 7.2) and a tool prototype for 
Eclipse (Section 7.3). Tool support allows modeling and creating Hazard Relation Diagrams.  
Empirical Evaluation of Hazard Relation Diagrams 
We have presented the design and results of a detailed empirical evaluation of Hazard Relation 
Diagrams (Part III). The purpose of the empirical evaluation was to assess the impact of Hazard 
Relation Diagrams on the challenges from Section 1.2. Three research questions have been 
defined in accordance with these challenges. Four hypotheses have been defined to investigate 
the research questions. A total of four experiments using reviews and inspections as well as 
between-subjects as well as within-subjects designs were conducted to investigate all hypothe-
ses. The results of the empirical investigation concerning the impact of Hazard Relation Dia-
grams on effectiveness were inconclusive (Hypothesis H3). However, the experiments show 
that Hazard Relation Diagrams significantly improve the rational objectivity when validating 
the adequacy of hazard-mitigating requirements (Hypothesis H1). Empirical results also show 
that using Hazard Relation Diagrams during validation leads to improved efficiency (Hypoth-
esis H3). Furthermore, there are indications that using Hazard Relation Diagrams improve val-
idators’ confidence in their judgements (Hypothesis H4).  
14.2. Discussion and Limitations 
In this section, the contribution of this dissertation are critically evaluated.  
Manual Specification of Hazard-Mitigating Requirements in Mitigation Templates 
Albeit Hazard Relation Diagrams can be automatically created, the creation process requires 
manual specification of hazard-inducing requirements using mitigation templates. From a usa-
bility perspective, this manual specification might be tedious for developers and they might 
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prefer the manual creation of Hazard Relation Diagrams. Manual creation of Hazard Relation 
Diagrams still yields the advantages outlined above. However, additional effort to verify that 
the resulting Hazard Relation Diagrams enforce the well-formedness rules is required.  
Sequential Validation of Hazards’ Conceptual Mitigations 
The use of Hazard Relation Diagrams might be constraint by the assumption that one hazard is 
validated at the time. This kind of validation might be quite time consuming [Flynn and 
Warhurst 1994], especially when there are large amounts of hazard-mitigating requirements 
and large amounts of hazards. However, safety standards (e.g., [ARP4761 1996] or [ISO26262 
2011]) require that each conceptual mitigation has to be validated with regard to each hazard it 
is meant to mitigate. Thus, every hazard must be meticulously identified, documented, and mit-
igated, and there must be no doubt about the adequacy of the conceptual hazard mitigations.  
However, the question remains if conceptual mitigation validation on a per-hazard basis is 
more or less efficient than bulk assessments of hazards. We did not validate this. Empirical 
evidence if individual hazards or bulk hazard validation using Hazard Relation Diagrams is 
more effective is an open issue.  
Limitations of the Tool Prototype 
The intention of the tool support was to show that Hazard Relation Diagrams can be created 
and visualized. This was illustrated in Chapter 7. Limitations of the tool prototype to create 
Hazard Relation Diagrams include graphical layouting of the created Hazard Relation Dia-
grams, execution order of transformation steps, and well-formedness of activity diagrams, as 
outlined in Chapter 8.  
14.3. Future Work 
The following related topics have been identified for continued and tangential work.  
Continued Empirical Investigation of the Impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams 
We have empirically evaluated the benefit of Hazard Relation Diagrams in reviews and inspec-
tions using within- and between-subjects designs. Our experiments were conducted with stu-
dents. Future work might conduct repetition studies of our empirical investigations involving 
experienced students and/or practitioners. Furthermore, an investigation into which contextual 
information about a hazard are most beneficial to get objective validation results might be fruit-
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ful. Moreover, investigations could focus on the upper limit in modeling elements and associa-
tions within a diagram that validators can be expected to be able to handle before the complexity 
of the visual representation outweighs the benefit of Hazard Relation Diagrams.  
Reduction of Subjectivity in Validation and Confidence in Safety Arguments 
The quality and objectivity of validation results largely depends on the involved stakeholders, 
their understanding of the relevant processes (see [Lisagor et al. 2010; Sun 2012]), their under-
standing of the system under development (see [Gacitua et al. 2009; Glinz and Fricker 2015]), 
and simply on the information available to them to make an informed judgment (see, e.g., 
[Flynn and Warhurst 1994; Sikora et al. 2011; Sikora et al. 2012]. Especially in early phases of 
development, there is thus a risk that those factors affect the confidence in the adequacy of 
conceptual mitigations, and thereby the overall confidence in the safety. Hazard Relation Dia-
grams provide an objective visualization of the dependencies between safety assessment arti-
facts and requirements engineering artifacts. While the positive impact of Hazard Relation Di-
agrams on validation has been established, future work might be concerned with investigating 
the impact of Hazard Relation Diagrams in improving the confidence in the safety argument of 
a system under development and their ability to improve the safety of the system.  
Improving the Tool Prototype to Create Hazard Relation Diagrams 
Obviously, the limitations of the tool prototype from Section 14.2 shall be the focus of future 
work. 
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